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ABSTRACT
Philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the question of reason and
rationality, as its central focus. From the perspective of the modern
metaphysical tradition, this focus has developed around the theme of
subjectivity in general, and the assumption of an ahistorical transcendental
subject in particular. The idea of reason was thus foundational for the
articulation and validation of the notions of truth and freedom. From the
perspective of modernity, reason has thus been the condition of the possibility
of enlightenment, freedom and moral progress.
The debate between Habermas and the representatives of postmodern thinking
represents the latest chapter regarding the question of reason, its limits, and its
possibilities. What makes this debate particularly challenging is that Habermas,
while he defends the idea of reason against its critique by the postmodernists,
is actually in agreement with them in their dismissal of the tradition of
metaphysical thinking.
In view of his defense of the idea of reason, however, Habermas has invariably
been accused of defending an outmoded and discredited form of philosophical
thinking, while his opponents have generally been hailed as progressive
thinkers who have succeeded in effecting a radical break with the conceptual
legacy of the metaphysical tradition.
In my dissertation I argue that the exact opposite position is the case, namely,
that it is Habermas, and not his postmodern opponents, who has effected a
radical break with metaphysical thinking. It is his ability to transform the idea of
reason, from a transcendental into a postmetaphysical concept, in terms of
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which the question of reason and rationality, and the related ideas of truth and
knowledge, are recast in fallibilistic terms, that, in my view, represents the
overcoming of metaphysics.
The postmodern turn, on the other hand, in view of its reluctance to consider the
question of reason from an alternative model of rationality, finds itself still
trapped within a form of transcendental thinking in which it seeks to enquire into
the (im)possibility of reason, in the absence of a transcendental subject.
In the final analysis, I argue that it is postmetaphysical rather than postmodern
thinking, that offers us a practical alternative to the problematic conception of
reason, bequeathed by the tradition of metaphysical thinking.
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ABSTRAK
Die fenomeen van die rede en die betekenis van rasionaliteit vorm tradisioneel
'n sentrale fokus van die filosofie. Vanuit die perspektief van die moderne
metafisiese tradisie het hierdie fokus ontwikkel rondom die tema van
subjektiwiteit in die algemeen, en die aanname van 'n a-historiese
transendentele subjek in die besonder. Die rede was dus fundamenteel vir die
artikulasie en legitimering van die konsepte van waarheid en vryheid. Vanuit die
perspektief van moderniteit was die rede dus die voorwaarde vir die
moontlikheid van verligting, vryheid, en morele vooruitgang.
Die debat tussen Habermas en die verteenwoordigers van postmoderne denke
verteenwoordig die mees onlangse hoofstuk van die verhaal van die vraag na
rede en rasionaliteit - die beperkings daarvan, asook die moontlikhede daarvan.
Hierdie debat bied besondere uitdagings omdat Habermas, terwyl hy die idee
van rede verdedig teen die kritiek van die postmoderniste, eintlik met hulle
saamstem vir sover hulle die tradisie van metafisiese denke verwerp.
In die lig van sy verdediging van die idee van rede, is Habermas egter
voortdurend daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n uitgediende en gediskrediteerde vorm
van filosofiese denke bly voorstaan, terwyl sy opponente in die algemeen
voorgehou is as progressiewe denkers wat suksesvol 'n radikale breuk gemaak
het met die konseptuele erfenis van die metafisiese tradisie.
In my dissertasie beweer ek dat die teenoorgestelde inderwaarheid die geval is,
naamlik dat dit Habermas, en nie sy postmoderne opponente nie, is wat hierdie
radikale breuk met metafisiese denke suksesvol uitgevoer het. Dit is sy verrnoe
om die idee van die rede te transformeer vanaf 'n transendentale na 'n post-
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metafisiese konsep, in terme waarvan die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit, en die
verwante idees van waarheid en kennis, omskep is in fallibilistiese beg rippe,
wat, soos ek aantoon, 'n (die!) suksesvolle transendering van die metafisika
bewerkstellig.
Die postmoderne wending, aan die ander kant, in die lig van die traagheid
daarvan om 'n alternatiewe en verruimde konsepsie van rasionaliteit te
ontwikkel, bly vasgevang in 'n vorm van transendentele denke waarin dit
probeer om ondersoek in te stel na die (on)moontlikheid van die rede ten
aansien van die afwesigheid van 'n transendentele subjek.
Uiteindelik beweer ek dat dit die post-metafisiese eerder as die postmoderne
denke is wat aan ons 'n praktiese alternatief bied vir die problematiese konsep
van die rede, soos ons dit qeerf het by die tradisie van metafisiese denke.
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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE DEBATE IN PERSPECTIVE
Over the past two decades, the work of JOrgen Habermas has emerged as one of
the most challenging and powerful interpretations of modern society. Habermas's
views on the question of modernity have evoked widespread reaction, ranging from
critical acclaim to outright condemnation by academics and thinkers from various
disciplines and backgrounds. Overthe years, Habermas has distinguished himself
as one of the most influential and controversial defenders of modernity, which he
basically construes as a normative philosophical framework for the evaluation and
critique of reason as an historical process, and a "project" worth defending
(Habermas 1981).
Since the 1980's, Habermas has been particularly productive in the development
of his own vision of modernity, which has found expression not only in the
publication of various articles and books, most notably the two-volume The Theory
of Communicative Action (1984, 1987 a), The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
(1987b), as well as Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays (1992a), but
also in the form of a "debate", the significance of which, I think, will continue to
challenge us for years to come.
I must, however, point out at the outset that, although I refer to Habermas's critical
engagement with the representatives of postmodern thinking as a "debate", it
should be noted that, with the exception of Richard Rorty (1996), no such thing
ever transpired, certainly not in a sense similar to any of his previous debates, such
as, for example, the "positivist dispute" with Karl Popper (during the early 1960's),
or the famous debate with Hans-Georg Gadamer during the late 1960's, following
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2the publication of the latter's Truth and Method. 1 Moreover, on the one occasion
when a formal meeting was arranged for Habermas to interact with the leading
French theorists, with a view to debating the status of contemporary French and
German philosophy, the much anticipated excitement turned into disappointment
for representatives and observers on both sides:
From the 20 to the 22nd of February, 1986, several of Germany's most
important philosophers met in Paris with a number of their equally
renowned French colleagues. Habermas attended the first day's debate,
but did not participate, forfeiting his role to Apel and Wellmer. Foucault's
death and Lyotard's last minute cancellation left Derrida as the chief
spokesman for the French side.
The meeting actually did take place. That, however, was the extent of its
success. Expectedly, it ran aground. The hoped-for dialogue between two
groups which have been unable to hear each other never materialized.
(Rochlitz 1985/86: 124-125.)
Another difficulty regarding the notion of a debate arises when one considers that
Habermas seems to confront the work of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and
Jean-Francois Lyotard strictly on his own terms. Unlike Habermas, these thinkers,
with the possible exception of Lyotard (1984), have never self-consciously made
the question of modernity the central focus of their work. Given the fact that no
formal debate has actually taken place, the question arises as to why
contemporary philosophers feel themselves almost obliged to take sides between
two modes of reflection which seem to have very little common ground, and which
seem to be diametrically opposed in terms of their basic orientation and respective
concerns; and those who do not take sides, are at least prepared to acknowledge
that philosophy, in the traditional sense, has been profoundly affected by the
thinking of these theorists.
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as in former times, has recently been radicalized into sloganistic pronouncements
of the "end of philosophy", without any clear indication of what exactly the "end"
means. It is precisely in view of the lack of clarity and the problematic nature
regarding this "end", that Habermas's engagement with the representatives of
postmodernity becomes relevant. Not only has he made a considerable
contribution towards an understanding of the complex nature of the problems that
have accompanied the historical development of the "project of modernity"; equally
important is his interpretation of modernity as an expression of reason.
It is the central focus on reason within the modernity problematic which establishes
a common philosophical framework, and which makes a "debate" between him and
the postmodernists not only possible, but absolutely imperative. It is in view of this
consideration that I have found it necessary to construe a debate between
Habermas and his postmodern opponents, one which focuses on the central
problematic of reason and rationality, and its significance for contemporary
philosophical thinking. Although many contemporary thinkers do question the
status and legitimacy of "reason" within modern society, they are often at a loss
when challenged to suggest meaningful alternatives, that is, alternatives that
originate within the normative framework of modernity which, as an historical
category, defines itself on the basis of its critical autonomy and independence from
all premodern structures of legitimacy and authority.
From the perspective of my dissertation, what makes Habermas's arguments
particularly challenging is his central thesis that a critique of modernity necessarily
implies a critique of reason, and a critique of reason (especially that which he
associates with postmodern thinking) implies a critique of modernity. While it is true
that the French theorists such as Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard, and a "post-
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stage in his philosophical critique of modernity), were not overly concerned with the
problem of modernity, there can be little doubt that all share a common interest in
the philosophical question of reason."
While Habermas has often been denounced as an out-and-out rationalist,
incapable of appreciating the subtle nuances as well as the radical nature of the
postmodern challenge, his opponents have invariably failed to recognize the
significance of his attempt to address their challenge from within the philosophical
discourse of modernity, in which the question of reason, its scope, its limits, its
conditions of possibility, has been the central focus. It is from the perspective of
this common theme, that I propose to proceed in my evaluation of the debate.
My main objective is to show that the postmodern challenge on its own provides
us with very little guidelines within which to continue the critique of reason in a
philosophically meaningful way, that is, one that allows for a more universal
approach, and which not only focuses on the problematic nature of the modern
conception of reason, defined in terms of a universal ahistorical (rational) subject,
but which can also account for the rational basis of its own critique. This does not
mean, however, that the postmodern aesthetically inspired challenge must
therefore be rejected out of hand for not being concerned with the question of
"truth. I am of the opinion that Habermas, in spite of his emphasis on "the rational",
is not completely insensitive to the tremendous value of an aestheticist critique that
seeks to disclose "the familiar" from a defamiliarized perspective (Habermas
1985: 199-203). It is indeed in keeping with the overall vision of his own project that
the "distortions of communication" be addressed from all available resources within
modernity, inciuding the aesthetic, which has paraded under various banners such
as "deconstruction" and "genealogy". As Dews (1999) argues:
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primarily concerned with evading assessment of their truth?Would it not be
more accurate to say they seek to perform the interpretative task which
Habermas himself goes on to describe as 'an illuminating furtherance of
lifeworld processes of achieving self-understanding, processes that are
related to totality'. This task, Habermas claims, is vital, because 'the
lifeworld must be defended against extreme alienation at the hands of the
objectivating, the moralizing, and the aestheticizing interventions of expert
cultures'....This dismissal of the currently predominant styles of philosophy
becomes even more surprising when we recall that Habermas himself has
stressed the 'multilingual' virtues of philosophy...in its role of mediator
between the laboratory, the courtroom, the museum and the lifeworld. For
what can these multiple languages be, if not precisely the ...genealogical
and deconstructive currents of twentieth century thought? What other
discourses are available which weave between validity dimensions,
reflecting upon the textures of the lifeworld as a whole, and thus
simultaneously disrupting and disconfirming them? (Dews 1999: 17.)
(Emphasis, Dews's.)
What the postmodernist has in common with Habermas is an attempt to
contextualize philosophical thinking from the point of view of its embeddeness
within the "larger" structures of language and power, which are in turn construed
as the a priori structural framework(s) for the (im)possibility of Reason. From this
perspective, Habermas (1987b:131) speaks of "the debsublimation of the spirit"
and the "disempowering of philosophy", a post-Hegelian movement which certainly
does anticipate the postmodern critique of reason.' What is lacking in the latter
critique, however, is a comprehensive analysis of the historical faces of reason
from a (normative) philosophical perspective, one that allows not only for a
meaningful diagnosis, but also for the possibility of resisting and (hopefully)
overcoming, in a concrete manner, what Habermas calls "the pathology of
modernity" (1992b:98).
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which until recently has been marred by needless misunderstanding and
miscommunication should, in my opinion, be revisited. Instead of casting the
debate as a battle between two irreconcilable (hostile) camps, I believe it would be
more fruitful to approach it in terms of its common scepticism regarding the legacy
of metaphysical thinking. I argue further that the aesthetically-inspired approach is
almost inevitable, given the narrowness of the postmodern understanding of
reason, thus accounting for its exclusive focus on the phenomenon of power within
modernity.
Instead of interpreting reason exclusively from the perspective of "power" (as is
invariably the case when reason is restricted to a scientific-technical conception),
it would be more useful to consider (as Habermas does) a postmetaphysical
redefinition of rationality, that is, one that accepts a fallibilistic context as its point
of departure, and in which its knowledge claims allow for a process of
argumentation aimed at consensus, determined by a discursive procedure, whose
rationality is to be determined by a norm of universal acceptability regarding the
claims advanced by its participants, engaged in a dialogical exchange of
problematic ideas. The underlying objective of this procedure is the possibility of
mutual understanding and agreement, based on an exchange of reasons to
validate claims that are, in principle, subject to redemption, rejection, revision and
confirmation, depending on the critical and rational integrity of the relevant
discursive process. In this way our notions of validity and truth are determined by
the "force of the better argument", since a postmetaphysical approach, in principle,
rules out all recourse to the foundationalist (metaphysical) principles that have
served as the universal grounds of legitimation and validation within modern
philosophy (Haberrnas 1985: 194).
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in the communicative process of linguistic interaction, aimed at mutual
understanding and agreement. It is in terms of the fundamental assumption of a
rational potential implicit in the speech acts of competent communicators, that
Habermas proceeds to defend his vision of modernity.
It is my contention that a postmetaphysical approach will contribute to a deeper
understanding of the present crisis of philosophy, whose current state seems to
render it more and more ineffectual in its efforts to get to grips with a modern world
(paradoxically) characterised by a "new obscurity", but whose proudest moment
seems to have been its conversion to the "enlightenment" once promised by
reason (Habermas 1989:48-70). For the debate to be conducted in a more fruitful
manner, it is therefore essential to avoid the hostile climate that has accompanied
its development since its inception in the 1980's. Consider, for example, Michael
Peters' (1994) comments on the unfortunate difficulties that have characterized this
debate, and the equally unfortunate polarisation that has undermined the possibility
of meaningful dialogue:
The philosophical debate on the question of modernity as it has been
conducted between JOrgen Habermas, the leading representative of the
Frankfurt School and the French post-structuralist thinkers - principally
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault and Jean-Francois Lyotard - is now over
a decade old. The debate which was both violent and polemical at the start
has passed through several phases, showing all the strains of a strongly
polarised opposition. What was considered in the philosophical world as a
confrontation between two major schools and positions - irreconcilable and
based on genuine philosophical differences - has turned out to be not the
clear and unequivocal opposition first thought. (Peters 1994:3.)
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implications of a postmetaphysical form of thinking, ratherthan a postmodern form
of thinking, that I propose to evaluate Habermas's debate with the representatives
of postmodernity, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and Rorty. Furthermore, given the
thematic focus on the critique of reason, from a post-Hegelian perspective,
Habermas must surely have a case when he states that our approach to the
question of rationality as the normative basis of modernity, should be determined
by a prior consciousness that philosophy, in a certain sense, has indeed reached
its end. Unlike the representatives of postmodern thinking, however, Habermas
does not believe that this "end" necessarily dictates an abandonment of
philosophy's traditional concern with the question of reason and rationality. It is for
this reason that he resists the dogmatic nature of the postmodern claim that reason
is synonymous with a logocentrically defined tradition of philosophy, and that "the
end" of this tradition implies the "the end" of reason, conceptualized normatively.
I therefore agree with Habermas (1987b) when he claims:
No matter what name it appears under now - whether as fundamental
ontology, as critique, as negative dialectics, or genealogy - these
pseudonyms are by no means disguises under which the traditional form
of philosophy lies hidden; the drapery of philosophical concepts more likely
serves as the cloak for a scantily concealed end of philosophy (Habermas
1987b:35).
In the development of his own position on the question of modernity, Habermas
has been particularly indebted to the contributions of philosophers such as
Immanuel Kant, G.W. Hegel and Karl Marx, whose collective influence has found
expression in the work of the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory, with
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer as its principal representatives." It is
especially within the context of Critical Theory, that Habermas has sought, in his
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the world, and that world history is therefore a rational process" (Hegel 1975:27).
Given this idea as his point of departure, Habermas has also critically appropriated
the ideas of Max Weber as well as Gyorgy Lukacs, in an effort to recast the
question of modernity from a sociological perspective in order to provide a more
positive account of the processes of modernization and rationalization than that of
his predecessors, Horkheimer and Adorno, as presented in their joint effort
Dialectic of Enlightenment (orig. 1944, trans. 1993). Habermas's commitment to the
idea of reason as an historical process forms the basis of his approach to
modernity. As he once put it:
Reading Adorno had given me the courage to take up systematically what
Lukacs and Korsch represented historically: the theory of reification as a
theory of rationalization, in Max Weber's sense. Already at that time, my
problem was a theory of modernity, a theory of the pathology of modernity,
from the viewpoint of the realization - the deformed realization - of reason
in history. (Habermas 1992:98.)
Habermas's critical assessment of modernity has found its fullest expression in his
two-volume The Theory of Communicative Action (1984, 1987a). It is on the basis
of the arguments advanced in that complex study that Habermas turns his attention
to the post-structuralist aesthetically inspired critique of the modern conception of
reason (and the attendant processes of rationalisation within modernity).
Habermas's engagement with the French representatives of modernity is
articulated in his combative and controversial The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity (1987b). The (political) implications of the debate are further explored
in his collection of essays in The New Conservatism (1989), and the
postmetaphysical angle of his approach can be found in his Postmetaphysical
Thinking (1992). I will also focus on Habermas's important encounter with Rorty,
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as documented in Debating the state of philosophy (1996). My evaluation of
Habermas's defence of modernity will be based mainly on the relevant arguments
developed in these texts since, in my opinion, they provide the most
comprehensive account of his current position.
As stated above, my evaluation of the debate will proceed from the point of view
of the implications arising from the various attempts to overcome the conception
of reason. The debate unfolds around an assumption on Habermas's part, that in
spite of the tremendous problems that have beset the development of the modern
age, and in spite, furthermore, of the philosophical plausibility of the postmodern
scepticism regarding the modern philosophical tradition, it does not necessarily
follow that we must rid ourselves of certain basic ideas, ideas such as truth and
reason, freedom and justice - ideas which have played such a vital role in the
development of the Western philosophical tradition of critical thinking. While
Habermas is in agreement with the postmodernists that philosophy can no longer
define its status and role within the traditional context of philosophical
foundationalism or a priori transcendentalism (conceived either in terms of a
transcendental subject or dialectical process that unfolds in the world), this does
not mean that he is prepared to abandon the discipline of philosophy as "the
guardian of reason", that is, a discipline concerned with the critical evaluation of the
ideas and ideals which, although originating within the Enlightenment tradition, are
still relevant and significant "in a period in which basic irrationalist undercurrents
are transmuted once again into a dubious form of politics" (Habermas 1985: 195).
Crucial to an understanding of Habermas's philosophical project is to realise that
he does not use the term "philosophy" in its traditional sense. In this regard,
McCarthy (1984) correctly points out:
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[Habermas] does not use the term philosophy in its traditional sense as a
"philosophy of origins" or "first philosophy". It does not designate a
presupposition less mode of thought that provides its own foundations; nor
can the ideals inherent in philosophy - truth and reason, freedom and
justice - be realised by philosophy itself. Philosophy belongs to the world
on which it reflects and must return to it. (McCarthy 1984:127.)
For Habermas, philosophy ultimately boils down to the possibility of reaching
understanding and consensus through a process of debate and argumentation. In
this process we can no longer fall back on the metaphysical comforts of
transcendent universal truths and principles, whether in "the mind", "reality", "God",
or a dialectical (teleological) movement towards "truth" beyond history. According
to Habermas, these normative notions of the metaphysical tradition must be
transformed in such a manner that they reflect a fallibilistic ethos of critique and
self-critique. In Habermas's view, the answer to the critique of metaphysical
foundationalism, is a postmetaphysical account of our limits, limitations and
possibilities in and through a communicative model of rationality, based on the
possibility of mutual understanding through dialogue, as I will show in Chapter 5.
Central to Habermas's defence of modernity is the claim that the total rejection of
modernity is based on an acceptance of an illegitimate privileging of a problematic
and narrow (positivistic or logocentric) conception of reason, as a result of which
reason has been reduced to its scientific-technical dimension, thus giving rise to
the notion that "progress" in the modern world must be defined exclusively in terms
of scientific and technological advancement. As Habermas (1985: 197) puts it,
"[I]ogocentricism means neglecting the complexity of reason effectively operating
in the life-world, and restricting reason to its cognitive-instrumental dimension (a
process, we might add, that has been noticeably privileged and selectively utilized
in processes of capitalist modernisation)".
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While acknowledging the significance of the scientific-cognitive dimension of
rationality, Habermas argues for a more balanced perspective which also
recognises two other equally important forms of rationality, the practical and the
aesthetic, each with its own distinct region of validity, and each addressing its own
distinct problematic:
The project of modernity formulated in the 18th century by the philosophers
of the Enlightenment consisted in their efforts to develop objective science,
universal morality and law, and autonomous art, according to their inner
logic. At the same time, this project intended to release the cognitive
potentials of each of these domains to set them free from their esoteric
forms. The Enlightenment philosophers wanted to utilize this accumulation
of specialized culture for the enrichment of everyday life, that is to say, for
the rational organization of everyday social life. (Habermas 1981 :9.)
Probably the most important question that has been raised in this debate is the
following: Is modern Western society currently witnessing its demise, that is, an
exhaustion of its cultural resources, or is the present crisis simply the result of an
inadequate arone-sided understanding of the culture of modernity? Depending on
one's point of view, the present crisis of modernity is interpreted either as a
transition to a culture of postmodernity; alternatively, there is a school of thought
which holds the view that" [r]ather than entering a period of post-modernity, we are
moving into one in which the consequences of modernity are becoming more
radicalised and universalised than before" (Giddens 1990:3).
The representatives of postmodernity seek to explain the current scepticism
regarding the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and progress in terms of a
misguided faith in a scientifically (technically) oriented conception of reason, in
which the "free will" of "man", defined essentially as a rational being, is allowed
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unlimited scope to create new forms of domination and oppression, in the name of
an enlightened and enlightening reason. From this perspective, the modern
conception of reason is accused of complicity in the unspeakable ways in which the
modern world has plunged relentlessly to unprecedented depths of human
suffering and ecological destruction. Thus we find postmodern thinkers such as
Lyotard (1984) questioning a teleological conception of history that seeks to
legitimate itself by means of certain universalist "meta narratives", in the light of
which "History" is construed as a progression of events unfolding inevitably towards
the improvement of "man" and society in general.
Reacting against a unitary conception of reason, and questioning the ability of the
traditional philosophical and political modes of critical reflection to understand and
overcome the Western forms of domination so deeply embedded within the modern
capitalist industrialised society, the postmodernists evoke a scenario of plural
histories, disparate language-games, incommensurable discourses and life-worlds,
in the hope of defending "the Other" of reason, variously referred to as "the non-
identical and the nonintegrated, the deviant and the heterogeneous, the
contradictory and the conflictual, the transitory and the accidental" (Habermas
1992a: 115-116).
This debate therefore highlights two radically different approaches to the problem
of modernity; for Habermas (ibid.:116), modernity can be defended if reassessed
from a postmetaphysical perspective, based on "a concept of reason that is
skeptical and postmetaphysical, yet not defeatist ". For the postmodern thinkers,
on the other hand, modernity, and the metaphysical philosophical tradition
underlying it, has lost its legitimacy, and should consequently be abandoned. On
this latter argument, philosophy as a discipline concerned with normative notions
of reason and rational action, believed to be capable of grounding and validating
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our claims to (scientific) truth, on the one hand, and forging a collective vision of
a better society, on the other hand, is dismissed.
It is important to note that, for Habermas, the defence of modernity, is not a matter
of abstract theoretical speculation, but a practical commitment to the principle of
reason as the normative basis of a modern democratic culture. Habermas's interest
in modernity as a potential manifestation of reason can be traced back to his
experiences as a teenager, just after the Second World War, trying to comprehend
the full significance of the atrocities perpetrated by Adolf Hitler and the supporters
of the Nazi regime. In the face of such a political disaster, Habermas has
endeavoured to understand how the German cultural tradition, based on principles
of freedom, justice, and democracy, had capitulated so easily to the dictatorship
of fascism and mass extermination. Habermas recalls these early teenage
experiences as follows:
At the age of 15 or 16, I sat before the radio and experienced what was
being discussed before the Nuremberg Tribunal; when others, instead of
being struck silent by the ghastliness, began to dispute the justice of the
trial, procedural questions, and questions of jurisdiction, there was that first
rupture, which still gapes. Certainly it was only because Iwas still sensitive
and easily offended that I did not close myself to the fact of a collectively
realized inhumanity in the same measure as the majority of my elders.
(Habermas 1983:41.)
The deeply "personal" nature of Habermas's response to the horrors of the Nazi
regime, as well as his deep sense of shock and bewilderment at the general
indifference displayed in post-war Germany to the atrocities of the Nazi era, not
only by "ordinary" people, but also by leading historians and academics (for whom
political normalisation had taken precedence over all efforts to come to terms with
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the past), has had a profound effect on his development." Richard Wolin's (1989)
comments on the general evasiveness regarding the so-called "German question'
are indeed illuminating in so far as they provide us with a perspective on the
"practical" dimension of Habermas's theoretical work:
For years, the "German question" as perceived by politicians of Western
Europe had been "How can German aggressiveness be curbed?" But after
1945, this question took on an entirely different, more sinister meaning. It
was rephrased to read, How could the nation of Goethe, Kant, and Schiller
become the perpetrator of 'crimes against humanity'?" Or simply, "How was
Auschwitch possible?" One could justifiably say that the very "soul" of the
nation is at stake in the answer to this question. For the development of a
healthy, non pathological identity would seem contingent on the forthright
acknowledgement of those aspects of the German tradition that facilitated
the catastrophe of 1933-1945. And that is why recent efforts on the part of
certain German historians ...to circumvent the problem of "coming to terms
with the past" are so disturbing. For what is new about this situation ... is the
attempt not simply to provide evasive answers to the "German question",
...but to declare the very posing of the question itself null and void. (Wolin
1989: ix.)
For Habermas, the "German question" provides the starting point of a long
intellectual journey in which he looks back questioningly to the pre-Nazi German
tradition in the hope offinding the vital clues to many disturbing questions, the most
important of which has concerned the betrayal of freedom and respect for others,
and the subsequent denial of responsibility for such a "monstrous pathology"
(Bernstein 1985:2). The desire to understand this pathology has motivated
Habermas not only to re-read the German "classics" in philosophy, but to turn his
attention abroad to thinkers within the "analytic" and "pragmatist" philosophical
traditions, as well as his predecessors of the Frankfurt School of "Critical Theory",
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in an attempt to reformulate the question of "reason in history". It is especially in
reaction to the work of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno (1993), that
Habermas has developed his own notion of modernity as an "incomplete project"
(Habermas 1981).
It was on the occasion of being awarded the Adorno Prize in 1980, that Habermas
fired the first shots at the critics of modernity, blaming their pessimism and neo-
conservatism on a certain reception of Nietzsche in which the "dialectic of
enlightenment" is replaced by the severance of the traditional association of
freedom and reason. In his denunciation of the widespread appeal of postmodern
thinking, and his description of its exponents as "young conservatives", Habermas
identifies the core issues and major implications implicit in the "new" trend of
thought:
The Young Conservatives recapitulate the basic experience of aesthetic
modernity. They claim as their own the revelations of a decentred
subjectivity, emancipated from the imperatives of work and usefulness, and
with this experience they step outside the modern world. On the basis of
modernistic attitudes, they justify an irreconcilable anti-modernism. They
remove into the sphere of the faraway and the archaic the spontaneous
powers of imagination, of self-experience and of emotionality. To
instrumental reason, they juxtapose in manichean fashion a principle only
accessible through evocation, be it the will to power or sovereignty, Being
or the dionysiac force of the poetical. In France this line leads from Bataille
via Foucault and Derrida. (Habermas 1981:13.)
Habermas's criticism of the French postmodernists stems from a failure on their
part, he believes, to appreciate fully the normative potential within the culture of
modernity. As a result, he claims that they confuse the social form of modernization
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
17
(that is, the capitalist modernization of processes) with its cultural form (that is, one
which, in addition to the cognitive-instrumental form of rationality, also has a moral-
political, as well aesthetic dimension of rationality). It is this more comprehensive
interpretation of reason that Habermas brings to bear on his postmodern
opponents. This interpretation allows for the possibility of a greater appreciation of
an aesthetically oriented perspective, not with a view to contrasting "the aesthetic"
with "the political" as two diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive
orientations, but to view the two, instead, as complementary processes,
contributing (in a different way) to a fuller understanding of the problematic of
modernity.
Habermas's defence of modernity as an "incomplete project", as well as his
indefatigable commitment to reason, have undoubtedly contributed to a great deal
of misunderstanding on the part of his opponents. This misunderstanding has given
rise to two major accusations against him. In the first place, his attempt to defend
a notion of reason from a universalistic position is incompatible with the "obvious"
move towards contextualism, on the grounds that the universalistic pretensions at
systematic thinking, associated with a discredited metaphysical tradition, are simply
incompatible with "difference" and the pluralism of incommensurable language-
games as the authentic expression of the post-modern condition (Lyotard 1984).
Secondly, it is claimed that modernity is incapable of being anything more than a
phenomenon of power and domination, in view of its privileging of an instrumental-
technical form of rationality whose untrammelled advancement undermines the
possibility of collective action in the name of freedom and self-determination, thus
restricting the possibility of change to the realm of the aesthetic, as the only
meaningful source of resistance within the modern world.
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Following Stephen K. White's (1991 :4-11) analysis, one can define the postmodern
problematic in terms of four major trends. Firstly, an incredulity towards
metanarratives. In this regard, the position of Lyotard (1984) is exemplary in its
questioning of the founding principles of the modern metaphysical tradition,
especially the assumption of an ahistorical subject as the legitimating basis of the
modernist ideals of freedom, moral progress, and knowledge.
Secondly, a new awareness of the dangers of societal rationalization. In this
regard, Foucault's (1977a) perspective on the problem of "normalisation" as a
subtle but very effective form of power and domination, is especially illuminating
insofar the credentials of the modern welfare state as well as the Marxist
alternative are viewed as instruments of oppression whose programmes of social
welfare and upliftment only succeed in denying the individual her sense of self-
worth and self-determination.
Thirdly, new informational technologies, such as the television are viewed (mainly)
as centralizing instruments of propaganda capable of invading the most private and
intimate aspects of the individual's life, thus diminishing the possibility of critical
disengagement and the development of meaningful alternative perspectives."
Fourthly, new social movements which seek their identity and solidarity in social
and political spaces "outside" the prevailing conventions and ideological reach of
current political discourse. These new social movements, primarily defensive in
character, suffer from experiences of disaffection and marginalization in view of
their search for a more authentic identity that is not necessarily tied to economic
status and the acquisition of wealth:
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The women's movement, antinuclear movement, radical ecologists, ethnic
movements, homosexuals and countercultural groups in general all share,
at least to some degree, this new status, even if they differ in many
substantive ways. They all have a somewhat defensive character, as well
as a focus on a struggle to gain the ability to construct socially their own
collective identity, characteristics that make them rather anomalous in
relation to the standard rules for interest group behaviour in the modern
state. (White 1991:10.)
The characterisation of the postmodern problematic outlined above is certainly not
exhaustive, but it does give us an indication of the range and complexity of the
issues involved in the debate. But since the postmodern form of thinking derives
its impetus from an aesthetic orientation, and is also sceptical about the
deployment of universal "metanarratives", the question of the appropriate criteria
for an assessment of the debate does indeed present us with a serious challenge.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
By defining his own position within the context of the Hegelian- Marxist legacy in
general, and the so-called Frankfurt School tradition of "Critical Theory" in
particular, Habermas has set himself the task of re-examining the legacy of the
European Enlightenment as it has taken shape within the processes of
modernization, with a view to developing a theory of modernity aimed at revealing
its achievements, its (rational) normative potential, as well as its destructive effects.
It should, however, be noted that Habermas's commitment to the "project of
modernity" is not of a dogmatic nature; he is not blind to the tremendous problems
that have accompanied the process of modernization. With the possible exception
of Foucault, there are few thinkers who can match his prodigious analytic skills in
evaluating the disabling effects of a modern world wedded to the imperatives of
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capitalism, bureaucracy, and technology. At one level it would seem as if
Habermas and his postmodern opponents are saying the same things; at a deeper
level, however, one detects an element of guarded optimism in Habermas that is
lacking in the reflections of his opponents. It is his attempt to overcome the
pathologies and imbalances of modernity, while retaining its more positive
elements, that sets Habermas apart from those who despair of a political solution
to a crisis-ridden modern age in which "the present" does not seem to make any
sense at all, and "the future" does not seem to admit of any possibility of
redemption from the various forms of power and domination that have come to
characterise the modern experiment. In this regard, Habermas (1989) writes:
Today it seems as though utopian energies have been used up, as if they
have retreated from historical thought. The horizon of the future has
contracted and has changed both the Zeitgeist and politics in fundamental
ways. The future is negatively cathected; we see outlined on the threshold
of the twentieth century the horrifying panorama of a worldwide threat to
universal life interest: the spiral of the arms race, the uncontrolled spread
of nuclear weapons, the structural impoverishment of developing countries,
problems of environmental overload, and the nearly catastrophic operations
of high technology are the catchwords that have penetrated public
consciousness by way of the mass media. (Habermas 1989: 50-51.)
But in spite of the negative mood informing current analyses of the present
situation, Habermas believes that the West cannot turn its back on the
Enlightenment ideal of a rationally organised society. The basic problem for
Habermas, is that the rationalistic optimism that once inspired the Western
Enlightenment thinkers of the 18th century has given way to a regrettable, but
understandable, mood of despair and cynicism, which he attributes to the Western
world's loss of confidence in the modern age, which in turn is attributable to a
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general "obscurity", which has had a crippling effect on our understanding of
modernity as a post-traditional phenomenon. As Habermas puts it:
The responses of the intellectual reflect as much bewilderment as those of
the politicians. It is by no means only realism when a fortnightly accepted
bewilderment increasingly takes the place of attempts at orientation
directed towards the future. The situation may be objectively obscure.
Obscurity is nonetheless also a function of a society's assessment of its
own readiness to take action. What is at stake is Western culture's
confidence in itself. (Habermas 1989:51.)
In addressing the problem of "obscurity", Habermas embarks on a project that he
shares with the postmodernists: the philosophical critique of the modern conception
of reason. In this regard, Iwill examine the respective positions developed by each
of these thinkers and also consider the implications of their various critiques forthe
question of modernity. The major argument of my dissertation is that Habermas's
debate with postmodern thinking can be rendered more meaningful and rewarding
if one resists the temptation that necessarily arises when one is compelled to take
sides in a debate couched in mutually exclusive terms that support either
"modernity", on the one hand, or postmodernity", on the other. It is my contention
that instead of approaching this debate in terms of "modernity versus
postmodernity", we approach it in terms of the possibility of a postmetaphysical
mode of thinking. I argue further that such an approach provides, not only the
necessary vantage point for a more useful evaluation of the question of modernity,
it also provides us with a framework capable of dealing with Habermas's position
in a more nuanced manner than the dismissive and dogmatic stance that have
invariably typified the positions of his critics thus far.
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It will become apparent that from the perspective of a postmetaphysical mode of
thinking, as opposed to the postmodern mode of thinking, certain seemingly
intractable aspects of Habermas's position become more plausible. This, in turn,
provides us with the possibility of responding in a more constructive manner, for
example, to Rorty's allegation that Habermas is essentially a transcendental
thinker, still trapped in the metaphysical straitjacket of the Kantian "grid" (Rorty
1980:364).7 It is allegations such as Rorty's that have inclined me to consider the
possibility that maybe Habermas and his critics are simply talking past one another,
and that the present confusion stems from a "paradigm shift" in the Kuhnian sense,
on Habermas's part, thus ruling out the possibility of reaching consensus regarding
the appropriate criteria for an assessment of the debate. Are we to rest content
with the incommensurability of the different positions, with each side resorting to
various rhetorical strategies aimed at silencing its adversary, or is there a way of
possibly overcoming this dilemma?
As indicated above, these questions strike at the heart of the debate between
Habermas and the representatives of postmodern thinking. At its deepest level,
Habermas's confrontation with postmodern thinking invokes one of the most
important philosophical challenges of our day: the debate on contextualism and
objectivism, the outcome of which, ultimately, will have profound implications for
our self-understanding as moral agents imbued with a rational sense of
accountability and responsibility, and whose scientific practices belie the popular
claim to objectivity and neutrality.
In the final analysis, as stated above, my main objective is to show that the concept
"postmetaphysical thinking" offers a more plausible description of the
commonalities between Habermas's position and that of his critics. Furthermore,
it is my contention that if we are prepared to investigate and develop the
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implications of a postmetaphysical mode of thinking, I believe it will prove to be
more beneficial for future research than the vague (but highly fashionable) claims
currently made in the name of postmodern thinking. To this end, I propose to
evaluate the debate within a structural framework which examines the details of the
individual contributions of Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and Rorty, only to the extent
that they contribute towards my two primary objectives: firstly, to show how this
debate can clarify the need for a reconceptualization of our understanding of
reason and rationality from a postmetaphysical perspective; and, secondly, to show
how we can contribute to a more meaningful understanding of the problem of
modernity.
In the light of these objectives, I propose to provide a general overview of the
historical and philosophical contexts that inform this debate. This will serve the
primary purpose of providing some clarity on the more important terms and relevant
concepts that have formed the background for the development of the debate.
Special attention will be given to controversial terms such as "modernity",
"postmodernity", "rationality", and "pluralism" (Chapter Two).
This is followed by a detailed analysis of the various arguments employed by
Habermas and his opponents in their respective critiques of modern reason. In this
regard, I consider the major implications of these arguments forthe role and status
of philosophy as a critical discipline. I examine not only Habermas's direct
confrontation with postmodern thinking in his own writings (Habermas 1981, 1985a,
1992), but I also examine actual instances of his debate with thinkers such as
Rorty (Bernstein 1985; Niznik and Sander [eds.] 1996), as well as constructed
accounts of the debate such as that presented by Robert C. Holub (1991) between
Habermas and Lyotard (Chapter Three). I then provide a detailed analysis of
Habermas's debate with Derrida and Foucault in Chapter Four.
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In Chapter Five I proceed to offer a critical account of the postmetaphysical critique
of reason. In this regard, I will consider the significance of his attempt to
contextualize the postmodern critique of reason by aligning it with the more general
critique of reason that has accompanied the development of modern philosophy,
a critique or discourse of modernity which, in the wake of Hegel's idealist
conception of rationality, has played such a vital role in the development of modern
philosophy as a critical discipline. According to Habermas,
In the discourse of modernity, the accusers raise an objection that has not
substantially changed from Hegel and Marx down to Nietzsche and
Heidegger, from Bataille and Lacan to Foucault and Derrida. The
accusation is aimed against a reason grounded in the principle of
subjectivity. And it states that this reason denounces and undermines all
unconcealed forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and
alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of
rationality. Because this regime of a subjectivity puffed up into a false
absolute transforms the means of consciousness-raising and emancipation
into just so many instruments of objectification and control, it fashions for
itself an uncanny immunity in the form of a thoroughly concealed
domination. (Habermas 1987b:55.)
However, if Habermas is willing to align the postmodernists with the tradition of
criticism that has unfolded within the "discourse of modernity", this does not mean
that they interpret their own work from this perspective. Indeed, it is the failure of
the postmodern thinkers to appreciate fully the tradition within which they are
functioning that leads to Habermas's (1987b:53) interpretation of their work as a
misguided attempt to overcome reason by calling into question the tradition of
philosophy in its entirety, while paradoxically and implicitly relying on the very
conceptual tools that have formed the cornerstone of the philosophical tradition in
question.
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CHAPTER TWO: MODERNITY IN PERSPECTIVE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter One, I indicated that Habermas's debate with the representatives of
postmodern thinking concerns two fundamental inseparable themes; firstly, the
theme of reason and rationality; secondly, modernity, conceptualized as the
normative framework for the assessment of reason. I also stated in the previous
chapter that if the debate is to yield more positive results, it should be assessed
from a postmetaphysical ratherthan a postmodern perspective. It should be noted,
however, that the value and success of such an approach will ultimately depend
on demonstrating two points; firstly, that Habermas and the postmodernists are
essentially concerned with a common problematic, namely, the modern conception
of reason as it finds expression within a philosophical framework of a universal
subject, the a priorifoundation of philosophical truth and knowledge. Secondly, that
their opposing conceptions of modernity (explicit in Habermas's case, implicit in the
case of the postmodernists) are determined by the different conception(s) of
reason underlying their respective arguments. A fair assessment of the debate
therefore requires a preliminary clarification, not only of the terms that constitute
its frame of reference ("reason" and "rationality"), but also of "modernity" as an
historical as well as philosophical category. My account of these rather complex
and controversial terms will necessarily be limited to their relevance to my general
objective, namely, to demonstrate that the critique of reason is very much a part
of the modern philosophical tradition, and that Habermas as well as the
postmodernists, in their respective critiques, are trying to establish new ways of
thinking, based on their common acceptance that the rationalist legacy of the
modern metaphysical tradition has reached its end.
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The purpose of this chapter is therefore to clarify the relevant philosophical terms
within the context of modernity, understood firstly as a historical category, and
secondly, as a philosophical category. Although a conceptual distinction has been
made between these two categories, I must point out that they form part of a
common problematic: reason as it manifests itself in history. In the final analysis,
postmodern and postmetaphysical thinking have one thing in common, namely,
what Habermas (1987b:131) refers to as "the desublimation of the spirit" and the
"disempowering of philosophy", conceptualized as a special discourse with a
privileged insight into the nature of rationality and truth.
In the modern metaphysical tradition the privileged status of philosophy has found
expression in an ahistorical (a priori) conception of reason, assumed to have its
origin in the "mind" of a universal ahistorical subject, defined as the universal
foundational context for the modernist quest for certainty, with philosophy
functioning as a privileged discourse of validation and legitimation. But before this
aspect of the debate can be discussed, we need to reach clarity on the "subjective
turn" as the defining moment in the modern philosophical tradition.
2.2 MODERNITY AS AN HISTORICAL CATEGORY: A NEW
CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME
As an historical category, modernity is a complex phenomenon. Its origin is closely
connected with the impact of Christianity in Europe in general, and the Christian
eschatological consciousness of time in particular. According to Robert Pippin
(1991 :17), although the concept of modernity is today indissolubly associated with
the sixteenth- and seventeenth centuries of Western Europe, the term "modern"
actually goes back to the late fifth and early sixth centuries, when Roman historians
of the day grappled with the problem of how to integrate the wisdom of antiquity
into a world that had changed on a dramatic scale. Pippin (ibid.) explains:
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The very idea of the modern ... is, it is safe to say, very much a product of
the Western European, Christian tradition, perhaps its most representative
or typical product, even though the term itself is literally of Roman origin
and predates by some time the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
formulations of an explicit revolutionary project. It is widely conceived that
the term came into existence in the late fifth or early six century (derived
from the adverb modo, "recently" or "of this time") and that a significant,
even problematic distinction between moderni and antiqui can first be noted
in the speculations of the Roman historian Cassiodorus about the virtues
and practices of the "old" Rome in this "new" time, so much under the
influence of the East and the Germans. In that context, the original problem
was not, as it was to become, a kind of opposition between ancients and
moderns, but a way of "translating" ancient wisdom and practices into a
new context. (Pippin 1991:17.)
The epochal consciousness of modernity as a consciousness of a "now" in
opposition to a "then" was a gradual process which became more and more
decisive to the extent that the early Christian notion of the temporary status of a
secular life within a fallen world began to be challenged. In the face of this
challenge, the Christian faith in an imminent "Second Coming" began to lose its
appeal. In its place a new notion of time, linked to a future destiny beyond the
natural and historical life of humankind began to take root in the Christian
consciousness. Given this change of time-consciousness, the historical
consciousness of "the present" also shifted dramatically; "the present" was no
longer conceived of in terms of a future in historical time, but an "eternal future"
after death. This shift in the Christian understanding of time meant not only that
"the present" becomes a constant series of moments in anticipation of eternal bliss,
but it also inaugurated a new historical consciousness of "the present" as a vehicle
of transition, and a medium of social and political involvement.
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When it became more and more unlikely that one's chief historical stance
should simply be a preparation for the apocalypse, the problem of
temporality became more and more complex and numerous issues
involving the proper Christian reconciliation with the actual world, human
historical institutions, and the past, became much more prominent. So
Christianity, it is said, with its linear, eschatological, progressive and
revolutionary concept of time, prepared the ground for a later, much
different sort of revolution and eschaton. (Pippin 1991:18.)
As the sense of connection with the past became more fragile, the sense of
incompatibility with the past became increasingly more pronounced. This new
historical consciousness reached its climax with the impact of the (European)
Renaissance, the Reformation, the Scientific and French revolutions. Thus the
"Age of Reason" was born.
The historical phenomenon of modernity was interpreted as a momentous triumph
over the institutions, the superstitions, and the ignorance of the past (Bauman
1987:283). Generally committed to the Enlightenment ideals of reason and
autonomy, the modern age embraced the principle of individual and collective
emancipation through the progressive achievements of modern science. The
methodology of science as inaugurated by Galilean astronomy and Newtonian
physics, combined with the principles of mathematical reasoning, were to become
the basic "tools" for the rational reorganization of modern social and political life.
The future was immanent in "a present" which proceeds in linear fashion
(progressively) towards a life of enlightened (democratic) freedom, moral self-
determination and responsibility. Central to the project of the Enlightenment was
the idea of progress, based on rational insight, within a world characterized by
change, and amenable to enlightened interventions based on such rational insiqht."
As David Harvey (1989) put it:
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Enlightenment thought. .. embraced the idea of progress, and actively
sought that break with history and tradition which modernity espouses. It
was, above all, a secular movement that sought the demystification and
descralization of knowledge and social organization in order to liberate
human beings from their chains ... To the degree that it lauded human
creativity, scientific discovery, and the pursuit of individual excellence in the
name of human progress, Enlightenment thinkers welcomed the maelstrom
of change, and saw the transitoriness, the fleeting and the fragmentary as
a necessary condition through which the modernizing project could be
achieved. Doctrines of equality, liberty, faith in human intelligence (once
allowed the benefits of education) and universal reason abounded. (Harvey
1989:12-13.)
As an essentially European phenomenon, modernity as an historical project,
received and sustained its self-awareness against the background of the profound
changes that had accompanied the institutional transformations in Europe,
following its industrialization, on the one hand, and its social reorganization in
terms of the economic principles of capitalism, on the other hand. Given the
dynamic nature of these processes of modernization, the oppositional status of
modernity in relation to antiquity became even more pronounced, as the modern
mind became more focused on the economic and administrative processes of
modernization. Today modernity is invariably linked with the social processes of
state administration, the imperatives of a capitalist economy, and the role of
science and technology in preserving and consolidating these processes (Giddens
1990).
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Given the dynamic and expansionist nature of the imperatives governing the
development of its capitalist economy and industrial systems, the concept of
modernity was eventually uprooted from the particularity of its historical context and
origins to assume a much greater significance. The significance of modernity would
ultimately, and controversially, be determined in universal terms. As John W. Tate
(1997) points out:
The claims of at least sections of entire cultures and societies to such a
'modern' identity or status seems, at least originally, to have been a
distinctively European phenomenon, originating in the eighteenth century
and eventually proselytized throughout the world, by political, economic and
military means. It had its philosophical roots in the Enlightenment, and its
sociological roots in the broad social, economic and political changes
associated with the immense upheavals of the industrial and French
revolutions. (Tate 1997:281.)
To the extent that modernity represented an historical epoch irreconcilably
opposed to the past, and irrevocably committed to the future, the historical self-
consciousness of the Enlightenment as a new beginning ultimately translated into
one central question: How was the newfound modern consciousness to define the
moral-political dimension of its social existence in a world, irretrievably cut off from
the past, and whose legitimacy was no longer tied to the values that had
characterized the traditions of the past? All attempts to answer this question would
henceforth proceed from the perspective of a self-definition of reason, defined as
critical progressive faculty, and attesting to the essential nature of "man" as a
rational being. The historical self-consciousness of a modern age committed to the
progressiveness of reason was justified, it was generally thought, by the dynamic
potential of a scientific-technical rationality capable of dominating and controlling
nature - nonhuman as well as human. Zygmunt Bauman's (1987) comments on the
nature of the modern self-consciousness of a new age, imbued with a progressivist
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vision of history which, in turn, found expression in a progressivist conception of
reason, conceptualized primarily from an instrumentalist perspective, are
particularly relevant:
... the vision of history as the unstoppable march of les luminaires; a
difficult but eventually victorious struggle of Reason against emotions or
animal instincts, science against religion and magic, truth against prejudice,
correct knowledge against superstition, reflection against uncritical
existence, rationality against affectivity and the rule of custom. Within such
a conceptualization, the modern age defined itself as, above all, the
kingdom of Reason and rationality; the other forms of life were seen,
accordingly as wanting in both respects. This was the first and most basic
of the conceptualizations providing modernity with its self-definition.
(Bauman 1987: 111.)
Central to the self-definition of the historical consciousness of modernity is an
image of a social form of life believed to be progressively more advanced.
According to this self-understanding of modernity, the modern age as the age of
"the new", conceived from the perspective of a time-consciousness immersed in
the dynamics of the contingent and transitory nature of the present, defines its
status in terms of a constant overcoming of the past, and thus seeking its
redemption in the present only to the extent that it can guarantee modernity's faith
in the future. As Habermas (1987b) puts it:
Because the new, the modern is distinguished from the old by the fact that
it opens itself to the future, the epochal new beginning is rendered constant
with each moment that gives birth to the new. Thus it is characteristic of the
historical consciousness of modernity to set off'the most recent (neuesten)
period' from the modern (neu) age: Within the horizon of the modern age,
the present enjoys a prominent position as contemporary history.
(Habermas 1987b:6.)
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The radicalized historical consciousness of time emanating from modernity,
conceptualized as a radical break from the past, consequently gave rise to the
notion of modern culture as a progressively advanced phenomenon, laying claim
to a status of universality. Underlying this claim was a general belief that the very
nature of modernity required a rational justification for its radical break with the
past, a justification based on general principles and a conceptual framework
originating within the structures of modern consciousness itself. In this regard,
Habermas (ibid.7), points out, "Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria
by which it takes its orientation from models supplied by another epoch; it has to
create its normativity out of itself. Modernity sees itself cast back upon itself without
any possibility of escape." (Emphasis, Habermas's.)
In contrastto modernity's preoccupation with a "new beginning" reflectively focused
on the future, traditional culture is generally viewed as one reflectively focused on
the past, with a view to preserving the values and collective experience of past
generations, as the normative source and orientation of social life. Modernity, on
the other hand, is characterized by an historical consciousness of a radical break
and separation from past traditions. Thus, in traditional or pre-modern culture, the
present social structures and values are preserved by honoring the past, thus
ensuring the historical possibility of continuity with the past as the means of
achieving stability and social harmony in the present. Given the dynamic nature of
modernity, traditional culture is generally viewed by the modernist as a form of
social life resistant to change, and therefore "stuck" in the anachronistic habits and
conventions of the past. This is, of course, an oversimplification because, in
traditional culture, the preservation of the past paradoxically takes the reflective
form of a critical appropriation of traditional values, thus reinterpreting and
reinventing the past.
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At the root of the difference between the traditional and the modern outlook, are
two mutually exclusive interpretations of time. Commenting on the consciousness
of time within a traditional culture, Giddens (1990:37-38) correctly point out, "in pre-
modern civilizations reflexivity is still largely limited to the reinterpretation and
clarification of tradition, such that in the scales of time the side of the 'past' is much
more heavily weighed down than that of the 'future' ".
Although the concept of modernity was originally defined in terms of its oppositional
status to antiquity, it is important to note that current conceptions of modernity have
taken a "sociological turn" as the normative conceptual framework for an
assessment of the Enlightenment legacy. From this perspective, the humanist
principles of rationalism have been seriously questioned. According to Mike
Featherstone:
From the point of view of late nineteenth- and early twentieth century
German SOCiologicaltheory from which we derive much of our current
sense of the term, modernity is contrasted to the traditional order and
implies the progressive economic and administrative rationalization and
differentiation of the social world ... processes which brought into being the
modern capitalist-industrial state and which were often viewed from a
distinctly anti-modern perspective (Featherstone 1988:197-198).
If modernity is to be defined primarily in sociological terms, that is, in term of the
modernization processes aimed at promoting and consolidating the imperatives of
a capitalist-industrialized world, with reason being identified with a scientific-
technical process of thinking, one can understand the moral-political protests of the
postmodernists who criticize and dismiss modernity and its Enlightenment legacy
of rationalism which, it is claimed, has privileged the discourse of scientific and
technical reasoning, thus contributing in no uncertain terms to the political disasters
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of the twentieth century (Giddens 1990). This is an argument which Habermas first
encountered in the Dialectic of The Enlightenment (1993, German original 1944),
written jointly by Adorno and Horkheimer, in which they question the legitimacy of
the Enlightenment's optimistic credo of rationalism and progress. Harvey (1989)
summarizes the significance of Adorno and Horkheimer's negative position on
modernity as follows:
The twentieth century - with its death camps and death squads, its
militarism and two world wars, its threat of nuclear annihilation and its
experience of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - has shattered this (Enlightenment)
optimism. Worse still, the suspicion lurks that the Enlightenment project
was doomed to turn against itself and transform the quest for human
emancipation into a system of universal oppression in the name of human
liberation. This was the daring thesis advanced by Adorno and
Horhkeimer ...Writing in the shadow of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's
Russia, they argued that the logic that hides behind Enlightenment
rationality is a logic of domination and oppression. (Harvey 1989:13.)
The arguments put forward by Adorno and Horkheimer anticipate significantly the
basic themes of the postmodernist critique of modernity. Lyotard (1984), for
example, bases his justification for a postmodern condition on an argument
designed to demonstrate that the processes of modernization have consisted
predominantly in a scientific/technocratic transformation of Western society, in
which normative notions such as "truth" and "justice" have lost their legitimacy. For
Lyotard, the "delegitimation" of modernity implies a need to break radically with the
modern philosophical discourse, which is rooted in the assumption of a universal
subject. It is in this sense that we have to understand the "post" (in postmodern as
well as postmetaphysical thinking) as implying a need to overcome the modern
metaphysical tradition.
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Although the term "postmodernity" is highly controversial and elusive, it does carry
a basic connotation of something "new", something radically different from the past,
a sense of rupture based on the general assumption that modernity has ended. In
this regard, Douglas Kellner (1990) explains the postmodern sense of rupture as
follows:
[M]ost theorists of postmodernity deploy the term - as it was introduced by
Toynbee - to characterize a dramatic rupture or break in Western history.
What all these conceptions of the "postmodern" have in common ... is the
assumption of a radical break or rupture with the past. The discourse of the
postmodern therefore presupposes a sense of an ending, the sense of
something new, and the sense that we must develop new categories,
theories and methods to explore and conceptualize this novum, this novel
social and cultural situation. (Kellner 1990:258.)
In keeping with the postmodern sense of rupture, Lyotard (1984) evokes images
of a "postmodern" consciousness, having rid itself of the "meta narratives" that have
been used to legitimate modernity, trying to readjust to a world characterized by
constant change, incommensurable discourses or language games, none of which
can legitimately lay claim to a status of privilege. With Friedrich Nietzsche as their
primary source of inspiration, the defenders of postmodernity have attempted to
challenge the rationalist tradition of the Enlightenment which, with its normative
principles of progress and freedom in the name of "man" or "humanity" as a rational
being, has only succeeded in accentuating the hopeless plight the "other of reason"
(Habermas 1987b:337). Given the postmodernists' deliberate eschewal of the
conceptual framework of the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism, the
postmodernist defense of "the other of reason" is couched in a language that
deliberately seeks to avoid the totalizing effects of the metaphysical assumptions
of the Enlightenment tradition of universalism, in the hope of releasing the concrete
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and historical reality of the individual (the "other of reason") from the paralyzing grip
of societal modernization. In this regard, Harvey (1989) observes:
By the beginning of the twentieth century, and particularly after Nietzsche's
intervention, it was no longer possible to accord Enlightenment a privileged
status in the definition of the eternal and immutable essence of human
nature. To the degree that Nietzsche has led the way in placing aesthetics
above science, rationality, and politics, so the exploration of aesthetic
experience - 'beyond good and evil' - became a powerful means to
establish a new mythology as to what the eternal and the immutable might
be about in the midst of all the ephemerality, fragmentation, and patent
chaos of modern life. (Harvey 1989: 18.)
It is the perception of an epochal shift beyond the conceptual horizons of
modernity, based on an ahistorical construal of the societal processes of
modernization, and the privileging of an aesthecist critique of modernity, that
Habermas singles out as the primary reason for the illegitimate claim by
postmodern thinkers that modernity has been eclipsed by a new and radically
different postmodern order. According to Habermas (1992:28), it is not so much a
shift in epochal consciousness, but a restricted and problematic conception of
reason that is to blame for the current debates concerning the "end of philosophy",
debates which derive their justification from the hope of "encircling that which
metaphysics had always intended and had always failed to achieve". Habermas
(1987b) therefore argues:
The theory of modernization ...dissociates "modernity" from its modern
European origins and stylizes it into a spatio-temporal neutral model for
processes for social development in general. Furthermore, it breaks the
internal connections between modernity and the historical context of
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Western rationalism, so that the processes of modernization can no longer
be conceived of as a rationalization, as the historical objectification of
rational structures. (Habermas 1987bb:2-3.)
The claim in support of a postmodern age is further reinforced by a radicalized
sense of time in which the "present" is endorsed as a moment of rupture, and as
such, it constitutes a radical break with modernity and tradition. This radicalized
sense of time is experienced as a sense of discontinuity in which the transient and
the ephemeral, the fragmentary and the physical, are given pride of place. From
this perspective, the articulatability, if not the intelligibility, of the postmodern age
becomes linked to an aestheticist critique of modernity in which the (postmodern)
present, as a constant source of flux, is celebrated. This aesthetically inspired
critique and celebration takes its cue from the French conception of modernite, a
concept the significance of which Featherstone (1988) explains as follows:
The French use ofmodernite points to the experience of modernity inwhich
modernity is viewed as a quality of modern life inducing a sense of the
discontinuity of time, the break with tradition, the feeling of novelty and
sensitivity to the ephemeral, fleeting and contingent nature of the present
(Featherstone 1988:199).
The centrality of the concept ofmoderniie within the postmodern critique of reason,
constitutes the overarching context for postmodern critique of reason, defined from
a metaphysical perspective of closure and finality, and anchored in the assumption
of a universal ahistorical subject of reason and rationality.
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2.3 MODERNITY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL CATEGORY: THE SUBJECTIVE
TURN
As stated above, the emergence of modern society coincided with a radical shift
in historical self-consciousness. The new age, as the age of Enlightenment, was
seen as a progressive advance and an irreversible triumph over the values and
principles that had characterized all premodern forms of society. Given this radical
self-understanding of modernity, the major thinkers of the Enlightenment
movement interpreted their task primarily in terms of the general assumption that
modernity represents a radical break from the past; the task of philosophy was to
validate modernity's cultural independence and autonomy. This assumption
generally implied that philosophy was faced with the challenge of justifying the
Enlightenment's faith in reason, as the only appropriate form of authority in the
modern world. In trying to meet this challenge, it was generally accepted that
reason would have to be shown to be critical, independent and autonomous, in a
manner as radical as that which had accompanied the modern sense of historical
self-consciousness.
Modernity was not to be conceived of only from a chronological perspective; it was
seen to be a more progressively advanced political and social formation. For this
reason it could not, in principle, "look back" to the traditional values and principles
of the past for moral-political guidance. Indeed, what with the tremendous impact
of the Scientific Revolution, the Reformation, and the French Revolution, there was
great optimism regarding the possibility of a rational society in which its citizens
would display a moral responsibility and enjoy a political freedom unimaginable in
any other society.
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With the theme of autonomy and independence constituting the general context of
modern philosophy, the primary focus has been an investigation of "man" as the
subject and foundation of reason, from an epistemological as well as moral point
of view. In this regard, modern philosophy interpreted its role on the basis of a
specific interpretation of rationality aimed at the achievement of freedom and
autonomy for the individual, as a citizen of a modern democratic culture, on the one
hand, and a "private" moral agent, on the other hand.
In order to achieve these goals, philosophy had to demonstrate modern man's
capacity for "enlightenment", that is, moral-political maturity, as the cornerstone of
modern culture. Modern philosophy thus initiated a process of self-reflective and
self-validating reasoning, aimed at ruling out the possibility of all forms of
dependence on unfounded assumptions and knowledge claims incapable of
meeting the "universal" standards reason. In this regard, Descartes' model of
methodological doubt as means of arriving at certainty serves a classical example.
On this approach, Descartes believes he has discovered a universal truth insofar
as no rational person would deny that he or she exists. The "universality" of this
truth accordingly becomes the basis of rationality for Cartesian thinking.
The Kantian approach, as Iwill show in this chapter, also looks for the foundations
of certainty; in terms of this approach. however, it is the assumption of universal
a priori categories of understanding, and the intuitions of space and time, which
provide the basis for certainty. The implicit assumption underlying the Cartesian
and Kantian positions is that the possession of reason presupposes the possibility
of self-emancipation from ignorance and all forms of dogmatism, through a process
of rational self-reflection. This assumption is also central to political theory as it has
found expression in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, insofar as oppression and
exploitation are equated with ignorance of the true rational potential of bourgeois
society, as represented in the proletarian promise of a universal classless society.
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Given the general orientation and self-interpretation of modern philosophy as a
radical break with the preconceptions and preoccupations of its classical and
medieval predecessors, the collective efforts of modern philosophical reflection was
focused on overcoming the insecurity and anxiety that had inevitably resulted from
its endorsement of modernity as a radical new beginning. Eschewing the
metaphysical speculations of premodern philosophical enquiry, modern philosophy
could no longer concern itself with speculations regarding the status and position
of "man" in a cosmos or universe whose interrelated structure was thought to
display the harmonious workings of a mysterious Creator. The emergence and
impact of modern science seriously challenged the legitimacy of traditional
metaphysics, oriented towards a contemplation of a reality (permanent, necessary,
constant, unchanging) "behind" the flux of everyday experience. Given the
persuasive authority of the empirical methods of modern science, the abstract
speculations and doctrines of traditional metaphysics thus lost their legitimacy as
methods of enquiry.
From a philosophical perspective, the possibility and significance of modern
science had to be accounted for; the justification of the knowledge claims of
science had to be undertaken in such a way so as to prove the legitimacy of
modernity's self-definition and status as a progressive cultural phenomenon whose
superiority was attested to by its sole reliance on reason. The search for certainty
in a metaphysical realm "beyond" the field of sense experience, was now replaced
by a search for certainty "within" the a priori conceptual structures of a universal
thinking subject. Hence the "subjective turn".
If the central challenge of modern philosophy is to demonstrate that the question
of reason and rationality is of universal concern, then, closely related to this
challenge is an undertaking of a more radical nature: to demonstrate that the
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validity of all scientific knowledge claims is dependent on an a priori, more
fundamental, philosophical form of certainty whose essential nature consists in the
universal categories and principles of reason. From this perspective, the modern
approach to rationality does not concern itself only with a demonstration of such
universal categories and principles of reason; it also seeks to defend its status as
an autonomous discipline capable of grounding and validating such knowledge
claims. Within this context, modern philosophy, with its focus on "man" as the
universal subject and possessor of reason, has progressively advanced its cause
as an epistemological discipline intent on defending a subjectivist conception of
rationality. The "subjective turn" at the root of the modern approach to rationality,
presupposes the existence of a universal and permanent conceptual framework at
work in the thinking process, defined as rational.
In order to gain more clarity on the implications of this "subjective turn" for the
postmodern and postmetaphysical critiques of reason, it will be necessary briefly
to consider two of the most important representatives of the modern philosophical
tradition: Rene Descartes (1596-1650), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
2.3.1 Rene Descartes
Modern philosophy isgenerally regarded to have originated with Descartes, whose
reflections initiated a process of philosophical enquiry which would subsequently
be critically appropriated and redefined to accommodate the thoughts of a
distinguished lineage of thinkers, culminating in the writings of Immanuel Kant, and
beyond. For both Descartes and Kant, the Enlightenment legacy of subjective
rationalism represented the point of departure for modern philosophy. Although
Kant's transcendental approach differed radically from Descartes' "first philosophy"
of foundationalisrn, both philosophers were committed to the same ideal: to place
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philosophy within a universal context whence to determine the grounds of
rationality in order to adjudicate and ground all knowledge claims. In order to
achieve this goal, Descartes, in his Meditations, embarked on a journey of radical
doubt with a view to establishing the permanent foundations of knowledge within
the cogito (or mind) of the thinking subject. Introducing a method of systematic
doubt, leading to "clear and distinct" ideas that serve as the rational foundation for
the attainment of true knowledge, Descartes introduced a dilemma that would
become the central focus of modern epistemology: demonstrating the legitimacy
of a method that is claimed to originate within the a priori conceptual structures of
the thinking subject, but whose objective validity transcends the "inner"
representations of the thinking subject.
Descartes' epistemological program, which proceeded by means of a method that
was to be applied in strict accordance with clear and distinct ideas, was ultimately
to haunt modern philosophical enquiry for a long time to come. Doubts concerning
the Cartesian legacy of a presuppositionless beginning and an absolute foundation
of certainty, as the conditio sine qua non of all rational enquiry, have given rise to
serious questions regarding the feasibility of such a program. This skepticism has
ultimately culminated in the postmodernist critique and rejection of reason as a
normative principle. Richard Rorty, for example, raises serious doubts not only
about the foundational status of the modern epistemological program; he also
questions the very possibility of any theory of rationality that seeks to justify its
status in the light of ahistorical a priori (universal) standards and principles of
reason. Rorty (1980:315-316) is therefore critical of "[the] notion that there is a
permanent neutral framework whose 'structure' philosophy can display .... (or) rules
which constrain enquiry".
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In Descartes' epistemological program, the problematic nature of his dogmatic
insistence on an absolute foundation of certainty as the precondition of all
knowledge claims, ultimately leads him to invoke the hypothesis of "God" as the
originator of the cogifo's clear and distinct ideas, thus causing him to violate the
Leitmotif of modern philosophy by illegitimately acknowledging an authority
"outside" the parameters of the validating principles of subjective reason. In the
third and fourth "Meditations", Descartes (1980), for example, seeks to validate the
"clear and distinct" ideas in his mind by invoking the authority of "God" as a non-
deceiver, ultimately responsible for the existence of these ideas in his mind. This
move clearly runs contrary to the self-understanding of modernity, which prides
itself on the self-sufficiency of reason. This self-understanding is reflected, for
example, by Habermas (1987b:7) when he asserts that modernity must "create its
normativity out of itself'.
In the light of the above outline of the Cartesian programmatic orientation, the
question that presents itself is the following: What was the true significance of the
Cartesian quest for certainty? It is important to deal with this crucial question first,
before prematurely dismissing the Cartesian legacy as an impossible exercise
which can no longer be defended with any plausibility.
It is important to understand that for a philosopher such as Descartes, the modern
historical and cultural condition was experienced as something radically
disconcerting and disorienting, in spite of an acceptance, on his part, of the
Enlightenment project of reason. Pippin (1991), for example, vividly describes the
disorienting effect of the natural sciences on the reflections of Descartes:
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Given what Descartes himself was discovering about optics, what
astronomy had discovered about the apparent motions of heavenly bodies,
what the new physics was telling us about matter and motion, and the great
sense of natural contingency created by late Medieval notions of divine
omnipotence, the common-sense, trusted world of appearances might
indeed be thought of as a kind of dream, perhaps a show staged by an evil
genius. Things, it was turning out, were not at all, as they had seemed,
comfortably for countless generations. (Pippin 1991:23.)
Given Pippin's comments above, one can argue that the modern philosopher's
preoccupation with discovering the ultimate foundations of rationality within the
consciousness ofthe thinking subject, is a reflection of modernity's historical sense
of self-consciousness of an age which had to come to terms with a natural world
which had lost its familiarity in the face of the tremendous advances of the natural
sciences. If the scientific achievements of the day were construed as a cause for
concern regarding one's orientation within the context of everyday life, then
Descartes, in spite of his obvious admiration for the scientific and mathematical
modes of reasoning, felt obliged to subject the question of rationality to a radical
examination. In the process of carrying out this radical examination of reason,
Descartes set himself a task, the import of which has far outweighed the more
conventional interpretations which his work has generally received; interpretations
which have focused primarily on the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of
his thinking. Descartes' philosophical quest for certainty was rooted in a profound
fear of failure regarding the complex nature of his task of providing the self-
referential and self-validating grounds of rationality. Descartes feared that if he
failed in his undertaking, the cultural condition of modernity could lead to a cultural
condition of "madness". Descartes (1980) explains the underlying intent and
possible implications of his project of methodical doubt aimed at foundational
certainty, as follows:
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Yesterday's meditation filled my mind with so many doubts that I can no
longer forget about them - nor yet do I see how they are to be resolved.
But, as if I had suddenly fallen into a deep whirlpool, I am so disturbed that
I can neither touch my foot to the bottom, nor swim up to the top.
Nevertheless I will work my way up, and I will follow the same path I took
yesterday, putting aside everything which admits of the least doubt, as if I
had discovered it to be absolutely false. I will go forward until I know
something certain - or, if nothing else, until I at least know for certain that
nothing is certain. Archimedes sought only a firm and immoveable point in
order to move the entire earth from one place to another. Surely great
things are to be hoped for if I am lucky enough to find at least one thing that
is certain and indubitable. (Descartes 1980:61.)
Because for Descartes, epistemic certainty can only prevail in a situation purged
entirely of the possibility of doubt, it has generally been accepted that the modern
quest for certainty can only succeed if the mind is capable of divorcing itself from
all ties with the "real world". With this objective before him, Descartes initiates a
process of solitary self-refection in which the "inner voice" of the philosopher
becomes the only authentic (independent) voice of reason and truth, and which,
as such, is deemed capable of judging and dismissing the cultural and historical
contexts which necessarily inform the process in which all knowledge claims are
made. In the opening pages of the Meditations Descartes (ibid:) writes:
Several years have now passed since I first realized how many were the
false opinions that in my youth I took to be true, and thus how doubtful
were all the things that I subsequently built upon these opinions. From the
time I became aware of this, I realized that for once I had to raze everything
in my life, down to the very bottom, so as to begin again from the first
foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the
sciences. (ibid.:57.)
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On the Cartesian model, the general assumption of an absolute foundation of
certainty as a necessary condition and starting point within the rational process of
evaluating the validity of knowledge claims, has two important implications: firstly,
that the modern philosophical enterprise can only function successfully to the
extent that it overcomes its dependence on principles and assumptions that
originate within the philosophical traditions of the past; secondly, the quest for the
universal conditions of rationality and truth can only proceed within the
consciousness of a thinking subject, despite the fact that its "rational nature" is
something that it is supposed to have in common with all other rational subjects.
By dismissing the option of a shared commitment to the guiding assumption of
truth, within an intersubjective context of hypothetically advanced knowledge
claims, modern philosophy not only seeks to provide the invariant context for
evaluating the knowledge claims advanced in the scientific disciplines; it also seeks
to defend its status as an authoritative discipline on the question of rationality, thus
casting the philosopher in the role of a "master thinker" in relation to all disciplines
of knowledge, in the natural as well as social sciences (Habermas 1990:1-20).
As indicated above, for Descartes, the path to epistemic certainty, as the
precondition of knowledge and truth, can only produce one of two results: the
rational foundations of knowledge or, an inescapable descent into "madness". This
dilemma is at the root of the modern philosophical condition, and is aptly described
by Richard Bernstein (1983) as "Cartesian Anxiety":
The specter that hovers in the background of this (Cartesian) journey is not
just radical epistemological skepticism but the dread of madness and chaos
where nothing is fixed, where we can neither touch bottom nor support
ourselves on the surface. Descartes leads us with an apparent and
ineluctable necessity to a grand and seductive Either/Or. Either there is
some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we
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cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with
intellectual and moral chaos .... despite the many attempts to discredit the
foundation metaphor that so deeply affects modern philosophy, this
underlying Cartesian Anxiety still haunts us ... (Bernstein 1983: 18.)
In the philosophical search for certainty, Descartes endorses the Enlightenment
notion of a new beginning. Implicit in his position is the basic assumption that the
discipline of philosophy is essentially to be characterized by an autonomous a priori
self-reflective process of reasoning. In his Discourse on Method, Descartes (1988),
proceeds from a normative position offoundationalism, and explains his approach
as follows:
[N]ever to accept anything as true that I did not know evidently to be so;
that is, carefully to avoid precipitous judgement and prejudice; and to
include nothing more in my judgements than what presented itself to my
mind with such clarity and distinction that I would have no occasion to put
it in doubt (Descartes 1980: 10).
The truth that presents itself with a sense of clarity and distinctness to Descartes,
is the seeming self-evident and immediate certainty of his own existence as a
thinking being. Descartes (ibid) asserts:
And noticing that this truth - I think, therefore I am - was so firm and so
certain that the extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were unable to
shake it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle
of the philosophy I was seeking (Descartes (ibid.:17). (Emphasis,
Descartes'. )
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By placing the subject at the centre of the philosophical search for the foundations
of certainty, Descartes lays the cornerstone of the modern philosophical enterprise
of subjective rationalism. From this perspective, the foundation of certainty turns
out to be the self-certifying truth of a self-conscious awareness of the cogito as the
source not only of doubt, but, more importantly, of a truth whose validity is derived
from the immediate presence to the mind of the overwhelming certainty of one's
own existence. The cogito is accordingly given a unique status in modern
philosophy: it provides the normative grounds for validating the ideational contents
of the mind. The thinking subject is thus given a privileged status and a central role
in the process of attaining knowledge of "the object".
From the perspective of the Cartesian epistemological model, the process of
rationality is determined within the general context of a metaphysical distinction
between a subject that thinks (res cogitans), standing over and against the object
that it seeks to know (res extensa). In terms of this distinction, the subjective a
priori conditions of the possibility of knowledge are taken to be the fundamental
concern of philosophical enquiry. From the perspective of Descartes' metaphysical
distinction between "man" as a "thinking thing" (res cogitans), on the one hand, and
"the world" as object (res extensa), on the other hand, modern philosophy has
developed its distinctive hierarchical pattern of binary oppositions which have their
roots in the mind-body dualistic problematic of the Cartesian model.
The implication of Descartes' methodological mind-body distinction, with its
emphasis on clear and distinct ideas as the only valid basis for one's knowledge,
is that, in the final analysis, the world is construed merely as the contingent context
for the application of the formal concepts and a priori principles of reasoning of the
thinking subject. On this approach, the dominance of the subject is sharply
contrasted with the passivity and receptivity of the object. The possibility of
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dogmatism therefore continues to pose a threat insofar as the modern philosopher
insists on the application of a "method", the legitimacy of which is based on
subjective judgements assumed to be capable of identifying and distinguishing
clear and distinct ideas. In this regard, philosophical solipsism is a distinct
possibility; as Pippin (1991) points out:
Given the self-understanding of an extreme break in the tradition, of a need
for a new beginning not indebted to old assumptions, and so wholly self-
grounding, the modern philosophic enterprise appears to be locked in a
kind of self-created vacuum, determining by arguments or reason a method
for making claims about the world, but unable to argue convincingly that
what results is anything other than what the method tells us about the
world, be the "real" world as it may (Pippin 1991:25-26).
On the Cartesian model, the question of knowledge becomes extremely
problematic when one considers that it presupposes a normative conception of
reason whose effectiveness is tied to a faculty of judgement capable of validating
the truth and falsity of statements. The will has the unimpeded capacity for either
granting or withholding its assent from the knowledge claims presented to the
faculty of judgement. According to Descartes, the validity of such judgements
ultimately depends on the rational subject's choice to allow its free (infinite) will to
be guided by the true and distinct ideas implanted in the imperfect cogito by a
perfect "God", assumed to be incapable of deception. Descartes (1980) states:
Next I observe that there is in me a certain faculty of judgement that I
undoubtedly received from God, as is the case with all other things that are
in me. Since he has not wished to deceive me, he certainly has not given
me this a faculty such that, when I use it properly, I could ever make a
mistake. (Descartes 1980:79.)
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In view of the importance accorded by Descartes to the hypothesis of "God", one
can understand why, in the final analysis, his approach to the question of rationality
fails to meet the requirements of a modern self-consciousness whose evaluative
and critical capacity can only be derived from "within" the modern context of norms
and criteria. Given the parameters of the Enlightenment legacy of rationalism,
modern philosophy cannot invoke "external" sources of authority; its validation and
legitimation can only be derived from the "internal" authority of reason itself. It is
from the perspective of validating the role of reason as the only legitimate
normative authority of modernity, that the transcendental philosophy of Kant
assumes its distinctive significance.
2.3.2 Kant and the transcendental turn
Kant's contribution to modern philosophy has taken the form of a critique of reason,
defined as a critical self-examination of the limits and powers of reason. For Kant,
the term "critique" or "criticism" has a very specific meaning: it is a form of
reasoning that seeks to identify and uproot all forms of dogmatism in the light of
reason's authority to produce its own critical standards and principles. In order to
overcome the problem of dogmatism, Kant embarks on a critical program aimed
at establishing "by what right reason has come into possession of (its) concepts"
(1965:8 xxxvi). He believes that progress in philosophy can only occur once the
philosopher has reached clarity on the nature and limits of reason. This clarity, for
Kant, involves a transcendental process of critical self-examination:
It is a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks,
namely that of self-knowledge, and to institute a tribunal which will assure
reason its lawful claims, and dismiss all groundless pretensions, not by
despotic decrees, but in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable
laws. This tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason. (1965:A xii.)
(Emphasis, Kant's.)
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If the philosophical task of self-knowledge goes back, at least, to Socrates'
injunction to "know thyself', the task of reason's self-reassurance as a legitimate
and autonomous normative authority, is certainly central to modern philosophy's
self-understanding. Although Kant has correctly identified the major concern of
modern philosophy as being that of reason's self- reassurance, it is Hegel,
according to Habermas (1987b: 16), who first recognized the full import of the
problem of self-reassurance as the central problem of modernity. The success of
the project of modernity ultimately depends, according to Habermas, on reason's
ability not only to be critical, but also to provide the normative constraints for moral-
political action in the post-traditional and post-conventional ethos of modernity.
Habermas claims:
Hegel was the first to raise to the level of a philosophical problem the
process of detaching modernity from suggestions of norms lying outside of
itself in the past ... only at the end of the eighteenth century did the problem
of modernity's self-reassurance (Selbtsvergewisserung) come to a head in
such a way that Hegel could grasp this question as a philosophical
problem, and indeed as the fundamental problem of his own philosophy.
The anxiety caused by the fact that a modernity without models had to
stabilize itself on the basis of the very diremptions (or divisions:
Eintzweiungen) it had wrought is seen by Hegel as "the source of the need
for philosophy". (1987b:16.) (Emphasis, Habermas's.)
The "diremptions" referred to above are reflected separately in each of Kant's three
major works, Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique
of Judgement, where the focus is, respectively, on an examination of "theoretical"
reason, "practical" reason, and aesthetic judgement. In each of these
investigations, Kant's primary concern is to establish the existence of the a priori
conditions within the conceptual structures of the thinking subject. It is in terms of
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the philosopher's investigation and alleged understanding of these a priori
conditions, that modern philosophy receives justification for its specific undertaking:
the demonstration of reason's autonomy and normative authority as a (self-) critical
agency.
Regardless of the specific focus of his investigations, however, whether it is a
critique of the rationalist or empiricist orientation of modern philosophy, aimed at
establishing the foundation of theoretical reason, whether it is a critique of
speculative metaphysics with a view to establishing the basis of practical reason,
or whether he is concerned with establishing a cognitive basis for aesthetic
enquiry, the central question underlying Kant's research has essentially remained
the same: How can modern philosophy demonstrate the autonomy or
independence of reason from all hidden forms of dependency and all irrational or
non-rational forms of legitimation? More specifically, what are the universal and
necessary conditions ofthe possibility of knowledge insofar as these conditions are
assumed to originate within the a priori conceptual framework of the thinking
subject?
The execution of this enquiry takes the form of a transcendental investigation of the
rules and principles that are necessarily presupposed in the search for knowledge.
If modern philosophy is to be defined as an epistemological discipline, then the
question of reason and rationality is inseparably linked to a process of cognition
concerning the alleged universal principles and rules which are necessarily
presupposed in all cognitive disciplines. The task of the philosopher is to
investigate the nature of these rules and principles, and thus establish the a priori
context for the validation of all knowledge claims, a context whose legitimacy will
depend on its independence of all sense experience (Kant 1965:A xii). Kant is
therefore specifically motivated by the following question: "what and how much can
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the understanding and reason know apart from all experience?" (1965:A xvii.) The
investigation of this specific question proceeds by way of "transcendental"
approach:
I entitle "transcendental" all knowledge which is occupied not so much with
objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode
of knowledge is to be possible a priori (Kant 1965:A 12).
In the development of his program, Kant links the question of reason's legitimacy
and normative status to a procedural conception of rationality, in which he argues
for the validity of a "different" logic at work in each of the three domains of enquiry:
theoretical reason, practical reason, and aesthetic judgement. Although Kant has
presented each of his Critiques as an integral part of a more comprehensive
concern aimed at demonstrating the normative basis of reason's critical
independence and autonomy in the age of enlightenment, his Critique of Pure
Reason, however, has had a greater impact than the other two Critiques.
The significance of the success his first Critique is to be found in the fact that
modern philosophy has always seen itself as inextricably linked to the natural
sciences. Modern philosophy, defined as an epistemological discipline, has sought
its justification as a foundational discipline, equipped to legitimate and validate the
knowledge claims advanced in the natural sciences. Given the privileged status
that science has enjoyed in the advancement of the modernity project, it comes as
no surprise that modern philosophy has given pride of place to the cognitive status
of modern science, while at the same questioning whether philosophy can provide
the normative principles for establishing a cognitive basis for the "practical" and
"aesthetic" dimensions of human existence within the parameters of modernity.
Max Weber, for example, sees the progress of science as being incompatible with
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the respective types of rationality relating to the practical and aesthetic "value
spheres" of modernity:
'Scientific' pleading is meaningless in principle because the various value
spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each other.
(Quoted in Tate 1997:298.)
From the perspective of Kant's epistemological program, the modern philosopher
has been greatly influenced by Kant's denial that human understanding is capable
of knowing reality. This Kantian assumption has been translated into modern
philosophy by way of a radical shift from an object-centered approach, aimed at
defining the essential nature of reality, to a subject-centered approach, aimed at
defining the necessary epistemic conditions and presuppositions that are
transcendentally, that is, unavoidably, involved in the process of knowledge. In this
regard, the subject-as-knower has been privileged as the ground of reason and
rationality. Modern philosophy, as epistemology, has accordingly set itself the goal
of explaining that which the scientist allegedly has taken for granted, namely, the
rational grounds for the possibility of knowledge. On Kant's view, the human mind
is limited to a knowledge of phenomena only, since reality is the effect of a
mediated interaction between the a priori concepts or categories of the
understanding, and the material of sense experience, mediated through the a priori
forms of space and time.
By placing the thinking subject at the centre of the epistemological project of
modern philosophy, Kant is, in fact, reinforcing the authority of the humanist or
subjectivist orientation of the Enlightenment tradition. It is, however, important to
note the nature of Kant's "subjectivism". According to Lewis White Beck (1960):
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Both the forms of intuition and the categories may be called "subjective" in
the sense that they are forms of our experience, not of metaphysical
realities. But they are "objective" in the sense that they are not personal,
psychological features, of this or that mind, but are the rules for the conduct
of experience from the reception of data to the establishment of knowledge
of public objects in one space and time, the same for all observers. They
are thus the foundations for the kind of objectivity that characterizes
knowledge and distinguishes it from mere fancy and error, to wit, objectivity
as universality and necessity, producing a standard for all knowing minds
and underlying agreement among various observers about their common
objects. (Beck 1960:22.)
According to Kant, knowledge of the "subjective" dimension of human knowledge
constitutes a radical departure from the kind of arguments that have characterized
the work of his predecessors, the empiricists as well as the rationalists. His primary
concern is to establish what the mind can know independently of sense
experience, while fully accepting that the validity of such knowledge ultimately
relates only to the way in which we necessarily experience the phenomena of the
world. As Kant puts it
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding
no objects would be thought. Thoughts without concepts are empty,
intuition without concepts are blind. (Kant 1965:B 75, A 51.)
For Kant, the only way of establishing reason's independence is to show that all
human knowledge stems from the same sources, and that it is governed by the
same principles. Kant compares the significance of his transcendental approach
to a "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy:
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Hitherto, it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to
objects. But all our attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by
establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts,
have on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial
whether we may have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we
suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree
better with what is desired, namely that it should be possible to have
knowledge of objects a priori, determining something in regard to them prior
to their being given. We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines
of Copernicus' primary hypothesis. (Kant 1965:B xvi.)
From the perspective of the Enlightenment principle of reason's autonomy and
independence from all forms of illegitimate authority, except the authority of reason
itself, Kant has sought to define the main principle of modern philosophy, not only
in terms of the possibility of the "subjective", that is a priori forms of knowledge, but
also in terms of the significance of these "subjective" conditions. In this regard, the
possibility of a priori forms of knowledge bears testimony to the autonomy of
modern reason, and therefore the freedom of the modern subject. In his famous
essay, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, Kant (1996) reveals
the nature of his commitment to the Enlightenment principle of autonomy when he
states:
Enlightenment is mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity
is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without the
guidance of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its cause lies not in the
lack of understanding but rather in the lack of resolution and the courage
to use it without the guidance of another. Sap ere aude! Have the courage
to use your own understanding is thus the motto of enlightenment. (Kant
1996:58.) (Emphases, Kant's.)
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Kant's defense of the autonomy of reason reveals an implicit assumption that
knowledge is essentially "human" in character; it cannot but reflect its own
underlying "human" principles; it cannot lay claim to knowledge of anything beyond
the parameters of human understanding. As Kant puts it, "such knowledge has
only to do with appearances, and must leave the thing in itself as indeed real per
se, but as not known by us" (Kant 1965:8 xx).
Kant's restriction of human knowledge to the realm of appearances is not, however,
a cause for despair, but a celebration of the moral freedom of "man". In this regard,
Kant asserts, " I have therefore found it necessary to deny know/edge, in order to
make room for faith" (1965:8 xxx). For Kant, the autonomy of human reason as the
central category of modern philosophy, means that "reason has insight only into
that which is produced after its own plan ... it must not allow itself to be kept, as it
were, in nature's leading strings, but must itself show the way with principles of
judgment based upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answer to questions
of reason's own determining" (1965:8 xiii).
Kant argues furthermore that reason is, however, not concerned only with the a
priori categories governing our understanding of nature; it is also concerned with
the question of conceptual coherence or unity. Kant claims:
The law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary
law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason,
no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this
no sufficient criterion of empirical truth (Kant 1965:A 651, B 679).
Given the inseparable link between reason and the understanding, Kant challenges
the validity of the cognitive status of metaphysics, whilst acknowledging the
regulative status of its transcendental Ideas, not as source of knowledge, but as
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a means of ordering the diversity of sense experience into a meaningful and
coherent conceptual pattern (Kant 1965: A 644/B 672). Kant therefore accuses the
metaphysician of conceptual confusion when reason uses the categories of the
understanding to pronounce on metaphysical matters such as the existence of
God, and the moral freedom of the human subject, orthe fundamental assumption
of an objectively existing world, common to us all. On Kant's view, however, human
knowledge is confined to the realm of sense experience; the categories of the
understanding are valid only insofar as they apply to the realm of sense
experience. These categories are incapable of providing knowledge of anything
that falls outside or beyond the realm of sense experience. Metaphysics, therefore,
is not concerned with theoretical reason, or the domain of science; its primary
focus is the moral-political conduct of the modern subject within the context of
practical reason.
Beck's (1960) comments on the significance of the transcendental Ideas within
Kant's system are particularly useful:
Our thinking of them is not ... idle fancy. These categories themselves and
the demand for systematic unity determine what concepts of objects must
be used in order to complete, or attempt to complete, the search for
ultimate principles which will explain everything ... The categories, freed of
their anchorage in experience, become Ideas of reason. Ideas are
concepts to which no object in the senses can ever be adequate; but they
are not useless. They regulate the orderly pursuit of the whole. But if it is
erroneously thought that Ideas refer to objects as they really are, as the
categories refer to the objects of the senses, there arise various kinds of
illusions which it is the business of critique to expose. (Beck 1960:24.)
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Kant locates the origin of the idea of unity within the realm of pure consciousness:
There can be in us no modes of knowledge, no connection or unity of one
mode of knowledge with another, without the unity of consciousness which
precedes all data of intuitions, and by relation to which representation of
objects is alone possible. This pure original unchangeable consciousness
I shall name transcendental apperception. (Kant 1965:A 107.)
Kant's critique of metaphysics ultimately reinforces the autonomy of reason which
seeks to advance the legitimate demands for coherence and unity from a "this
worldly" perspective. The radical implication of Kant's critique of metaphysics does
not so much concern his restriction of knowledge to the realm of sense experience;
it has more to do with the critical dimension imparted to reason as a normative
authority in relation to the condition of modernity. The full import of Kant's critique
of metaphysics takes its orientation from the position that" pure reason is occupied
with nothing but itself. It can have no other vocation" (Kant 1965:A 680, B 708).
This ultimately translates into an appropriation of the critical aspects of the
metaphysical tradition, the significance of which is appropriately captured by Beck
(1960:24) when he refers to Kant's project as a form of" 'immanent metaphysics',
i.e. the systematic exposition of the a priori principles within experience and of the
regulative Ideas."
The critical aspects of Kant's project of "immanent metaphysics" have a decidedly
political dimension in so far as reason assumes a predominantly "public" role, as
the only legitimate authority within modernity capable of pronouncing on the
question of freedom. Kant asserts:
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Our age is, in especial degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism
everything must submit. Religion through its sanctity, and law-giving
through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then
just awaken suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason
accords only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and
open examination. (1965:A xii.)
For Kant, a crucial relationship exists between reason, as a critical power, and its
employment in the public domain of unconstrained dialogue and debate, the very
possibility of which relies on the political and moral freedom of the modern subject.
Reason is therefore the normative and critical authority of freedom, and as such,
it cannot be separated from the struggle against domination. Kant proclaims:
Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has no
dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free
citizens, of whom each must be permitted to express, without let or
hindrance, his objections or even his veto. (1965:A 739/B 767.)
In contemporary social and political philosophy, serious doubts have been raised
about the possibility of reason functioning as a normative authority within the
political and social existence of the modern subject. These doubts have become
more profound as the question of reason and rationality, traditionally associated
with the noble aspirations of a metaphysical tradition, focused on the "higher"
calling and dignity of "man" as a rational being, has increasingly fallen into
disrepute. The critics of the metaphysical tradition invariably cite, in justification of
their stand, the untold suffering (human as well as non-human) witnessed in the
modern world, and promoted in the name of truth, progress and human civilization.
This metaphysical legacy of the Enlightenment has, in the meantime, been
surpassed by a more practical form of reasoning, aimed at the strategic pursuit of
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ends, valorized in a capitalist-technologically driven social order, given the
centrality of these ends to the preservation of the human species. Within this
scenario, the rationality of technical-scientific knowledge has become the
paradigmatic expression of reason. The challenge of Kant's differentiated approach
to the question of rationality, together with its radical implications for the moral-
political dimension of modern life, have largely gone unheeded. The critics of
reason have thus proceeded to challenge the Kantian defense of enlightenment
in the light of modernity's inability to make good on its promises of a better life.
At first, this challenge took the form of what Habermas (1987b) has referred to as
a "dialectic of enlightenment", the purpose of which has been the transformation
of the modern conception of reason, from an a priori philosophical enquiry into the
alleged eternal laws of human understanding, into a practical pursuit of reason
within the political and social structures of history, the institutionalization of which
would henceforth be construed as the concrete manifestation of rationality in the
modern world. This challenge, however, has become more serious as the question
of human freedom has increasingly been conceptually separated from the realm
of "the rational". To the extent that the legitimacy of the social and political
institutions of modern life has been questioned, the enlightenment legacy of
modern philosophy has equally been challenged as a legitimate normative
authority. In this regard, the "post" in the postmodern challenge does not so much
represent the announcement of a "post-new or post-modern" age; more accurately,
it is an official announcement that the conceptual framework of modern philosophy,
with its exaggerated emphasis on the powers of the rational subject, has been
used and abused by "the System" to unleash its own programmes of power and
domination on an increasingly incredulous, but disempowered modern subject.
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It is against the background of the modern world's failure to live up to modernity's
potential for a better life that Habermas undertakes his critical defense of modernity
as an "unfinished project" of the Enlightenment. In this regard, Habermas has
found himself swimming against the tide of contemporary conventional wisdom,
which draws its inspiration from the litany of catastrophes that have accompanied
the modern experience. In order to appreciate Habermas's critical reaction to the
postmodern challenge of reason, it will be necessary to understand his
conceptualization of reason within the context of modernity.
2.4 CONCLUSION
The theme of subjectivity is the cornerstone of modern philosophy. The modern
metaphysical tradition has essentially been characterized by the privileging of an
autonomous subject, conceptualized from a universalist perspective, as a rational
subject of knowledge and moral action. This subjective turn within the modern
metaphysical tradition has meant that the question of being or reality could no
longer be investigated independently of a reflection and understanding of the role
played by the a priori conceptual and linguistic structures that are necessarily and
unavoidably presupposed in the rational process of thinking. From the modern
philosophical perspective, knowledge of reality (the object) goes hand in hand with
knowledge of a subject who "thinks" that reality, given its central constitutive role
in the modern epistemological tradition.
In view of the privileging of the subject, the modern approach has radically
reinterpreted the major themes of traditional metaphysics. Thus we find that the
central theme of "the unity of Being", as conceived within Greek metaphysical
thinking, and accordingly construed as a quest for harmony within the cosmos (the
hallmark of perfection for the Greeks), has been recast from the perspective of the
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modern conception of subjectivity, thus giving rise to the distinctive Cartesian-
Kantian emphasis on the foundational role of a rational subject, as the universal
condition of the possibility of knowledge as well as moral action.
In the modern metaphysical tradition, the theme of unity is reproduced from the
perspective of the subject, with a process of critical self-reflection serving as the
medium for establishing the legitimate limits and scope of reason. This process of
critical self-reflection, specifically aimed at establishing universal criteria of reason
and rationality, and anchored in the assumption of a universal subject, reflects
modernity's self-understanding of its freedom and autonomy from all non-modern
normative structures. Within the context of modernity, "man" (as a rational being)
assumes a central and superior role in a world where the rationality of scientific
knowledge has been interpreted as the paradigmatic expression of reason in the
world.
It is this humanistic orientation within the modern metaphysical tradition that has
become the main target and central challenge of postmodern as well as
postmetaphysical thinking. As McCarthy (1987b) puts it:
The strong conceptions of reason and of the autonomous rational subject
developed from Descartes to Kant, despite the constant pounding given to
them in the last one hundred and fifty years, continued to exercise a broad
and deep - and often subterranean - influence. The conception of "man"
they define is, according to the critics of enlightenment, at the core of
Western humanism, which accounts in their view for its long complicity with
terror. In proclaiming the end of philosophy - whether in the name of
negative dialectics or genealogy, the destruction of metaphysics or
deconstruction - they are in fact targeting the self-assertive and self-
aggrandizing notion of reason that underlies Western "Iogocentricism".
(McCarthy 1987b:viii.)
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In the following three chapters, we will examine in detail the various critiques of
reason, as presented from the postmodern perspective, on the one hand, and the
postmetaphysical perspective, on the other, within the broader context of
Habermas's debate with postmodern thinking.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DEBATE WITH LYOTARD AND
RORTY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Two we looked at the conception of reason at the root of the modern
philosophical tradition. In this regard, we acknowledged the principle of subjectivity
as the cornerstone of the modern philosophical tradition, and as the conditio sine
qua non of the modern model of rationality. We considered this model of rationality
from the philosophical perspective of the Cartesian-Kantian assumption of a
transcendental subject, defined as the a priori foundation of knowledge.
According to Descartes, the ultimate foundation of knowledge is to be found in the
indubitable existence of "the mind" (the res cogitans) which, as the foundational a
priori precondition of absolute certainty, justifies the validity of our knowledge
claims not only of an "external world", but also of all other objects and subjects
within it.
For Kant, on the other hand, the ultimate foundation and justification of our
knowledge has a transcendental basis insofar as the question of the truth of our
knowledge claims can only be determined once the universal and necessary
conceptual structures of the (rational) thinking process have been identified. Kant's
"Copernican revolution" thus constitutes a radical departure from claims to
knowledge of "the thing in itself', since our knowledge is necessarily determined
by (and restricted to) the way in which we, as (rational) thinking subjects,
necessarily think. On Kant's approach, all knowledge claims are necessarily
mediated through the a priori categories of the understanding (the conceptual
apparatus responsible for the way in which we arrange the "stuff' of our sensory
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experience of the world), on the one hand, and the a priori intuitions of space and
time (which determine the way in which we necessarily receive, or are affected by
the "stuff' of our sensory experience), on the other hand.
Even though the Cartesian and Kantian approaches are marked by profound
differences, with the former engaged in a quest for certainty as the condition of the
possibility of knowledge, and the latter engaged in establishing the conceptual
structures necessarily assumed to be involved in the thinking process, what they
both have in common is the assumption of an a priori universal basis for
knowledge, a basis that is assumed to be common to all thinking subjects. Within
this context, the assumption of a transcendental subject as the foundational
context of philosophical enquiry is the primary focus. From this perspective, the
modern epistemological tradition is primarily concerned with legitimating and
validating the knowledge claims of science, given its prior assumption that for
knowledge to be valid it must originate "within" the subjective rational thinking
processes of a universal transcendental subject which inhereswithin, but somehow
transcends the scope and limits of all specific cultural and historical contexts. The
question of reason and rationality, and the related problematic of knowledge (its
conditions of possibility), finds its locus in the monological "inner" space of a
disembodied, acontextual, ahistorical transcendental subject.
What happens when the assumption of a transcendental subject as the universal
foundation of knowledge is questioned? If the thesis of "the universal" as conceived
within the Cartesian-Kantian tradition is discarded, what are the implications forthe
modern philosophical tradition in which the question of truth and knowledge has
been inextricably linked to the question of reason and rationality? Does the
questioning, and subsequent abandonment, of the assumption of a transcendental
subject necessarily lead to a position of contextual ism which, in principle, denies
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the possibility of a coherent unity of perspectives? Does the acknowledgment of
a pluralistically defined world of multiple discourses, with philosophy being one of
them, necessarily lead to the disappearance of the assumption of "the universal"
as a regulative idea (in the Kantian sense), not only for providing coherence, but
also for imparting a critical dimension to philosophical thinking? Does philosophy
have the resources to deal with these challenges, and redefine its traditional role
as the "guardian of reason", or has it finally depleted its resources as the defender
of reason and rationality in the face of these challenges? Can the question of
reason and rationality still be linked to that of knowledge?
These are just a few of the questions that inform "the postmodern challenge", and
although they can be addressed from a numberofperspectives, I am of the opinion
that the one that takes us to the heart of the debate around the postmodern
challenge concerns the problem of rationality and relativism as arguably the most
important challenge the discipline of philosophy is currently faced with. Habermas
(1992a) sets the tone of the debate with the postmodern thinkers when he asserts:
[C]ontextualism has become a manifestation of the spirit of the times.
Transcendental thinking once concerned itself with a stable stock of forms
for which there was no recognizable alternatives. Today, in contrast, the
experience of contingency is a whirlpool into which everything is pulled:
everything could also be otherwise, the categories of the understanding,
the principles of socialization and of morals, the constitution of subjectivity,
the foundations of rationality itself. (Habermas 1992a:139.)
In this chapter and the next, we will evaluate the debate between Habermas and
his opponents in the light of the implications that arise when the question of reason
and rationality is pursued from the perspective of contextual ism. Our assessment
of Habermas's critical engagement with each of the postmodernists will concentrate
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on those aspects of their thought that relate to the central question of rationality as
it impacts on their respective interpretations of modernity. In this regard, we will
also examine the nature and implications of Lyotard's (1984:xxiv) claim regarding
a "postmodern condition", free of the "metanarratives", and thus of philosophy as
a privileged discourse for validating the knowledge claims of science. We will also
examine Rorty's position in the wake of his rejection of the epistemological legacy
of foundationalism.
In the next chapter, we will continue our assessment of the debate by focusing our
attention on Derrida and Foucault's respective attempts to overcome the modern
metaphysical tradition. We will examine the implications of the deconstructive form
of critique in the case of Derrida, and the genealogical form of critique in the case
of Foucault.
Before we assess the respective arguments of the postmodernists proper, it is
necessary first of all to present in broad outline an overview of the radical critique
of reason, its conditions of possibility or impossibility with regard to the question of
knowledge and truth.
3.2 THE CRITIQUE OF REASON
The debate between Habermas and his postmodern opponents centres around the
question of reason as a normative force within modernity. Even though the
postmodernists are not explicitly concerned with the question of modernity, it is
presupposed in their questioning and critique of reason. Although the question of
the condition of the possibility of reason (and the related notions of truth,
knowledge, objectivity) remains a legitimate one, this question is now approached
by the postmodernists from the perspective of modernity's historical self-
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consciousness, and mediated by a post-structuralist deconstruction of received
notions of knowledge and truth. The consequence of this (historicist) approach is
a collective attempt at decentering the subject as the privileged source and
foundation of truth, certainty and meaning, as exemplified in the foundationalist
assumptions of the modern philosophical tradition.
At the root of the postmodern critique of reason, is a determination to acknowledge
the historical nature of reason, which as such, cannot be separated from a pre-
defined linguistic network of social meanings and practices, nor does it allow for a
privileged ahistorical neutral point of reference, whence to determine permanent,
fixed and final criteria of rationality. On this approach, knowledge is essentially an
historically, socially determined process, and the knower is seen as a practically
engaged, socially embedded and embodied agent, in stark contrast to the
Cartesian-Kantian metaphysical notions of a disengaged, ahistorical, neutral,
prejudice-free subject. It is against this background, that Habermas has set the
overall context for his critical engagement with postmodern thinking.
In a debate held recently between him and Richard Rorty (1996), Habermas
underlines the broader hermeneutic (historical) focus which, up to a point, he
shares with his postmodern opponents; he also outlines the nature of his
fundamental differences with them. The common framework is the hermeneutical
idea of an historically and linguistically mediated interpretation of truth and
knowledge: his disagreement is voiced against a naturalized notion of truth and
knowledge, defined and justified solely with reference to their acceptance by a
particular community occupying a particular (social) space at a particular (historical)
time. As Habermas (1996) puts it:
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According to this idea, a linguistically disclosed world a priori fixes the rules
of what counts as true or false and rational or irrational for "us" - members
of the corresponding speech community - who are locked into this particular
world as long as the ontogrammatical regime of the language happens to
last. This radical contextualism relies on the proposition that meaning
determines validity but not vice versa. I would propose, instead, that the
interaction between world disclosure and innerwordly learning processes
works in a symmetrical way. linguistic knowledge and world-knowledge
interpenetrate. While one enables the acquisition of the other, world-
knowledge may in turn, correct linguistic knowledge. (Habermas 1996:24.)
The turn towards historical practices as the condition of the possibility of knowledge
and truth is a direct consequence of what Habermas and the postmodernists refer
to as the anti-Platonist movement that has accompanied Western philosophy
virtually from its inception. This movement reached its climax in the nineteenth
century, and found expression in the post-Hegelian orientation towards, what
Habermas (1987b:131) has called, "the desublimation of the spirit" and the
"disempowering of philosophy".
According to Habermas, the contemporary crisis of reason coincides with the
historical self-consciousness of modernity in the wake of the disintegration of
substantive traditional world-views. Habermas (1987b) interprets this historical self-
consciousness in the light of a general awareness that:
Modernity can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its
orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its
normativity out of itself. Modernity sees itself cast back upon itself without
any possibility of escape. (Habermas 1987b:7.) (Emphasis, Habermas's.)
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The problem of modernity's normativity or self-grounding was, according to
Habermas, first recognized by Hegel who, in response to Kant's differentiation of
reason into the three dimensions of theoretical reason, practical reason. and
aesthetic judgment, implicitly acknowledged the internal divisions brought about by
the reason of the Enlightenment insofar as it had effectively invalidated the
traditional values and practices, without being able to bring about the unity and
coherence once provided by traditional (religious) and metaphysical world-views.
Habermas's description of Hegel's critique of Kant underlines the need for unity
and the normative self-grounding of modernity:
Hegel can understand Kant's philosophy as the standard or (authoritative)
self-interpretation of modernity; he thinks he sees what also remains
unconceptualized in this most highly reflected expression of the age: Kant
does not perceive as diremptions the differentiations within reason, the
formal divisions within culture, and in general the fissures among all these
spheres. Hence he ignores the need for unification that emerges with the
separations evoked by the principle of subjectivity. (Habermas 1987b:19.)
(Emphasis, Habermas's.)
The need for unity of the three domains of rationality, as outlined by Kant, is seen
by Hegel as the most fundamental challenge facing modernity, and the task of
philosophy is accordingly interpreted as having to provide the relevant rational
criteria for stabilizing a destabilized epoch. As Habermas puts it:
[O]nly at the end of the eighteenth century did the problem of modernity's
self-reassurance (Selbsvergewisserung) come to a head in such a way that
Hegel could grasp this question as a philosophical problem, and indeed as
the fundamental problem of his own philosophy. The anxiety caused by the
fact that a modernity without models had to stabilize itself on the basis of
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the very diremptions (or divisions: Entweiungen) it had wrought is seen by
Hegel as" the source of the need of philosophy". (Habermas 1987b:16.)
(Emphasis, Hegel's.)
It does not fall within the scope of the present enquiry to follow the details of
Hegel's attempt to stabilize modernity, apart from mentioning that for him the
principle of subjectivity was seen as a divisive and authoritarian force within history,
whose achievements are, at best, one-sided and limited insofar as it operates in
terms of conceptual oppositions, thus inevitably marginalizing or excluding
"difference". In this context, Hegel sets philosophy the task of striving for absolute
knowledge of "the Whole", that is, identity in difference. In trying to address this
problem, Hegel turns his back on history in favour of a metaphysically orchestrated
dialectical process in which the specificity and uniqueness of historical events are
sacrificed on the alter of a false harmony between reason and history. The search
for the Absolute, defined as the absolute knowledge of reason, is seen by Hegel
as the solution for the disruption caused by the dynamic historical processes of
modernity set loose from the authority of past traditions. Habermas describes
Hegel's failure to reassure modernity as follows:
[A]s absolute knowledge, reason assumes a form so overwhelming that it
not only solves the initial problem of a self-reassurance of modernity, but
solves it too well. The question of the genuine self-understanding of
modernity gets lost in reason's ironic laughter. For reason has now taken
over the place of fate and knows that every event of essential significance
has already been decided. Thus, Hegel's philosophy satisfies the need of
modernity for self-grounding only at the cost of devaluing present-day
reality and blunting critique. In the end, philosophy removes all significance
from its own present age, destroys interest in it, and deprives it of the
calling to self-critical renewal. (Habermas 1987b:42.) Emphasis,
Habermas's. )
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The reaction against Hegelian idealism thus takes the form of a greater concern
with the question of history. The ahistorical epistemological foundationalism of
traditional philosophy is rejected in favour of an historical view of knowledge. This
historical orientation has in contemporary philosophy manifested itself in the
writings of Heidegger (1962) and Gadamer 1975), whose combined influence
cannot be overestimated within the post- Hegelian movement.
For our purposes, their most important contribution to the "desublimation of reason"
and the "disempowering of philosophy" is without a doubt the focus in their work
on the centrality of the notions of understanding and interpretation in the process
of knowledge. While Heidegger introduces the notion of Oasein's being-in-the-world
as co-extensive with a primordial pre-reflective understanding of a pre-existing
historical horizon as the enabling condition of knowledge, Gadamer radicalizes this
notion in terms of the inescapability of prejudice as the ontological interpretative
framework of knowledge. For Gadamer, the notion of prejudice is an
acknowledgment of the authority of our cultural traditions; not to acknowledge this
prejudice either lands us in an untenable position of ahistorical foundationalism, or
it leads us to an equally unacceptable alternative, namely, historicism, which
represents historical periods and events in terms of their absolute uniqueness and
complete independence of all other historical periods. According to Gadamer,
This recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice
gives the hermeneutic problem its real thrust.. .and there is one prejudice
of the enlightenment that is essential to it: the fundamental prejudice of the
enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which deprives
tradition of its power (Gadamer 1975:239-240).
It is to Habermas's credit that he accepts "the hermeneutic circle" as his point of
departure, but this does not mean, however, that he falls prey to its relativistic
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implications; nor does he accept its inherent conservatism. In his critique of
Gadamer, Habermas (1977) remarks:
Gadamer's prejudice for the rights of prejudices certified by tradition denies
the power of reflection. The latter proves itself, however, in being able to
reject the claim of tradition. Reflection dissolves substantiality because it
not only confirms, but also breaks up, dogmatic forces. Authority and
knowledge do not converge. To be sure, knowledge is rooted in actual
tradition; it remains bound to contingent conditions. But reflection does not
wrestle with the facticity of transmitted norms without leaving a trace. It is
condemned to be after the fact, but in glancing back it develops a
retroactive power. We can turn back upon internalized norms only after we
have first learned, under externally imposed force, to follow them blindly.
Reflection recalls that path of authority along which the grammars of
language games were dogmatically inculcated as rules for interpreting the
world and for action. In this process the element of authority that was
simply domination can be stripped away and dissolved into the less
coercive constraint of insight and rational decision. (Habermas 1977:358.)
As Habermas's critique of Gadamer shows, he accepts the "hermeneutic circle" of
cultural tradition and prejudice, as the condition of the possibility of knowledge; this
does not mean that normative elements implicit in the notion of truth should be
submerged in our attempt to come to terms with history. For Habermas, the idea
of history is inseparable from the idea of reason as a regulative, critical, context-
transcending force. Habermas (1987b:50, 53) claims that to the extent that
philosophers are still engaged in the problematic of history, they remain
contemporaries of the Young Hegelians, which meansessentially that philosophers
are still concerned with the self-critical reassurance of modernity, in search of its
own criteria and norms. On this view, although modernity is characterized by
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contingency and uncertainty, which is still susceptible to the normative ideas of
reason and truth. Indeed, as Peter Dews (1999) points out, for Habermas the idea
of reason-in-history is the major legacy of the Young Hegelians.
The Young Hegelians drew the conclusion that Hegel was in one sense
right about the relation between reason and history - there was indeed a
historically accumulated rational potential which his thought made visible.
But this potential still needed to be realized. Reason alone was impotent.
It had to be retrieved from the abstruse, abstract world of metaphysical
concepts, and made concrete in the lives of finite embodied beings. In
other words, the inner relation of reason and history, had to be preserved,
without transfiguring history into the already completed expression of
reason, as Hegel tended to do. (Dews 1999:3.) (Emphasis, Dews.)
Habermas accepts the situation described above as the context for the
development of his own project. The accumulated potential of reason is interpreted
by him from the perspective of modernity as an "incomplete project" (Habermas
1981 ). The context for the investigation of reason in history is the postmetaphysical
account of reason as it finds expression in the concrete "communicative" context
of the modern world, where the "pluralization of diverging universes of discourse
belongs to a specifically modern experience; (and) the shattering of naive
consensus is the impetus for what Hegel calls 'the experience of reflection
(Habermas 1985: 192).
For Habermas, the "linguistic turn", and the concomitant "desublimation of reason",
are representative of modernity's historical self-consciousness. Habermas's debate
with the representatives of postmodern thinking revolves around their respective
reactions to the contingencies that have accompanied the emergence of
modernity's historical self-consciousness. The most challenging question to be
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faced in this regard is whether the phenomenon of a plurality of world-disclosing
languages, discourses, vocabularies, power regimes, traditions, each with its own
specific social space and historical time, necessarily reduces us to the role of
passive cultural dopes, incapable of achieving a critical perspective, whence to
evaluate and challenge our inherited beliefs and values. Given this context, we will
now focus our attention on Lyotard, followed by Rorty.
3.3 LYOTARD: THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMATION
Of all the postmodern thinkers included in this study, Lyotard is undoubtedly the
most accepting of the term "postmodern". Indeed his most influential work bears
the title, The Postmodem Condition: A Report on Know/edge (1984, French
original, 1979). This book reflects in varying degrees an awareness of Habermas
as a defender of the Enlightenment legacy of freedom and reason, concepts which
for Lyotard are synonymous with the typically modernist attempts to justify the
modern condition in terms of "meta narratives", with philosophy operating as an
elitist discipline as it proceeds (firstly) to validate and legitimate the knowledge
claims of scientific as well as moral-political discourses, and (secondly) to provide
an overall unitary structure for indicating the "correct" status and "place" of such
knowledge claims within the larger scheme of things.
It is important to note that for Lyotard the "meta" part of the term "metanarrative"
denotes a sense of absolute independence from the realm of "the narrative". As
Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson (1989) point out:
We should not be misled by Lyotard's focus on narrative philosophies of
history. In his conception of legitimating narrative, the stress properly
belongs on the "meta" and not the "narrative". For what most interests him
about the Enlightenment, Hegelian and Marxists stories is what they share
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with other, nonnarrative forms of philosophy. Like ahistorical
epistemological and moral theories, they aim to show that specific first-
order discursive practices are well-formed and capable of yielding true and
just results. "True" and "just" here mean something more than results
reached by adhering scrupulously to the constitutive rules of some given
scientific and political games. They mean, rather, results which correspond
to Truth and Justice, as they really are in themselves independently of
contingent, historical social practices. Thus, in Lyotard's view, a
metanarrative is meta in a very strong sense. It purports to be a privileged
discourse capable of situating, characterizing and evaluating all other
discourses, but not itself infected by the historicity and contingency which
rendered first-order discourse potentially distorted and in need of
legitimation. (Fraser and Nicholson 1989:286.)
Given the above explication of the term "meta", if one seriously doubts the
possibility or legitimacy of metanarratives, then the metaphysical conceptual
structure that once performed the legitimating function is also rendered doubtful,
and this is the path Lyotard invites us to follow.
With the focus now falling on the role of scientific knowledge in a post-industrialized
technocratic age, the normative questions relating to knowledge and truth,
invariably acquire a technical sense in which the relevant criteria of rationality are
now aimed at evaluating the efficiency, the "performativity" and the "operativity" of
certain (knowledge) skills that are deemed necessary for the smooth running of a
scientific-technological, capitalist age (Lyotard 1984:xxiv-xxv). With philosophy's
privileged status as a foundational discipline regarding first-order epistemological
and moral-political truth claims now called into question, Lyotard feels justified in
his reference to the (post)modern condition as one of incredulity regarding the
legitimacy of a higher level of (philosophical) thinking, aimed at revealing the
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conditions of the possibility of (scientific) knowledge and moral-political freedom
and progress (ibid:xxiv).
Lyotard's critique of the modern epistemological and moral-political tradition is
indissolubly linked to his interpretation of modernity in general. In this regard,
Lyotard is primarily concerned with the role and status of scientific knowledge (the
discourse of "truth") in relation to moral-political knowledge (the discourse of
"justice"). Lyotard proceeds to compare and contrast scientific knowledge (the
paradigmatic expression of the modern conception of rationality) with the narrative
form of knowledge characteristic of pre-modern societies. In typically Nietzschean-
Freudian fashion, Lyotard challenges the positivist characterization of science as
a self-validating, self-referential, autonomous discipline. According to Lyotard,
modern science has forgotten its pre-scientific (narrative) roots, in view of its self-
definition as a discipline dealing with a type of knowledge, the acquisition of which
requires (ideally) a framework of absolute objectivity and neutrality, and has
accordingly sought to define its own status in opposition to narrative knowledge.
It is in this sense that philosophy, conceptualized as a foundational (nonnarrative)
discipline has come into its own:
Science has always been in conflict with narratives. Judged by the
yardstick of science, the majority of them prove to be fables. But to the
extent that science does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and
seeks the truth, it is obliged to legitimate the rules of its own game. It then
produces a discourse of legitimation with respect to its own status, a
discourse called philosophy. I will use the term modern to designate any
science that legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind
making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics
of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or
working subject, or the creation of wealth. (Lyotard 1984:xxiii.)
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Lyotard's critique of the modern condition is aimed at one fundamental concern:
the phenomenon of legitimacy as a source of (universal) consensus. As indicated
above, he contends that the modern condition has depended on two fundamental
metanarratives for its legitimation: the progressive advancement of "humanity"
based on the achievements of modern science; secondly, the progressive
emancipation and moral development of "humanity" towards a more advanced
condition. In this regard, philosophy fulfills two primary functions; firstly, accounting
for knowledge (and reason) in terms of the progressive emancipation of a
"humanity"; and secondly, that of "speculation" with a view to providing an account
of reality as whole by interpreting the various knowledge claims from a
metaphysical perspective of universal coherence:
The subject of the first of these versions is humanity as the hero of liberty.
All peoples have the right to science. If the social subject is not already the
subject of scientific knowledge, it is because this has been forbidden by
priests and tyrants. The right to science must be reconquered ... (the
second) ..."Speculation" is here the name given to the discourse on the
legitimation of scientific discourse ...Philosophy must restore unity to
learning, which has been scattered into separate sciences in laboratories
and in pre-university education; it can only achieve this in a language-game
that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in
other words, which links them in a rational narration, or rather
metanarrration. (Lyotard 1985: 33.)
But what happens when the meta narratives are found to be unacceptable? How
will the loss of legitimation (or the "delegitimation") of the meta narratives governing
the modern condition, affect our understanding of the modern condition, on the one
hand, and the claim to rationality and truth regarding the role of knowledge and the
progressive advancement of moral-freedom, on the other hand?
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Lyotard contends that the present crisis of modernity, and the accompanying
incredulity regarding the legitimacy of its metanarratives, has its origins in a
discredited metaphysical tradition, which has primarily been characterized by an
orientation towards a meaningful and coherent system. But this (metaphysical)
system of unity and meaning, Lyotard argues, has translated itself into a political-
economic (bureaucratic) system which radically undermines the possibility of
moral-political independence and autonomy. Fraserand Nicholson (1989) are quite
correct when they accuse postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard of identifying a
metaphysical crisis in philosophy as the basis of their social-political critique of
modernity, thus depriving themselves of the benefits of a critique anchored in the
actual and potential possibilities and achievements of the modern historical
processes and institutions:
Thus in the postmodern reflection on the relationship between philosophy
and social criticism, the term "philosophy" undergoes an explicit
devaluation; it is cut down to size, if not eliminated altogether. Yet, even as
this devaluation is argued explicitly, the term "philosophy" retains an implicit
structural privilege. It is the changed condition of philosophy which
determines the changed character of social criticism and of engaged
intellectual practice. In the new postmodern equation, then, philosophy is
the independent variable while social criticism and political practice are
dependent variables. The view of theory which emerges is not determined
by considerinq the needs of contemporary criticism and engagement. It is
determined rather by considerinq the contemporary status of philosophy.
(Fraser and Nicholson 1989:285.)
If one pursues the line of argument set out above, then one could argue further that
the crisis of modernity is a logical consequence of the recognition of the failure in
practical terms to produce an age of freedom and meaning consonant with the
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metaphysical demand for order and coherence. This demand is essentially in
conflict with the demand for freedom in a world that has been rationalized primarily
in instrumental terms.
Given the devaluation of philosophy, as indicated above, the question of the
universal is abandoned completely in favour of a pluralist understanding of the
(post) modern condition, characterized by an epistemological and moral-political
field of heterogeneous language-games. The implications of this analysis are that
philosophy can no longer function as a transcendent privileged discourse situated
"above" or " beyond" the actual domains of moral-political activity; science can no
longer be interpreted as a discipline of conceptual purity, functioning on an abstract
level "above" the interests and concerns of "ordinary people". Robert Koch's (1999)
comments on Lyotard's reconceptualization of philosophy in relation to science are
particularly significant:
Philosophy is and always has been a secondary discourse, an offspring, a
narrative produced by science to do battle with other narratives. Science
is therefore granted an absolute priority: for philosophy, at least, there is
"a/ways a/ready" science. At the same time, of course, the very production
of philosophy is an admission of a certain inadequacy on the part of
science. Science is absolutely different from narrative; but to do battle with
narrative, it is forced to provide evidence in narrative form ...Conceptual
knowledge condemns narrative knowledge as fable, but it can do so only
by producing yet another narrative, yet another fable, just as Plato
condemns writing in the form of written dialogues. From here one could
proceed to deconstruct the presumed conceptual purity of science. (Koch
1999: 128.) (Emphasis, Koch's.)
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For Lyotard, the problem of legitimation is a direct consequence of a rejection of
the meta narratives that have been used by modern philosophers to justify and
validate the modern legacy of the Enlightenment. This crisis of legitimation
following the general incredulity towards the modern themes of universality and
freedom inaugurates what Lyotard refers to as "the postmodern condition":
Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity towards
meta narratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a product of progress in the
sciences; but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the obsolescence of
the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds, most notably, the
crisis of metaphysical philosophy ... (Lyotard 1984:xxiv.)
It should be noted that when Lyotard refers to a "postmodern condition", he is not
so much thinking in terms of an historical periodization but rather a "mood ....or a
state of mind" (Lyotard1986-7:209). This recourse to a "mood or state of mind"
coincides with the postmodernists' refusal to engage in any "theoretical" analysis
or to project future historical possibilities based on "theory". On this approach, to
theorize is to perpetuate a metaphysical craving for order which, when it imposes
itself on history can only bring about domination and destruction, thus betraying the
democratic ideals of modernity. Recalling his personal experiences of the Algerian
War, Lyotard's comments are quite interesting:
[P]eople of my generation in France were confronted with the problem of
the Algerian War. After a simple enough analysis of the situation, it was
easy to see that the development of the Algerian struggle and the gaining
of independence would lead to the constitution of a bureaucratic-military
regime that would not exactly be democratic (Lyotard 1986-7:213).
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Lyotard argues furthermore that the condition of knowledge in contemporary
Western post-industrial and advanced capitalists societies, is no longer the same
as that of earlier societies. Knowledge in contemporary Western societies is no
longer concerned with "reality", or an identifiable universal rational subject as the
foundational basis of its claims to knowledge. On Lyotard's account, knowledge in
a post-industrialized postmodern age (of computers and the globalization of
information) is a matter of technology. The normative notions of reason and truth
are now confined to the technical sphere of "performativity", "efficiency" or
"operativity" (ibid.:xxiv-xxv).
Given this account of the condition of knowledge within the postmodern age,
Lyotard seeks to address the crisis of legitimation in the wake of the incredulity
regarding the privileged status of philosophy, defined as a metaphysical discipline.
He (1984) writes:
Wherein, after the meta narratives, can legitimacy reside? The operativity
criterion is technological; it has no relevance for judging what is true or just.
Is legitimacy to be found in consensus obtained through discussion as
Ji.irgen Habermas thinks? Such consensus does violence to the
heterogeneity of language-games. And invention is always born of
dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply the tool of the authorities;
it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate
the incommensurable. It's principle is not the expert's homology, but the
inventor's paralogy. (Lyotard 1984:xxiv-xxv.)
The quotation above reflects the essential elements of Lyotard's "solution" to the
current legitimation crisis. His strategy is to reverse the dominant theme of
consensus; his solution is to valorize "the other" opposite terms, with a view to
subverting the metaphysical legacy of the modern philosophical tradition. In his
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
84
critique and advocacy of a postmodern turn, the notions of "dissensus" or
"paralogy" replace the idea of "consensus". In this regard, Lyotard seeks to
promote an understanding of language based on the elements of paradox,
undecidability, discontinuities of speech acts, as a direct challenge to the
Habermasian understanding of language, which emphasizes the elements of
consensus and mutual understanding, as the ultimate goal of communication:
The theory of communicative action is based on an analysis of the use of
language oriented to reaching understanding. With the concept of
communicative action, the action-coordinating, binding effect of the offers
made in speech-acts move to the centre. Through these offers, participants
in communication establish interpersonal relations through intersubjective
recognition of criticisable validity-claims. (Habermas 1982:269.)
The notions of "dissensus" and "paralogy" are the central elements of Lyotard's
"agonistic" conception of language, in which the process of communication is
conceptualized as a fight, a competition, "a struggle for advantage over an
adversary" (Holub 1991: 141).
This reversal of the traditional conceptual order is made possible by a certain
(aestheticist) appropriation of the linguistic turn in philosophy. It is important to note
that Lyotard's linguistic turn is inspired by a moral-political intuition aimed at
challenging a modern condition in which knowledge has been equated with power:
He claims that "knowledge and power are simply two sides of the same question:
who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided? In the
computer age, the question of knowledge is now more than ever a question of
government (ibid.:8-9).
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Lyotard's assessment of modernity is based on a loss of confidence in philosophy's
ability to provide a coherent and plausible framework of meaning in place of the
traditional narratives of harmony and consensus:
My working hypotheses is that these narratives have lost their credibility for
the bulk of contemporary societies, and are no longer sufficient to ensure
a political, social and cultural bond, as they once claimed to do. Our
situation is that we have little confidence in them anymore. We must
confront the problem of meaning without any possibility of responding with
hopes for the emancipation of humanity (as did the Enlightenment school)
or for that of the Spirit (as did the German idealist school), or with the
practice of the Proletariat to achieve the constitution of a transparent state.
Even capitalism, the liberal or neo-liberal discourse, seems to have little
credibility in the present situation: that does not mean that capitalism is
finished, quite the contrary. But it does mean that it can no longer legitimate
itself. The old legitimation, "everyone will prosper," has lost its credibility.
(Lyotard 1986-87:210.)
With a view to justifying his critique of modernity, as well as his position regarding
the need to embrace the postmodern condition, Lyotard critically appropriates the
language theory of the later Wittgenstein. In terms of this appropriation, Lyotard
proceeds to challenge the notion that language is a transparent medium of truth
and reality. Instead of speaking of language, Lyotard now speaks of "language
games" in support of his argument that the postmodern society is a not a unified
whole, but a confluence of irreconcilable fields of "difference", incapable of
mediation or reconciliation at a meta-linguistic level. From the perspective of his
linguistic turn, Lyotard proceeds to develop an aestheticized conception of
language, in which "difference" is to be privileged in a universe characterized by
a plurality of incommensurable language games. Lyotard employs the argument
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for the incommensurability of language games in order to reinforce his basic
conviction regarding the nature of social-political interaction, namely that it is
primarily an arena of conflict and dissension. Lyotard accordingly views language
not so much as a means of communication aimed at reaching agreement or
consensus, as Habermas does, but as a site of struggle and conflict, which
ultimately results in dissension because "truth" is now simply viewed as a victory
of a particular (dominant) language game.
Robert C. Holub (1991) underlines the significance of Lyotard's conception of
language, and its attendant notion of incommensurable language games, in the
light of three basic considerations:
First, the rules by which they are played are not inherent in them, but rather
agreed upon among the players by contract. Second, the rules and the
game are mutually dependent. If a rule is changed, the nature of the game
or a correct move in the game is altered; if an incorrect move is played,
then it does not belong to the game. Third, there is no utterance that
escapes one or another language game. (Holub 1991:140-141.)
In the light of the above, Lyotard wants to argue that communication is essentially
reducible to the application and adherence to a set of rules, and the communication
partners are essentially involved in a mutual process of outwitting and
outmaneuvering one another. He writes: "to speak is to fight, in the sense of
playing, and speech acts fall within the domain of a general agonistics" (Lyotard
1984:10). Implicit in this understanding of language is the claim that the validity of
truth and knowledge claims are reducible to the specific context where they are
raised, and that their truth ultimately depends on those who literally "win" the
argument, and whose victory depends on considerations of power, strategy,
rhetoric. In this regard, validity claims and language claims are collapsed into one,
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a position which is unsatisfactory in view of the fact that Lyotard is unable to
account for the status and validity of his own claim regarding an "agonistic" theory
of language, since he wants us to agree with him in at least one important respect,
namely, that dissension is the primary motivation of language. As Holub (1991)
puts it:
If we assume that Lyotard is correct and that dissension is the te/os of
speech, then we are unable to account for the status of his own statement.
We cannot agree with the propositional content of his statement without
simultaneously denying the validity of the statement. In short, Lyotard
cannot consistently maintain an argument that seeks to convince us that
universally arguments do not aim at our consent. (Holub 1991 :143.)
Given his conception of language as a medium of incommensurable language
games, none of which can lay claim to a special or privileged status, in view of the
absence of a metanarrative in which to ground the various language games, it is
interesting to note that Lyotard is unable to consider the possibility of a narrative
of legitimation from "within" those language games. What is even more interesting
is that he does recognize more than one form of rationality within the (post) modern
condition, but for him therein lies the crisis, because without an overarching context
of legitimation, the different forms of rationality are, in principle, autonomous, and
should not collapse into one another for fear of the possibility of a "totalitarianism
of reason". Nor does he wish to consider the possibility of linking "the other" of
reason with narrative knowledge:
As we think through this side of Kant's thought...it is easy to show that it is
never a question of one massive and unique reason - that is nothing but an
ideology. On the contrary, it is a question of plural rationalities, which are,
at the least, respectively, theoretical, practical, aesthetic. They are
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profoundly heterogeneous, "autonomous", as Kant says. The inability to
think this is the hallmark of the great idealist rationalism of nineteenth-
century Germain thought, which presupposes without any explication that
reason is the same in all cases. It is a sort of identitarianism which forms
a pair with a totalitarianism of reason, and which, I think, is simultaneously
erroneous and dangerous. (Lyotard 1988:279.) (Emphasis, Lyotard's.)
Lyotard's unwillingness to investigate the possibility of consensus in a
postmetaphysical sense, together with his inability to reflect on the possibility of
linking these forms of rationality with a practical source within "the real" world, are
responsible for his views on a "crisis of reason", which for him is the inevitable
consequence of a "crisis of the foundations" of reason (ibid.:280). Lyotard thus
encourages his reader to challenge all forms of consensus by way of waging" a
war on totality" (Lyotard 1984:82).
What is particularly significant about his stance regarding the question of
consensus is that he looks to scientific practice for the possibility or impossibility
of consensus, which then serves as an analogy for the justification of a more basic
thesis: that non-scientific or pre-scientific (narrative) forms of consensus are
equally impossible to achieve in the (post) modern condition:
What has been called "the crisis of the foundations" is not something that
can be neglected today to the pretended advantage of a consensus of
argument, when the consensus is precisely what is missing from the interior
of the, let us say physical, sciences. And far from suppressing the
possibility, contrary to what might be thought, this absence of consensus
has, on the contrary, only worked to allow a more rapid and a more
impressive development of the sciences ...What conclusions can we draw ... 1
would say one thing, which is that the crisis of reason has been precisely
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the bath in which scientific reason has been immersed for a century, and
this crisis, this continued interrogation of reason, is certainly the most
rational thing around. (Lyotard 1988:280.)
At the root of Lyotard's position is a rejection of a correspondence theory of truth,
in which rationality is determined by our knowledge of an independent reality "out
there". The anti-realist position, adopted by Lyotard, severs the cognitive link
between rationality and "reality', and seeks instead to defend "truth" on pragmatic
grounds, as it finds expression within the particular contexts of particular
communities who happen to "speak the same language". Lyotard accordingly
advances a nonrealist or anti-realist conception of language, which presupposes
a non-representational model of rationality, and which thus rejects the subject-
object model of the modern philosophical tradition. For Lyotard, if language is not
to be conceived from a representational perspective, it is essentially to be
conceived of as a creative medium for the subversion of existing forms of
consensus in search of the "unpresentable" and "the sublime" (Lyotard 1984:71-
82).
If the question of knowledge is no longer to be determined on a representational
model of truth, then "consensus is only a particular state of discussion (in the
sciences), not its end. Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy" (Lyotard 1984:65-66).
The most significant implication of Lyotard's privileging of paralogy (as opposed to
consensus) is the possibility of resisting and overcoming metaphysical and
universalistic theories of rationality within the various fields of incommensurable
language games; there is no room for a privileged discourse. From the (post)
modern perspective, all we can do is to compare and contrast the scientific and the
narrative forms of knowledge. This argument allows Lyotard to place us, his reader,
before the (theoretical) possibility or a choice or preference between two seemingly
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irreconcilable, mutually exclusive types of knowledge: the scientific and the
narrative. Holub (1991 :144) summarizes Lyotard's comparative analysis as follows:
1. Narrative knowledge permits a great variety of language-games; scientific
knowledge is only concerned with the truth claims of denotative statements.
2. Narrative language presupposes a shared social bond; scientific knowledge
does not.
3. In scientific discourse knowledge is restricted to the competence of an
expert; in narrative knowledge competence resides within the structures of
the community (the sender and the recipient have an equal claim to
competence with regard to knowledge claims).
4. Statements of scientific knowledge are potentially falsifiable, and thus
tentative; narrative knowledge cannot be falsified.
5. Scientific knowledge is concerned with cumulative knowledge and progress.
Narrative knowledge is "circular" and is constantly reclaimed and
revalidated.
In the light of the differences indicated above, Lyotard questions the privileged
status of modern science, because, as he sees it, neither scientific nor narrative
knowledge has a claim to cognitive superiority. With the loss of a metanarrative in
which to ground the plurality of discourses rooted in their respective language
games, Lyotard claims that the discourse of science must legitimate itself in terms
of rules internal to itself. Given his position in this regard, Lyotard dismisses the
possibility of a more comprehensive notion of reason, inclusive of narrative
knowledge. For him scientific and narrative knowledge are discontinuous, mutually
exclusive:
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It is therefore impossible to judge the existence or validity of narrative
knowledge on the basis of scientific knowledge and vice versa. All we can
do is to gaze in wonderment at the diversity of discursive species, just as
we do at the diversity of plant or animal species. Lamenting the "loss of
meaning" in postmodernity boils down to mourning that knowledge is no
longer principally narrative. (Lyotard 1984:26.)
As can be seen in the above, Lyotard's main point regarding a postmodern
condition is that the principles and criteria of knowledge are not self-validating. All
knowledge claims arise within the pre-theoretical "narrative" realm. Although
scientific knowledge seems to have achieved a certain degree of autonomy in the
modern world (whence the illusion of science as a self-validating discourse), the
truth of the matter is simply that the narrative forms of justification have a socio-
political origin (the narrative of the freedom of a universal subject or class). But this
is exactly where Lyotard identifies a serious problem, because, for him, the
language game of scientific discourse is radically incommensurable with the
language game of moral-political discourse. Lyotard (ibid.:40) asserts, " [t]here is
nothing to prove that if a statement is true, it follows that a prescriptive statement
based upon it ...will be just". In view of this differentiation or "splintering" of reality
Lyotard (ibid.:41) concludes:
We may form a pessimistic impression of this splintering of reality: nobody
speaks all of those languages, they have no universal metalanguage, the
project of the system-subject is a failure, the goal of emancipation has
nothing to do with science, we are stuck in the positivism of this or that
discipline of learning ....Speculative or humanistic philosophy is forced to
relinquish its legitimation duties, which explains why philosophy is facing a
crisis whenever it persists in arrogating to itself such functions and is
reduced to the study of systems of logic or the history of ideas where it has
been realistic enough to surrender them. (Lyotard 1984:41.)
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When philosophy surrenders its legitimation duties, Lyotard, in keeping with his
aestheticist conception of language, feels "free" to challenge all forms of
consensus within the scientific and moral-political fields of discourse. This
aesthetically inspired subversion of prevailing scientific criteria as well as moral-
political codes and conventions do not, however, require any legitimation on the
grounds that it is articulated in the form of a "narrative", and narratives do not
require the kind of proofs and argumentation (so it is argued) that we have come
to associate with scientific knowledge. Lyotard may simply appeal to the authority
of empirical evidence to support his thesis that social reality (as well as scientific
reality), mediated in and through language, are fields of discourse marked by
irreconcilable "dissensus' and "paralogy".
On the postmodern approach, the question of "reality" as something to be
represented (and the corresponding idea of truth based on consensus) is replaced
with the focus now on "the unpresentable" and "the sublime" as regulative ideas
aimed at ruling out the possibility of metaphysical closure (1984:82). By promoting
an aesthetic orientation towards "the sublime", Lyotard wishes his readerto be fully
aware that all forms of conceptual representation are, at best, merely contingent
and tentative, given his central argument that knowledge claims within the
postmodern condition are characterized by the absence of the "metanarratives" of
the philosophical discourse which, in the modern tradition, has served as the
means of validating and grounding the knowledge claims of science. Lyotard
accordingly advocates an attitude aimed at an acceptance of the tentative nature
of our knowledge claims:
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the
unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the solace of
good forms, the consensus of a taste that would make it possible to share
collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for the
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new presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a
stronger sense of the unpresentable (Lyotard 1984:81).
Behind Lyotard's rejection of the assumption of a universal context of legitimation
for scientific knowledge, however, is a moral-political imperative to resist all forms
of "terror", which for him is synonymous with all forms of consensus and
legitimation. As Lyotard (1984) asserts:
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much terror as we
can take. We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole
and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the
transparent and the communicable experience. Under the general demand
for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear the muttering of the
desire for a return of terror, for the realization of the fantasy to seize reality.
The answer is: Let us wage a war on totality; let us to be witnesses to the
unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the
name (Lyotard 1984:82.)
In the light of Lyotard's commitment to the "unpresentable" beyond the rationalistic
trappings of modern epistemological foundationalism and metanarratives, a
question that presents itself is the following: Does the postmodern critique of the
epistemology with its founding principle .and assumption of a universal subject
necessarily lead to the abandonment of the universal? If it does, are we then
condemned to a plurality of different incommensurable discourses without the
possibility of transcending the specificity of our contingent horizons? If truth is now
to be determined relativistically, does it mean that we are permanently "stuck" in
our little corners, jealously guarding the integrity of limited positions in space,
without the possibility of transcendence? Is transcendence or the universal
necessarily synonymous with the "terror" of the conceptual? Is the aesthetic of "the
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sublime", that is, the permanent creation of "the new" (new languages or
vocabularies), our only hope of avoiding the false universalism that necessarily
accompanies the privileging a particular discourse - scientific, religious, moral-
political, or aesthetic? We will now consider Habermas's response to these
questions.
3.4 HABERMAS'S RESPONSE TO LYOTARD
Lyotard undoubtedly sees Habermas as a representative of an outmoded
metaphysical tradition, insofar as he still feels justified in seeking unity and
coherence in a world marked by the pluralism and diversity of incommensurable
languages games. Implicit in the charge of metaphysical unity and totality is an
attempt on Habermas's part, to justify the Enlightenment metanarrative of the
emancipation of humankind. In the debate between these two thinkers we witness
a serious clash between two radically different conceptions of language, invoked
to validate two radically different interpretations of the modern condition. Lyotard's
criticism of Habermas, is the direct consequence of his rejection of the two
distinctive metadiscourses of modernity: the narrative offreedom and the narrative
of speculation. In this scenario, philosophy has enjoyed a privileged status, insofar
as it has had to legitimate the scientific discourse of modernity from the perspective
of an ahistorical (non-narrative) perspective. But Lyotard does not accept the
neutrality and objectivity of science; he believes like Habermas, that modern
science has baen misrepresented, as having originated "in heaven" as it were.
Given the modernist assumption that scientific knowledge is the precondition of
moral progress and freedom, if the credibility of the narrative of speculation is
questioned, then the narrative of freedom is also questioned. On this account,
scientific discourse is demoted by Lyotard from its privileged status, and separated
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from all connection with the moral-political domain of discourse. For Lyotard, the
realm of science and the moral-political realm of narrative knowledge, constitute
two incompatible language-games. On this view, the consensus reached in the
world of science has no bearing on the realm of narrative knowledge. Lyotard's
argument, in this regard, is based on his rejection of a correspondence theory of
truth, where the latter provides a moral imperative which, as in the metaphysical
tradition, dictates a vision of "the good life" based on our position in the world. It is
from this perspective that he proceeds to accuse Habermas of an ontological
fallacy, that is, a position in which a true state of affairs in the world (of science)
becomes the basis forthe formulation of prescriptive rules of justice (Lyotard, 1984:
40).
But, as Holub (1991 :147) points out, Habermas clearly distinguishes between the
sphere of scientific truth and that of moral rightness. Indeed, Habermas's
understanding of modernity is based on a differentiation of three autonomous
spheres, science, morality, and art, each with its own particular question and
domain: truth is ascribed to natural science; normative rightness, in the form of
justice, is ascribed to morality; authenticity or beauty (through judgements of taste)
is ascribed to art (Holub 1991 :135, Habermas 1981 :9). Habermas identifies a
specific rationality or "inner logic" with each of these spheres; cognitive-rational for
science, moral-practical for ethics, and aesthetic-expressive for art. Lyotard's
accusation, therefore, that Habermas has collapsed these distinctions is clearly
without substance, because Habermas does not subscribe to a correspondence
theory of truth, but a consensus theory which presupposes the possibility of
agreement based on a process of rational deliberation.
Lyotard furthermore accuses Habermas of failing to appreciate the proliferation of
language games within the scientific world, in view of which a postmodern account
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of science is needed, given the absence of a metalinguistic principle in which to
ground these different discourses. According to Lyotard (1984:41), "nobody speaks
all of those languages, they have no universal metalanguage".
It is quite clear that Lyotard is referring to an empirical situation within science,
whereas Habermas is talking about a formal possibility inherent in the very process
of communicative action. The possibility of mutual understanding does not depend
for Habermas on the existence of a metaphysical principle, but rather on the
validity of the arguments that are raised in the process of intersubjective
communication. On this view, the process of debate and argumentation
presupposes the possibility of consensus.
The distinction that Lyotard makes between scientific and narrative knowledge lies
at the basis of his understanding of modernity. What is particularly interesting is
that he views the two forms of knowledge as being essentially incompatible. Here
we find a typical trait of modern thinking: the social world is contrasted with the
scientific world, with the former being regarded as devoid of reason, while the latter
is associated with a technical-strategic form of rationality. In view of his
identification of scientific knowledge as the paradigmatic model of rationality in the
modern age, Lyotard associates narrative knowledge with pre-modern times, with
no connection whatsoever with scientific discourse, so as to consolidate his vision
of a plurality of incommensurable language-games.
In his article, Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity (1985), Richard Rorty tries
to mediate between these two thinkers. In the course of his discussion, he
describes the respective positions as follows:
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...the French writers whom Habermas criticizes are willing to drop the
opposition between "true consensus" and" false consensus" or between
"validity" and "power" in order not to have to tell a metanarrative in order to
explicate "true" or "valid". But Habermas thinks that if we drop the idea of
"the better argument" as opposed to "the argument which convinces a
given audience at a given time", we shall only have a "context-dependent"
sort of social criticism. (Rorty: 1985: 162.)
For Lyotard the giving up of metanarratives should imply that scientific knowledge
is on a par with narrative knowledge. According to Seyla Benhabib (1985), this is
not the case, however, because Lyotard seems to equivocate with regard to the
relationship between scientific knowledge and narrative knowledge. Whereas for
Rorty there is a link between the scientific knowledge and the social world, and for
Habermas (1992:48-51) there is a connection between the pre-reflective practical
concerns of ordinary people within the life-world, that serves as a normative basis
for the world of science, Lyotard does not establish a link between the (practical)
realm of narrative and the (theoretical) realm of scientific knowledge. He therefore
condemns the social world to a status of ahistoricity, with no internal mechanism
for self-criticism, self-reflection and self-correction in the light of new learning
experiences. The social world seems to exist in a "non-rational' or "pre-rational
void".
It ...implies that all change in this episteme comes from without, through
violence. Such an episteme has no self-propelling or self-correcting
mechanism. But, in fact, this is to condemn the subjects of this episteme
to ahistoricity, to deny that they inhabit the same space with us. We do not
interact with them as equals, we inhabit a space in which we observe them
as ethnologists and anthropologists, we treat them with distance and
indifference. (Benhabib 1985:119.)
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Benhabib then proceeds to state the Habermasian alternative:
... if indeed narrative knowledge is the "other" of our mode of knowledge,
then Lyotard must admit that narrative and scientific knowledge are not
merely incommensurable, but they can and do clash, and that sometimes
the outcome is less than certain. To admit this possibility would amount to
the admission that "narrative" and "discursive" practices occupy the same
epistemic space, and that both raise claims to validity, and that an
argumentative exchange between them is not only possible but desirable.
(Benhabib 1985:119-120.)
Lyotard, however, cannot entertain the possibility of harmony and consensus, in
view of his uncritical acceptance of the language-game theory. Lyotard's account
of incommensurable language-games is supported by an agonistic theory of
language, which he opposes to Habermas's notion of consensus in order to show
that "consensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Its end, on the
contrary, is paralogy" (Lyotard 1984:65-66). This position, as indicated earlier,
leads Lyotard into "a performative contradiction" in the sense that Lyotard want us
to agree with the truth of his statement, but the propositional content of his
statement contradicts what he wants us "in the end" to do: to agree with him.
It is the formal aspects of language, the unavoidable pragmatic assumptions
inherent in the communicative mode of language that point beyond the radical
contextualism of Lyotard. At the root of his agonistic language theory of moves and
counter-moves, in which the power of strategic manipulation is privileged at the
expense of the co-ordinating function of language by way of rational discussion and
consensus, Lyotard clearly reveals an inability to distinguish between systematic
thought, which he associates with "terror", and the universalistic notion of
communicative reason that finds expression in communicative efforts of mutual
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understanding within the structures of conversations of ordinary people, across the
spectrum of differences that intersect their lives.
The main consequence of Lyotard's failure to grasp the significance of the
universal is that the very real possibility of communication beyond the horizons of
our particular contexts, is rendered impossible. When the possibility of learning
from others whose "truth" seems to undermine or invalidate our own conceptions
is ruled out, the very notion of truth itself, as "true for us" is rendered nonsensical.
We do not accept something because others who speak our own language say so.
We accept something as true because we believe we have reason(s) to accept its
truth. So the question of truth cannot be separated from the reasons that we offer
in its defense, and these reasons can only be vindicated in a form of
communication that will persuade others to accept them as universally valid and
therefore true. On Habermas' account, rational persuasion takes the place of
metaphysical principles or metanarratives, but the question of the universal
remains a live option. Axel Honneth's (1985) comments regarding Lyotard's failure
to appreciate the significance ofthe universal as an unavoidable assumption within
the process of communication and argumentation are particularly important:
...because he is not able to just ignore the problem of the universal without
remainder, Lyotard must in the end become ensnared in the premises of
his own thought: the antipathy towards the universal forbids a solution to
the very problem he came up against with his demand for an unforced
pluralism of social language-games. For, if recourse to universal norms is
in principle blocked in the interest of a critique of ideology, then a
meaningful argument in support of the equal rights to co-existence of all
everyday cultures can not be constructed. This excludes the possibility of
formulating a rule,let alone of institutionalizing a form of law, which, beyond
the internal moral perspective of language-games, could take responsibility
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for the universal recognition of the equal rights of culture. For how could the
equal rights of all language-games be grounded as a moral principle, if at
the same time every regulation of social intercourse which goes beyond the
norms of specific cultures is to be dispensed with? (Honneth 1985:155.)
We will now consider the views of another anti-universalist, Richard Rorty.
3.5 RORTY: THE CRITIQUE OF FOUNDATIONALISM
Rorty has been a leading voice in the call for the abandonment of the modern
philosophical conception of reason as anchored in the epistemological tradition. In
this regard, he has questioned the cognitive status and legitimacy of modern
philosophy, as a metaphysically defined discipline, capable of grounding the
knowledge claims of science within a normative framework aimed at giving a
universal account of reason and truth. In his influential and controversial work,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980), Rorty offers his reader a penetrating
and challenging critique of the central assumption at the heart of the modern
epistemological tradition: the subject (defined as "a mind") oriented towards an
independent object (reality), expressed in a correspondence theory of truth, as the
condition of knowledge and rationality.
Rorty's major concern is not, however, with the epistemological problematic; his
critique is based on the central conviction that reason, and its related notion of
truth, as a transcendent universal presupposition, is no longer valid. Rorty
consequently recommends that we desist from further attempts to salvage the
metaphysical legacy of epistemology, with its Platonic distinctions of truth-falsity,
reality-appearance, subject-object, and so forth, on the grounds that philosophy
has "outlived its usefulness" (Rorty 1982:xiv). As a consequence, Rorty advocates
hermeneutics not as a "successor subject" to epistemology, but "as an expression
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of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled"
(Rorty 1980:315).
For Rorty, a rejection of the metaphysical legacy of the modern epistemological
tradition leads unavoidably to a position of radical contextualism (historicism),
mediated by an appropriation of "the linguistic turn" which, for him, becomes the
condition for the impossibility of reason and truth, understood as context-
transcendent ideas. This appropriation of "the linguistic turn", following the
presumed demise of epistemology, sets the stage for a programme of
"epistemological behaviorism" in which language is no longer seen as a
transparent medium, used by an autonomous subject, to discover and accurately
describe an independent reality "out there". On Rorty's pragmatic account,
language is viewed, "not as a tertium quid between Subject and Object, nor as a
medium in which we try to form pictures of reality, but as part of the behavior of
human beings. On this view, the activity of uttering sentences is one of the things
people do to cope with the environment" (Rorty 1982:xvii).
This turn to the social environment as the condition of the possibility of knowledge,
brings Rorty in line with the central thrust of philosophical hermeneutics, but he
rejects all attempts to salvage the normative notions of truth and knowledge. A.T.
Nuyen (1992) describes the significance of Rorty's hermeneutic turn as follows:
[T]o abandon the notion of the mind as the mirror of nature is also to
abandon the epistemological project of polishing the mirror so as to reflect
nature more "truly". What is left is the notion of truth as a matter of
agreement reached in the course of conversation. The latter, for Rorty, is
the hermeneutical message. Instead of the epistemological project, what
we need is a process that yields agreements. Once we have agreements,
we can also allow truth to drop out of the picture; from the "hermeneutical
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point of view...the acquisition of truth dwindles in importance" ...lt matters
little whether agreements amount to knowledge: "The word knowledge
would not seem worth fighting over". (Nuyen 1992:70.)
For Rorty, the adoption of a programme of "epistemological behaviorism", means
that the justificatory process of knowledge claims is no longer linked to
universalistic theories of rationality and truth, but are rooted instead in the social
practices and conventions of a particular speech community who just happen to
share the same cultural tradition. In terms of this approach, Rorty (1980:390)
exhorts his audience to resist "the urge to see social practices of justification as
more than just such practices". For Rorty, the inescapable nature of social
practices, rooted in particular cultural linguistic communities, implies that an
acceptance of contingency and pluralism, the distinguishing hallmarks of the
modern condition, is incompatible with universalistic notions of truth and
knowledge. Rorty's idea of a speech community resembles Lyotard's notion of local
narratives, as a reaction against the modernist search for a metalinguistic
(metaphysical) dimension of Truth and Reality, beyond the reach of language. He
claims., "if we understand the rules of a language-game, we understand all that
there is to understand about why moves in that language-game are made at all"
(Rorty 1980: 174).
On the surface, there is nothing radically different in Rorty's hermeneutic turn as
an alternative to philosophy's traditional quest for absolute standards of certainty
and truth, viewed from an ahistorical vantage point of a presuppositionless
foundation. Rorty, however, does not stop here; he wants to argue that it is
impossible to reflect critically on our inherited social practices and beliefs from a
transcendent, universalistic perspective, and that we are "stuck" as it were in the
traditional heritage of our predecessors, and that the only possibility of "getting out"
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is the invention of new vocabularies expressing "the best idea we currently have
about how to explain what is going on" (Rorty 1980:385).
Rorty therefore rejects the notion that justification has anything to do with
transcendent notions of truth and knowledge; he rules out the possibility of a
learning process based on a reflective evaluation and revision of our inherited
ideas and practices: We do not change our ideas because they were wrong, we
change them to coincide with the prevailing linguistic consensus at a given time
and place. As Thomas McCarthy (1991) explains, Rorty's critique of traditional
foundationalism is quite impressive; it is the conclusions, however, that he draws
from this that are problematic:
As an expression of opposition to the traditional quest for foundations, this
is all to the good. But Rorty goes beyond that to a radically contextualist
account - he denies that it is a theory - of reason, truth, objectivity,
knowledge and related notions. (McCarthy 1991: 14.)
It is from the perspective of radical contextual ism that Rorty suggests that we "drop
the notion of the philosopher as knowing something about knowing which nobody
else knows so well ... (and abandon the claim) ...that philosophers have a special
kind of knowledge about knowledge" (Rorty ibid.:392-393). Critical of a
universalistic account of rationality and truth, Rorty (1991 :24) asserts that
"'knowledge' is, like 'truth', simply a compliment paid to the beliefs which we think
so well justified, that, for the moment, further justification is not needed". Rorty
bases his contextualist position on the argument that it is impossible to "step
outside our skins - the traditions, linguistic and other, within which we do our
thinking and self-criticism - and compare ourselves with something absolute" (Rorty
1982:xix). All attempts to "step outside" constitute a denial of "the finitude of one's
time and place, the "merely conventional" and contingent aspects of one's life
(ibid.).
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Rorty further underlines the relativistic and pragmatic implications of his position
by asserting:
[T]he only criterion for applying the word 'true' is justification, and
justification is always relative to an audience. So it is also relative to that
audience's lights - the purposes that such an audience wants served and
the situation in which it finds itself. (Rorty 1998:4.)
In a recent debate, Rorty (1996) has attempted to defend his ethnocentric theory
of epistemological behaviorism against the universalistic theory of reason and
rationality, as defended by Habermas. In the course of this confrontation,
Habermas gives a detailed account of the historicist background of Rorty's
contextualism. In his account, Habermas focuses on various versions of the
Platonic and anti-Platonic movements within the tradition of Western philosophy.
The main point arising from this account is that these two antagonistic tendencies
within philosophy must not be seen as mutually exclusive, but as co-implicative.
They give rise to a philosophical process in which the philosopher, depending on
his or her position, would privilege one term of the conception structure, and
thereby devalue its opposite term. This has resulted in the familiar pattern of the
postulation of "the universal", followed by its rejection, in the name of something
that has been excluded or marginalized, leading in turn to a reversal of the original
position. In this dialectical exchange, Habermas is torn between his support for the
Platonist (as a defender of a universalistic account of reason), on the one hand,
and his political sympathy with the anti-Platonist (as a defender of the "Other" of
reason). As Habermas (1996) puts it:
While I am in political sympathy with the anti-Platonist iconoclasts, my
political sympathy is on the side of the custodians of reason in those
periods when a justified critique of reason loses the implications of its
inevitable self-referentiality (Habermas 1996:6).
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It is the lack of historical self-consciousness within the metaphysical tradition,
Habermas claims, that accounts for a justified critique of reason being dismissed
and eventually submerged in the various historicist movements of thought,
collectively aimed at retrieving the elements of contingency and uncertainty within
the realm of the modern historical experience:
It is no surprise that this historical consciousness gave birth to an evermore
intense awareness of evermore widely spreading contingencies. This
explains the need to cope with a kind of contingency which no longer
emerged from the core of outer or inner nature but arose from the surface
of fluid human affairs, interpersonal relations, and social networks.
(Habermas 1996:7.)
The latest version of this historicist movement, according to Habermas, is "the
linguistic turn", as a critique of the metaphysical legacy with its underlying
assumption of an ahistorical transcendent subject. The linguistic turn is an effective
means of demonstrating the historical priority of pre-established social practices
and beliefs as constituting the enabling conditions for the possibility of knowledge.
With this turn to language, reason, however, has been downgraded and traced
back to its socio-cultural origins, and stripped of the transcendent dimensions that
has always sustained traditional metaphysical accounts of reason. For the anti-
Platonist reaction against the hypostatizations of absolutist accounts of truth and
knowledge to be successful, it has to validate (indirectly) the very conceptual
structure that it seeks to overcome. It is for this reason that Rorty urges his reader:
[T]o opt out of the whole game of Platonist and anti-Platonist moves. In
coping with their self-generated contingencies and risks, modern societies
would fare better without any philosophy. We are admonished to get rid of
the dualism we owe to the Platonist heritage, and to give up metaphysical
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distinctions between knowledge and opinion, between what is and what
appears as real or legitimate. We are told to emancipate our culture from
the philosophical vocabulary clustering around reason, truth, and
knowledge. (Habermas 1996:18.)
As far as language is concerned, it is simply a means or a tool for coping with the
environment; its creative dimension allows for the possibility of creating new and
better vocabularies, new and better tools for coping with an ever-changing
environment. This biologistic account of the human being as a user of word-tools
is supplemented by an account of knowledge aimed at utility, rather than a
representation of reality.
In the light of Rorty's ethnocentric epistemological behaviorism, he accuses
Habermas of being a metaphysical thinker, still trapped in the Kantian grid of
transcendental thinking, and of thus failing to appreciate the contingent nature of
the so-called "inevitable subjective conditions" of knowledge:
[T]he only truth in Habermas's claim that scientific enquiry is made
possible, and limited, by 'inevitable subjective conditions' is that such
enquiry is made possible by the adoption of practices of justification, and
that such practices have possible alternatives. But these 'subjective
conditions' are in no sense 'inevitable' ones discoverable by 'reflection on
the nature of enquiry'. They are just the facts about what a given society,
or profession, or other group, takes to be good ground for assertions of a
certain sort. Such disciplinary matrices are studied by the usual empirical-
cum-hermeneutic methods of 'cultural anthropology'. (Rorty 1980:385.)
Rorty accounts for the concept of rational agreement or truth simply in terms of the
justification of social conventions, or of giving as coherent an account as possible
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of the current trends and patterns of discourse which happen to prevail in any given
society at any given time, since "assessment of truth and assessment of
justification are, when the question is about what I should believe now, the same
activity" (Rorty 1998: 19).
Rorty (1982: 166) urges his reader to renounce the 'metaphysical comfort' of fixed
horizons and universal foundations, and to embrace instead, a more modest sense
of human solidarity, based on an acceptance of the contingent nature of all our
inquiries as they find expression within a context-bound hermeneutic framework of
ongoing and open conversation:
To accept the contingency of starting-points is to accept our inheritance
from and our conversation with, our fellow-humans as our only source of
guidance ...Since Kant, philosophers have hoped (to find) the a priori
structure of any possible enquiry, or language or form of social life. If we
give up this hope, we lose what Nietzsche called "metaphysical comfort",
but we gain a renewed sense of community. Our identification with our
community - our society, our political tradition, our intellectual heritage - is
heightened when we see this community as ours rather than nature's,
shaped rather than found, one among many which men might have made.
In the end, the pragmatist tells us, what matters is our loyalty to other
human beings clinging together against the dark, not our hope of getting
things right. (Rorty 1982:16.) (Emphases, Rorty's.)
In the final analysis, Rorty's critique of epistemological foundationalism is based on
a moral commitment in which the possibility of ongoing conversation is preserved
from the threat of closure. For Rorty, the transcendental mode of reflection is the
definitive expression of closure within the modern philosophical tradition, with
Habermas, according to Rorty, as one of its leading representatives. Rorty (1988)
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is therefore critical of Habermas's theory of communicative action, aimed at
revealing a normative rational potential, based on the central argument of
universalistic presuppositions, that accompany the validity claims within ordinary
everyday communication.
Although Habermas says that his "communicative-theoretic concepts" of
the lifeworld has been freed from the mortgages of transcendental
philosophy, and that "the purism of reason is not resurrected again in
communicative reason, he has no intention of freeing "communicative
reason" from the ideal of "universal validity". He still wants an Archimedean
point...[h]e still wants to say that "the validity claimed for propositions and
norms transcends spaces and times, 'blots out' space and time". (Rorty
1998:317-318.)
In the following section we will see how Habermas responds to Rorty's position.
3.6 HABERMAS'S RESPONSE TO RORTY
According to Habermas (1985: 197), Rorty's neo-pragmatist position stems from a
central prejudice that he shares with postmodern thinking, namely, that reason is
essentially of a logocentric nature, that is, it is to be interpreted on the basis of our
dealings with objects "in the world". For Habermas, this notion of reason is too
narrow. He (ibid.) defines logocentricism as a form of thinking that is confined to "
the ontological privileging of the world of beings, the epistemological privileging of
contacts with objects or existing states of affairs, and the semantic privileging of
assertoric sentences and propositional truth".
The most significant implication of the logocentric conception of rationality is that
it is blind to another equally important form of rationality, that is, communicative
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rationality that has its origins in the intersubjective structures of communication
oriented towards the reaching of mutual understanding and agreement. Habermas
(ibid.:197) therefore claims that the postmodernists' fixation on logocentricism
means that they neglect "the complexity of reason operating in the life-world, and
(restrict) reason to its cognitive-instrumental dimension". It is this narrow focus of
the logocentric account of rationality that Habermas challenges, because it means
effectively that even though the postmodern thinkers share his determination to
overcome metaphysics, they are unable to move beyond the conceptual framework
of the metaphysical tradition. Their characteristic reversal of the hierarchical
distinctions of metaphysics simply means that they are still operating with the
"subject-object" model of modern metaphysics.
In a modern world dominated by science and technology, as the paradigmatic
expression of reason, knowledge and truth, one can understand the "non-rational"
nature of postmodern thinking. As Habermas (1985) puts it:
Rorty takes Western logocentricism as an indication of the exhaustion of
our philosophical tradition and a reason to bid adieu to philosophy as such.
This way of reading the tradition can not be maintained if philosophy can
be transformed so as to enable it to cope with the entire spectrum of
rationality ...[s]uch a transformation is possible only if Rorty does not remain
fixated on the natural sciences. Had Rorty not shared this fixation, he might
have entertained a more flexible and accepting relationship to the
philosophical tradition. Fortunately, not all philosophizing can be subsumed
under the paradigm of the philosophy of consciousness. (Habermas
1985:197.)
In contrast to Rorty, Habermas claims that the Idea of "truth" takes us beyond the
boundaries of a particular cultural context. When we say something is true, we do
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not mean "true only" within this particular context: we mean it is true
unconditionally. This is an unavoidable assumption or idealization that we make
from the "first person perspective". Communicative action depends, in the final
analysis, on the validity of the reasons that are offered to support one's claims.
Sometimes the reasons are readily available within a given normative context, in
which case the speaker can convince her interlocutors of the validity of her claims
without much difficulty. But sometimes the validity claims are challenged and
problematized. In this case the communicative process either breaks down or it
moves to a "higher" level of discourse. Bernstein (1983) explains the significance
of Habermas's notion of discourse as follows:
Discourse consists of the type of elucidation and argumentation in which
we suspend immediate action and inwhich participants seek to redeem the
validity claims that have been challenged (Bernstein, 1983: 186).
The notion of discourse is crucial to Habermas' theory of communicative action; it
is raised in conjunction with the concept of an "ideal speech situation" as the
normative (practical) implication underlying the communicative process of mutual
understanding and agreement. For Habermas (1982:235), the notion of discourse
presupposes an "ideal speech situation", indicating a formal possibility, based on
the presuppositions implicit in the validity claims of everyday communicative action,
aimed at mutual understanding and agreement. In short, Habermas contends that
every rational person would accept that a true consensus presupposes the
absence offorce or manipulation, equal access to the relevant information, the full
acknowledgment of every interlocutor as an equal partner in dialogue. Implicit in
the notions of "discourse" and the "ideal speech situation", is the idea of truth
based on a consensus reached in a dialogical form of interaction, free from all
forms of distorting influences (McCarthy 1984:308).
111
Although Habermas is aware that he is advancing an ideal, it must not be
understood in the metaphysical sense of a metalinguistic ideal; he is referring to
the assumptions that we implicitly make when trying to reach agreement with
others. The ideal situation serves therefore, to a certain extent, as a regulative
idea, in the Kantian sense; but Habermas wants to make a stronger claim than this:
The speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere
construct, but rather an unavoidable supposition reciprocally made in
discourse. This supposition can, but need not be counterfactual; but even
if it is made counterfactually, it is a fiction that is operatively effective in the
process of communication. Therefore, I prefer to speak of an anticipation
of an ideal speech situation ...The normative foundation of agreement in
language is thus both anticipated and - as an anticipated foundation - also
effective ...To this extent the concept of the ideal speech situation is not
merely a regulative principle in Kant's sense; with the first step towards
agreement in language we must always in fact make this supposition.
(Quoted in McCarthy, 1984:310.)
Habermas claims that for communicative action to be successful, it must take place
against the backqround of a consensual framework that is acceptable to the
relevant partners in dialogue. But what happens when the consensual framework
is threatened to break down when one or more validity claim is seriously
challenged? This question takes us to the heart of Habermas's theory of language,
since it points to counterfactual possibility of transcending the specific context in
which the communication actually occurs. As Bernstein (1985) explains:
All communicative action takes place against a background consensus. But
this consensus can break down or be challenged by one of the participants
in the communicative context. Habermas argues that anyone acting
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communicatively must, in performing speech action, raise universal validity
claims and suppose that such claims can be vindicated or
redeemed ...These (validity claims) are not always thematic, but they are
implicit in every speech act. In most empirical situations we resolve our
conflicts and disagreements by a variety of strategies and techniques. But
to resolve a breakdown in communication, we can move to a level of
discourse and argumentation where we explicitly seek to warrant the
validity claims that have been called into question. Ideally, the only force
that should prevail in such a discourse is the "force of the better argument".
(Bernstein 1985: 19.) (Emphasis, Bernstein's.)
When Bernstein refers to the notion of discourse in conjunction with the "force of
the better argument", he is in fact referring to what Habermas (1990:88) calls an
"ideal speech situation", in which "...we see the structures of a speech situation
immune to repression and inequality in a particular way".
The "ideal speech situation" should not, however, be interpreted as an ideal of
linguistic transparency to which we strive, and which teleologically awaits us at the
end of the communicative process. For Habermas, a situation free of language is
inconceivable; when Habermas speaks of "ideal speech situation", he is merely
pointing to the formal conditions underlying the actual (empirical) communicative
process of mutual understanding and agreement. These conditions or
presuppositions are not to be found in some metalinguistic (metaphysical)
dimension; they originate within the structures of ordinary everyday conversation.
Habermas explains further:
The rationality inherent in (the communicative practice) is seen in the fact
that a communicatively achieved agreement must be based in the end on
reasons. And the rationality of those who participate in this communicative
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practice is determined by whether, if necessary, they could, under suitable
circumstances, provide reasons for their expressions. Thus the rationality
proper to the communicative practice of everyday life points to the practice
of argumentation as a court of appeal that makes it possible to continue
communicative action with other meanswhen disagreements can no longer
be repaired with everyday routines and yet are not to be settled by the
direct or strategic use of force. For this reason I believe that the concept of
communicative rationality, which refers to an unclarified systemic
interconnection of universal validity claims, can be adequately explicated
only in terms of a theory of argumentation. (Habermas 1984:17-18.)
(Emphases, Habermas's.)
At the root of Habermas's debate with Rorty is the latter's failure to distinguish
between the validity claims and the social practices of particular language. It is the
failure to make this distinction that separates Habermas's local speech community
from that of Rorty's. Habermas (1996) maintains:
We must stretch the referent of the idea that a proposition is rationally
acceptable "for us" beyond the limits and the standards of any local
community. We must expand the universe of 'all of us' beyond the social
and intellectual boundaries of an accidental bunch of people who just
happen to gather under our skies. 'True' would otherwise merge with
'justified in the present context'. (Habermas 1996:21.)
3.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have looked at the postmodern attempt to overcome the legacy
of modern metaphysics from the respective positions of Lyotard and Rorty. We
have tried to show that even though Habermas is concerned with the same
problematic, the possibility of reason, this question can only be answered
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meaningfully if we take the broader context of modernity into consideration. For
Habermas, modernity is the expression of three fundamental modes of rationality,
the scientific, the moral, and the aesthetic, as specialized spheres of expertise
within modernity. The primary question for him is how can reason be recast from
a postmetaphysical perspective of modernity, condemned to establish its own
normative frame of reference in the face an historical-self-consciousness, rooted
in the contingencies and vicissitudes of modern history.
In the following chapter we will examine Habermas's response to the attempts by
Foucault and Derrida to overcome the metaphysical legacy of the modern
philosophical tradition.
115
CHAPTER FOUR: THE DEBATE WITH DERRIDA AND
FOUCAULT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In his delineation of postmodern thinking, Thomas McCarthy (1987b:ix-x) asserts
that the Nietzschean model of an aesthetically inspired critique of metaphysical
thinking represents one of the most important aspects of the postmodern critique
of reason. Unlike other critiques, which proceed by way of philosophical arguments
and debate, in order to overcome a (problematic) conception of reason in favour
of a more plausible alternative, the postmodern critique seeks to establish the
grounds of its own possibility, but without the use of reason, and in this way it tries
to break away from the conceptual resources of modern philosophy. In their
critique of reason, the postmodern thinkers, given their rejection of the model of
instrumental or logocentric rationality, thus feel justified in their rejection of the
normative notions of truth and knowledge as well, since these notions cannot, from
the postmodern perspective, be separated from an instrumental or logocentric
context, nor can they be reflected upon independently of language as the condition
of their possibility. On the postmodern approach, the condition of the possibility of
postmodern thinking simultaneously implies the condition of the impossibility, not
only of metaphysical thinking, but also all forms of critique that presuppose a
normative foundation for a conceptual distinction between language and truth.
While Habermas (1992a:144-145) interprets the postmodern critique as a form of
"negative" metaphysics, in which a reversal of the dominant concepts of the
metaphysical tradition has been effected, thus resulting in a radical critique from
the "outside", that is, beyond the language of reason, I would rather see the
postmodern critique as another form of transcendental thinking. On my
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interpretation, the postmodern thinker is still guided by the "possibility question"
that once motivated Kant's transcendental philosophy. Unlike Kant, however, who
postulated a transcendental su bject as the condition of the possibility of knowledge,
in order to restrict the scope of metaphysical speculation, the postmodernist looks
for the condition of the impossibility of the metaphysical legacy of reason, by
postulating the realm of ditierence, in the case of Derrida, and "power" in the case
of Foucault, and in this way they try to undermine the normative foundations of the
notions of truth and freedom, as originating within the realm of reason.
Postmodern transcendental thinking, aimed at demonstrating the conditions forthe
impossibility of reason, is made possible by an aestheticist interpretation of
language, that seeks to deny and subvert philosophy's traditional role as the
custodian of reason, based on the impossibility of its traditional claim to
independence from the "impure" realm of language, the playground of metaphor,
paradox, and rhetoric. As McCarthy (1987b) puts it:
[An] important strand in the radical critique of reason can be traced back
to Nietzsche's emphasis on the rhetorical and aesthetic dimensions of
language. Thus, a number of critics seek to undercut philosophy's
traditional self-delimitation from rhetoric and poetics as reflected in the
standard oppositions between logos and mythos, logic and rhetoric, literal
and figurative, concept and metaphor, argument and narrative, and the like.
Pursuing Nietzsche's idea that philosophical texts are rhetorical constructs,
they take aim at philosophy's self-understanding of its discourse in purely
logical, literal - that is to say - non-rhetorical terms. They argue that this is
achieved only at the cost of ignoring or suppressing the rhetorical strategies
and elements of metaphor and figurative devices that are nevertheless
always at work in its discourse. And they seek actively to dispel the illusion
of pure reason by applying modes of literary analysis to philosophical texts,
explaining the tensions between reason and rhetoric within them so as to
undermine their logocentric understanding. (McCarthy 1987b:ix-x.)
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McCarthy's account of the aesthetic basis of the postmodern critique of reason is
especially relevant to Habermas's debate with Derrida who, more than any of the
other postmodern thinkers, has sought to subvert the legacy of metaphysical
thinking by drawing attention to the inescapable presence of "language as
writing"(grammatology) as its precondition, in order to challenge the logocentric
tradition of Western philosophy, with its orientation towards a "metaphysics of
presence", based on the privileging of "language as speech" (Derrida 1976).
Like Richard Rorty, Derrida tries to find away out of the conceptual distinctions that
have accompanied the metaphysical tradition, but unlike Rorty who seeks to opt
out of this tradition completely, Derrida does not believe that this is possible. He
therefore chooses a different route: one that seeks to undermine the logocentric
tradition of Western thinking in order to show its condition of possibility in the realm
of writing as the medium for the articulation of ditterence. In this regard, Derrida
focuses on the aesthetic possibilities of language with a view to subverting the
conceptual distinctions central to the critical ethos of philosophical thinking. In this
way he explores the possibility of overcoming metaphysical thinking by means of
a radical critique of the notion of a transcendental subject. This critique, which
proceeds from a linguistic perspective, in the form of deconstructive analysis,
ultimately turns against the major ideas and ideals that have characterized the
tradition of philosophical thinking; the ideas of truth and knowledge, on the one
hand, and the ideal of reason and universality, on the other hand. From this
perspective, Derrida and Foucault share the scepticism of Lyotard and Rorty with
regard to the normative potential of reason.
The aim of deconstruction is therefore to demonstrate the impossibility of epistemic
certainty, and hence to undermine philosophy's self-definition as a discipline
concerned with questions of truth and knowledge. Given Derrida's scepticism
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regarding the category of reason as a normative basis for critique (the traditional
concern of philosophy), the project of deconstructive analysis proceeds by shifting
the focus to the aesthetic dimensions of language, which provides it with the
"creative space" for its critique.
Foucault also looks to the aesthetics of language for the possibility of his
genealogical project. Like Derrida, he is also concerned with the problem of the
subject, but unlike Derrida, he does not look for the condition of its possibility in a
transcendental realm of diiterence, beyond the logocentric aspects of metaphysical
thinking, but rather in the transcendental realm of power, as the condition for the
impossibility of the rational transcendental subject of modern metaphysical-
humanist tradition. Pursuing a path of genealogical analysis, Foucault seeks to
show how the subject is constituted within the domain of power which produces
truth, which in turn fabricates the construct of an independent and autonomous
subject. The genealogical project of Foucault is thus a form of critique in which we
are made aware of the contingent "power" relations underlying the construction of
the modern subject. On the Foucauldian approach, the normative notions of truth
and reason, derive their "validity" from the dominant discourses that happen to
prevail in a particular context, at a particular time.
The point of departure for Foucault and Derrida is a critique of reason as it finds
expression in the assumption of a context-transcendent perspective of certainty
and truth. Within the context of the modern metaphysical tradition, this means that
the notion of a transcendental subject is untenable, and the ensuing critique of the
modern philosophical tradition of subjectivistic rationalism thus brings them in line
with a wider group of thinkers forwhom the "end of the subject" is synonymous with
"the end of metaphysics', and the "end of metaphysics" implies the "end of
philosophy", as the "guardian of rationality" (Habermas 1990:20).
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We will now proceed to an analysis of the critique by Derrida and Foucault of the
metaphysical tradition of rationalistic subjectivity and see whether it necessarily has
to lead to the bankruptcy of the notions of reason and truth. Our analysis will be
confined to those aspects and implications of their critiques that have an overall
bearing on Habermas's debate with postmodern thinking on the question of reason.
4.2 DERRIDA: THE CRITIQUE OF LOGOCENTRICISM
The critique of metaphysical thinking lies at the heart of Derrida's deconstructive
project. Taking the phenomenological tradition, initiated by Edmund Husserl, as his
point of departure, Derrida focuses his critique on the foundationalist assumption
of a fully self-grounding and self-transparent subject as the transcendental core of
philosophical reason, the pivotal point of modern metaphysics. From this
perspective, he seeks to overcome the notion of a constitutive (permanent, stable,
self-identical) centre or foundation of knowledge and truth by showing the
impossibility of reason from a transcendental perspective of absolute certainty, the
modern expression of logocentricism.
For Derrida, the most significant consequence of a philosophy of the subject is a
"metaphysics of presence" in which the "interior voice" of the subject or
consciousness is privileged by being present to the "truth" that it speaks. As
Derrida puts (1982) it:
But what is consciousness? What does "consciousness" mean? Most often,
in the very form of meaning, in all its modifications, consciousness offers
itself to thought only as self-presence, as the perception of self in presence.
And what holds for consciousness holds for so-called subjective existence.
Just as the category of the subject cannot be, and never has been, thought
without the reference to the present ...so the subject has never manifested
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itself except as self-presence. The privilege granted to consciousness
therefore signifies the privilege granted to the present... [t]his privilege is the
ether of metaphysics ... (Derrida 1982: 16.)
Derrida's deconstructivist project is developed to overcome the philosophy of the
subject (the philosophy of consciousness), by subverting the notion of self-
presence, and by extension, problematizing the notions of truth and knowledge, as
articulated in the logocentric tradition of speech, as the centre of reason.
In his critique of Western logocentricism, Derrida takes his cue from the anti-
phenomenological movement in France, a movement which at different times
(during the 1960's and 70's) associated itself with the structuralist and post-
structuralist schools of thought. The primary objective of this movement was to
overcome a metaphysically defined notion of reason, by locating its source within
the realm of "the social" and "the symbolic". The human sciences thus became the
medium for the exploration of the question of reason and rationality. By prioritizing
the order of the "the social" and "the symbolic", the anti-phenomenological
movement believed that they had finally escaped from "a critique of introspection
as a mode of knowledge, and (the) belief that philosophical speculation depends
upon unwarranted extrapolation from the experience of the individual" (Dews
1987:3).
Derrida, however, has challenged structuralist theory, and the human sciences
associated with it, on the grounds that it is a concealed form of metaphysics insofar
as the assumption of an a priori order is construed in terms of an unproblematic
(social-symbolic) structure that now "speaks" the "language of truth" in much the
same way that the transcendental subject had done within the metaphysical
tradition. And all the structuralist has to do is to demonstrate the underlying
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structure once "occupied" by the transcendental subject. Structuralism therefore
relinquishes the possibility of moving beyond that which it seeks to demonstrate,
thus becoming an apologist for the prevailing "system" (Dews 1987:4).
The structuralist movement, initiated by Ferdinand de Saussure has had a radical
effect on philosophy's self-understanding as an autonomous and self-validating
epistemological discipline. At the root of structuralism is a profound scepticism of
a link between "the mind" and "reality", in view of its fundamental claim that
knowledge and meaning are mediated in and through the prior structures of
language. On this view, knowledge and meaning are constituted within the
symbolic network of differential signs or signifiers. Christopher Norris (1982)
explains the significance of this point as follows:
[Saussure has] argued that our knowledge of the world is inextricably
shaped and conditioned by the language that serves to represent it.
Saussure's insistence on the 'arbitrary' nature of the sign has led to his
undoing of the natural link that common sense assumes to exist between
word and thing. Meanings are bound up, according to Saussure, in a
system of relationship and difference that effectively determines our habits
of thought and perception. Far from providing a 'window' on reality or (to
vary the metaphor) a faithfully reflecting mirror, language brings along with
it a whole intricate network of established significations. In his view, our
knowledge of things is insensibly structured by the systems of code and
conventions which alone enable us to classify and organize the chaotic flow
of experience. There is simply noway to access knowledge except by way
of language....Reality is carved up in various ways according to the
manifold patterns of sameness and difference which various languages
provide...This basic relativity of thought and meaning....is the starting-point
of structuralist theory. (Norris 1982:4-5.) (Emphasis, Norris'.)
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The structuralist view of language provides Derrida with the context for his own
project: the deconstruction of metaphysical thinking. However, in spite of his debt
to structuralist theory in this regard, Derrida is not convinced that its
representatives, such as Claude Levi-Strauss and Jacques Lacan, despite their
avowed claim, have moved beyond the reach of metaphysics. As Dews (1987)
points out:
From the beginning [Derrida] insisted that the structuralist human sciences,
far from being capable of supplanting philosophy, were based on
philosophical, indeed metaphysical, assumptions which demanded
interrogation, and in doing so he restored the rights of philosophical thought
- or at least of some successor to philosophy - to challenge the role and
status of the sciences, rather than being obliged to approximate to this
status. (Dews 1987:4.)
The successor to philosophy for Derrida is deconstructive thinking, the major
objective of which is to undermine and subvert the conceptual distinctions that
have established themselves within the metaphysical tradition, not with a view to
reversing the conceptual terms, but in order to demonstrate the "grounds" of their
origin and possibility in the realm of oitterence, a term used by Derrida to convey
a sense of two verbs ("to differ" and "to defer") collapsed into one. The realm of
ditterence, as conceptualized by Derrida, is associated with the activity of "writing"
as its primary medium of expression. From this perspective, Derrida challenges
structuralist theory on the grounds that it reinforces the conceptual biases of the
logocentric-metaphysical tradition, by preserving the conceptual distinctions or
binary oppositions so central to metaphysical thinking. Structuralist theory thus
does not only belie the arbitrary nature of the conceptual hierarchical structures of
the metaphysical tradition, it also betrays the primary objective of the structuralist
movement, which is to overcome metaphysics altogether.
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In Western, and notably French thought, the dominant discourse - let us
call it "structuralism" - remains caught, by an entire layer, sometimes the
most fecund, of its stratification, within the metaphysics - logocentricism -
which at the same time one claims rather precipitately to have "gone
beyond". (Derrida 1976:99.)
For Derrida, the overcoming of metaphysics means moving beyond the language
of truth as it has found expression in the logocentric tradition. To this end, he
develops a conception of language in which the "non-concept" of ditterence is
postulated as the destabilizing grounds of the "metaphysics of presence". Implicit
in the Derridean conception of language is a radical critique of philosophical reason
as the highest and final court of appeal in the service of logocentricism. For
Derrida, the binary oppositions of metaphysical thinking do not originate within the
a logic of identity and non-identity, but within the realm of oitterence itself which,
for him, becomes the condition of the possibility of metaphysical thinking:
What is written as differance then, will be the playing movement that
produces - by means of something that is not simply an activity - these
differences, these effects of difference. This does not mean that the
ditterence that produces differences is somehow before them, in a simple
unmodified in-different present. Diiterence is the non-full, non-simple,
structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus the name "origin"
no longer suits it. (Derrida 1982: 11.)
In his attempt to overcome the metaphysics of presence, Derrida challenges the
phonocentric prejudice of the logocentric tradition. Derrida maintains that since
philosophy, like every other discipline, is mediated through language, this means
that the subject is at best a symbolic construct, and given this argument, it cannot
simultaneously be the centre and foundation of knowledge and truth. From this
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perspective, Derrida seeks to dismiss the logocentric prejudice of metaphysical
thinking which privileges the voice of an ahistorical (solitary) thinker, engaged in an
internal monologue, and situated beyond the reach of language. In the
confrontation between speech (parole) and language (langue), Derrida wants to
show that the triumph of speech is a consequence of a metaphysics of presence
The medium of writing is conceptualized as a realm of radical disruption and
subversion, and as the contingent "text" underlying all contexts, it challenges all
forms of hypostatization in the name of "truth". Norris (1982) explains the
significance of the prejudice of "the voice" in Western metaphysics as follows:
Derrida sees a whole metaphysics at work behind the privilege granted to
speech ...Voice becomes a metaphor of truth and authenticity, a source of
self-present "living" speech as opposed to the secondary lifeless
emanations of writing. In speaking one is able to experience (supposedly)
an intimate link between sound and sense, an inward and immediate
realization of meaning which yields itself up without reserve to perfect
transparent understanding. Writing, on the contrary, destroys this ideal of
perfect self-presence. It obtrudes an alien, depersonalized medium, a
deceiving shadow which falls between intent and meaning, between
utterance and understanding. It occupies a promiscuous public realm
where authority is sacrificed to the vagaries and whims of textual
'dissemination'. Writing, in short, is a threat to the deeply traditional view
that associates truth with self-presence and the 'natural' language wherein
it finds expression. (Norris 1982:28.)
Derrida's model of writing therefore plays a double role: on the one hand, it is the
"transcendental" condition of the possibility of logocentricism; on the other hand,
it is the condition of the impossibility of metaphysical closure. Derrida's challenge
to the logocentric tradition of metaphysics thus takes the form of a critique as
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"deconstruction", which seeks to criticize and expose the metaphysical prejudice
and circularity of the argument that we can give "reasons" to justify "reason", and
thus establish the final (universal) formal basis of knowledge and truth in our
dealings with "reality". In this regard, Derrida seeks to establish the conditions of
the possibility of metaphysics with a view to destabilizing and subverting its claim
to closure in the name of "truth". Derrida employs the "method" of deconstructive
analysis to demonstrate the metaphorical "impurity" at the root of the supposed
conceptual purity of the modern epistemological paradigm, not in order to reduce
knowledge- and truth-claims to the level of metaphor, but in order to invoke the
dynamic and disruptive "absence" of ditierence that haunts "the language of
presence", the metaphysical language of "truth", as the transcendental condition
of its possibility. For Derrida, the realm of ditterence is a metaphor for the non-
conceptual origins of our knowledge and truth claims. Brendan Sweetman's (1999)
comments on this point are quite useful:
[A]ccording to Derrida, although the realm of ditterence is non-cognitive, it
never occurs without cognitive knowledge (the realm of presence). This is
because our contact with it in human experience, our involvement with it
through language, always takes place by means of concepts and
predication. And this is simply to say that all knowledge is contextual in the
sense that the relations of an object in any system of objects or meanings
are always changing (differing), hence meaning (i.e. identity) is continually
being postponed (i.e. deferred). The realm of ditterence is appropriately
conveyed or expressed in philosophical work by means of metaphor
because it is the nature of metaphor to signify without signifying, and this
illustrates nicely Derrida's point that identity is what it is not and is not what
it is. Derrida skillfully employs many different and often striking metaphors
to make the same point repeatedly: margins, trace, flow, arche-writing, tain
of the mirror, alterity, supplement, etc. (Sweetman 1999:7.)
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The above passage is indicative of arguably the most controversial aspect of
Derrida's thinking, because it clearly shows a submission to the mystical non-
cognitive authority of diiterence as the source of reason and knowledge.
It is clear that Derrida has identified the problematic nature of logocentric thinking
with its subjective orientation towards the realm of objects, where the subject
exercises its control and domination. But when Derrida tries to overcome this
logocentric orientation, he turns his back on history, and goes transcendental in
order to establish the non-rational condition for the possibility of reason within the
realm of ditierence. Rudolphe Gasche (1988), for example, explains the
transcendental aspect of Derrida's thinking in the following way:
As Derrida argues in Of Gremmetoioqy, the origin of reason is something
that adds itself to reason; it is a supplement of reason, something exterior,
nonnecessary to reason, but also that without which reason could not be
what it is. These nonrational origins of reason are of the order of unheard-
of trivialities. (Gasche 1988:535.)
The characterization above clearly reveals a restricted notion of rationality, the
major implication of which is that the knowledge and truth claims of reason will
inevitably be trivialized in the light of Derrida's transcendental turn, which Dews
(1987: 19) rightly describes as "a move upstream", aimed at establishing the
transcendental possibility of reason and truth as they occur within the tradition of
logocentricism. To this move "upstream", Dews (ibid) counterposes a move
"downstream", in the wake of the collapse of metaphysical and epistemological
subject-centered foundationalism, "towards an account of subjectivity as emerging
from and entwined with the natural and historical world".
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Derrida's privileging of philosophical thinking, albeit in the form of deconstructive
analysis, leads not only to an attempt to overcome the discredited tradition of
metaphysical thinking, but byfailing to distinguish between a logocentricorientation
aimed at achieving a foundation of absolute certainty on the one hand, and a
possible alternative model of rationality, on the other hand, the normative notions
of truth and knowledge (as the condition of independent critique), also fall by the
wayside.
All deconstructive analysis can therefore hope to achieve is to undermine all
attempts at metaphysical closure by invoking the non-conceptual, non-rational
realm of tiitterence, in the (subversive) medium of " writing", and in this way
unsettle the deep assumptions of metaphysical thinking. McCarthy's (1991)
comments on the significance of the attempts at metaphysical closure are indeed
to the point:
But such closure is impossible; philosophy cannot transcend its medium.
The claim to have done so always relies on ignoring, excluding, or
assimilating whatever escapes the grids of intelligibility it imposes on the
movement of tiitterence. And this repression of what doesn't fit, inevitably
has its effects, in the form of paradoxes, incoherencies, which it is the task
of deconstructive analysis to bring to light. Its aim in doing so is not to
produce a new improved unified theory of the whole but ceaselessly to
undermine the pretense to theoretical mastery, the illusion of a "pure"
reason that can gain control over its own conditions, and the dream of a
definitive grasp of basic meanings and truth. (McCarthy 1991: 100-1 01.)
Derrida is quite aware of the paradoxical nature of his deconstructive project
insofar as he accepts that he cannot "stand outside" the very discourse that he
seeks to destabilize, even though there have been times in his career when he has
entertained this idea:
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My central question is: from what site or non-site ...can philosophy as such
appear to itself, so that it can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an
original manner. Such a non-site or alterity would be irreducible to
philosophy. But the problem is that such a non-site cannot be defined or
situated by means of philosophical language. (Quoted in Bernstein
1991:210.)
It should be noted, however, that Derrida is skeptical of the possibility oftaking up
a position beyond the conceptual reach of metaphysical thinking; he is opposed to
the idea of a complete "rupture". As McCarthy (1991) duly points out:
Thus in an interview with julia Kristeva, Derrida professed his disbelief in
"decisive ruptures": "Breaks are always, and fatally, reinscribed in the old
cloth that must continually, interminably be undone." Deconstruction, then,
cannot aim to rid us, once and for all, of the concepts fundamental to
Western rationalism, but only, again and again, "to transform (them), to
displace them, to turn them against their own presuppositions, to reinscribe
them in other chains, and little by little to modify the terrain of our work, and
thereby to produce new configurations." By these means it "organizes a
structure of resistance" to the dominant conceptuality. (McCarthy 1991 :99.)
The deconstructive project is thus inseparably linked with the phenomenon of
logocentricism. As indicated above, Derrida accepts that there is no getting beyond
metaphysics, except paradoxically by challenging it from inside. Deconstruction
thus becomes a form of vigilantism, a permanent critique that implicitly raises the
possibility (the regulative idea) of moving beyond metaphysical thinking, while
acknowledging at the time that the very language of its critique is complicit with the
language that it seeks to overcome.
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The "concept" of diiterence seeks to subvert all metaphysical oppositions
(signifier/signified; sensible/intelligible; writing/speech; passivity/activity), while
hinting at the possibility offunctioning in a realm "outside" or "beyond" the tradition
of metaphysics. Given the complexity of the "concept" of diiterence, Derrida (1976)
can only describe it in negative terms, while simultaneously insisting that it is not
a metaphysical concept. In his book, Of Gremmetotoqy, we read:
[It is] origin of all repetition, origin of ideality... [it is] not more ideal than real,
not more intelligible than sensible, not more transparent signification than
an opaque energy, and no concept of metaphysics can describe it (Oerrida
1976:65). (Emphasis, Oerrida's.)
For Derrida (ibid.:61), a philosophy of oitterence is one that acknowledges the
"ultra-transcendental text" that serves as the "transcendental condition" of all
signification and identify.
Given his critique of any position aimed at finality and closure, Derrida finds himself
in an awkward dilemma on the question of "the subject". On Derrida's view, we are
forced to choose between two mutually exclusive alternatives: the subject is either
an immobile centre, a core of self-identity, or (alternatively) there is no subject at
all, except by default, as it were, that is, as the effect of the play of the text, an
ephemeral fiction. On this approach, the subject always comes after the play of
ditterence, and as such, its claim to identity is a denial of the disruptive effects of
language or "the text" that precedes the identity of selfhood. As Dews (1987:34)
puts it, "for Derrida, the collapse of the transcendentally signified entails the
'absence of a centre or an origin', allowing no thought of a subject which is no
longer an origin, but a focus which is never fully present to itself ".
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If Derrida's argument is correct (insofar as we cannot conceive of "the subject",
except in terms of its negativity or its "absence of origins"), what are the moral-
political implications of this argument? How does the project of deconstruction link
up with the institutional and historical processes in which "the subject" is invariably
the plaything of domination and power? It is precisely at this point that Habermas
challenges the arguments of Derrida in view of the latter's implicit rejection of
modernity's search for reassurance on its own terms, and in keeping with the
Enlightenment legacy of rationality as the condition of critical independence and
autonomy. Habermas is especially critical of Derrida when the latter asserts:
The "rationality" - but perhaps this word should be abandoned for reasons
that will appear at the end of this sentence - which governs a writing thus
enlarged and thus radicalized, no longer issues from a logos. Further, it
inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the de-sedimentation,
the de-construction of all the significations that have their source in that of
the logos. Particularly the signification of truth. All the metaphysical
determinations oftruth ...are more or less immediately inseparable from the
instance of the logos, or of reason thought within the lineage of the logos,
in whatever sense it is understood .... (Oerrida 1976:10.)
In the following section, we will examine Habermas's response to Derrida's critique
of logocentricism.
4.3 HABERMAS'S RESPONSE TO DERRIDA
In his Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas levels two fundamental
accusations against Derrida. In the first instance, he accuses Derrida of a form of
foundationalism that remains trapped within the conceptual framework of "the
philosophy of the subject". For Habermas, Derrida's postulation of a realm of
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aitterence which finds expression in "writing", testifies to a variation on a very
familiar theme of metaphysical thinking: that of "first principles". Habermas claims:
... Derrida by no means breaks with the foundationalist tenacity of the
philosophy of the subject; he only makes what it had regarded as
fundamental dependent on the still profounder - though now vacillating or
oscillating - basis of an originary power set temporally aflow. Unabashedly,
and in the style of Ursprungsphilosophie, Derrida falls back on this
Urschrift, which leaves its trace anonymously, without any subject. ..
(Habermas 1987b:178-179.)
The second accusation is that Derrida's deconstructive project has as its ultimate
aim the establishing of the primacy of "rhetoric" over "logic":
The rebellious labor of deconstruction aims indeed at dismantling the
smuggled-in basic conceptual hierarchies, at overthrowing foundational
relationships and conceptual relations of domination, such as those
between speech and writing, the intelligible and the sensible, nature and
culture, inner and outer, mind and matter, male and female. Logic and
rhetoric constitutes one of these conceptual pairs. Derrida is particularly
interested in standing the primacy of logic over rhetoric, canonized since
Aristotle, on its head. (Habermas 1987b:187.)
We will now proceed, in the light of the two arguments above, to a more detailed
assessment of Habermas's debate with Derrida, under the following headings:
The deconstruction of metaphysics (4.3.1)
The epistemic status of philosophy (4.3.2)
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4.3.1 The deconstruction of metaphysics
In defense of the first accusation above, Habermas makes many controversial
points, the most striking of which is his ad hominen argument in which he tries to
equate Derrida's conception of writing with the Jewish tradition of mysticism, in
order to prove Derrida's anti-modernist stance. On Habermas's reading, Derrida's
radicalism is not an end in itself, but rather a means of reaffirming a commitment
to the Jewish idea of a complete rupture with the continuum of history, based on
the expectation of a violent irruption which announces the birth of a radically new
consciousness of time. This stand on the part of Derrida is reminiscent of
Heidegger whose conceptual distinction between the ontological realm of Being
and the ontic realm of beings (the social-political dimensions of human interaction)
is reenacted in Derrida's distinction between the ontological realm of ditierence (as
archewriting), on the one hand, and a metaphysical legacy based on the dubious
authority of the truth- and knowledge claims of science and philosophy.
Given Derrida's anti-phenomenological stance, which is directed primarily against
the assumption of a transcendental subject, history seems to be devoid of the
possibility of a rationality capable of redeeming the Enlightenment ideal of moral-
political emancipation and autonomy.
Derrida develops the history of Being - which is encoded in writing in
another variation from Heidegger. He too degrades politics and
contemporary history to the status of the ontic, so as to romp all the more
freely, and with a greater wealth of associations, in the sphere of the
ontological and the archewriting. But the rhetoric that serves Heidegger for
the initiation into the fate of Being, in Derrida comes to the aid of a different,
rather more subversive orientation. Derrida stands closer to the anarchist
who wishes to explode the continuum of history than to the authoritarian
admonition to bend before destiny. (Habermas 1987b:181-182.)
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Whether one accepts Habermas's controversial reading of Derrida as a modern
exponent of jewish mysticism or not, one thing is clear; Habermas's interpretation
of his opponent's position seems to be a heuristic device aimed at demonstrating
his initial argument regarding modernity's need for self-reassurance on the basis
of its own norms and criteria. Thus, one must acknowledge the "personal" element
in Habermas's critique of Derrida, but not so much in order to accuse the latter of
a nostalgia for a premodern (re-enlightenment) condition of mysticism, but more
simply to identify yet another ill-conceived dismissal of the rational potential of
modernity, when the latter is reduced to the level of instrumental rationality. I
therefore regard the following interpretation by David Couzens Hoy (1998) of
Habermas's motive regarding Derrida's work as an oversimplification:
Oerrida's desire to transcend the aspirations of modern reason is in reality
a frustrated desire for a return to the premodern traditions where reason
has not yet undermined the mystery of hidden religious authority. Since the
quarrel is between the Enlightenment's faith in reason and the counter-
enlightenment against reason, what Habermas is objecting to is the vestige
of Jewish mysticism (not because it is Jewish of course, but because it is
mystical to the point of being not only mysterious but also unintelligible).
(Hoy 1998:127.)
The above reading of Habermas's reading of Derrida flies in the face of a more
urgent undertaking on the part of the former, and that is to show that Derrida's lack
of an alternative model of rationality, a post-metaphysical alternative, not only
keeps him entangled in the aporias of metaphysical thinking; it also mystifies the
historical self-consciousness of modernity in view of an inability to find a rational
potential within the culture of modernity:
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As a participant in the philosophical discourse of modernity, Derrida inherits
the weakness of a critique of metaphysics that does not shake loose the
intentions of first philosophy. Despite his transformed gestures, in the end,
he too, promotes only a mystification of palpable social pathologies; he too,
disconnects essential (namely, deconstructive) thinking from scientific
analysis; and he, too, lands at an empty, formula-like avowal of some
indeterminate authority. (Habermas 1987b: 181.)
As can be seen in the passage above, Habermas is more concerned about the
reactionary effects that follow when the radical rational potential of cultural
modernity is misrecognized or interpreted from an "alien" perspective. It is for this
reason that he interprets the fixation on logocentricism as indicative, not so much
of "an excess of reason but as a deficit of rationality" (Habermas 1987b:310).
According to Habermas, the "deficit of rationality is a direct consequence of reason
being restricted to its technical-scientific use, thus perpetuating the subject-object
model of rationality, as the medium of logocentric thinking".
A critique of the subject-object model of rationality will necessarily incline towards
mysticism if it cannot account for the epistemic nature of its own status. For
Habermas, the knowledge- and truth claims of philosophy must avoid the trap of
self-referentia1ity and self-validation if they are not to fall back into the fold of
metaphysical thinking, and this is why Habermas questions the validity of Oerrida's
deconstructive project, because the epistemic status of ditierence is problematic,
to say the least.
Habermas is of the view that if philosophy is to remain relevant to the challenges
of modernity, then it has to move in the direction of post-metaphysical thinking, in
which the ideas of reason and truth can still be validated, albeit within a context of
epistemic fallibilism. In this regard, Habermas defends philosophy's traditional
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concern with the question of reason from a universalistic perspective while, at the
same time, acknowledging its dependence on other disciplines, such as social and
reconstructive science, with regard to its central objective: the reformulation of
reason in post-metaphysical terms:
[P]hilosophy shares with the sciences a fallibilistic consciousness, in that
its strong universalistic suppositions require confirmation in an interplay
with empirical theories of competence. This revisionary self-understanding
of the role of philosophy marks a break with the aspirations of first
philosophy (Ursprungsphilosophie) in any form, but it does not mean that
philosophy abandons its role as the guardian of rationality. (Habermas
1985:196.)
If the imperative of modernity's self-reassurance is not adequately addressed, it
can lead to an historical obscurity and a general moral-political paralysis in the face
of modernity's main challenge: the establishment of a rational society (Habermas
1987b:16, 1989:48-70). Habermas consequently states that Derrida, like his fellow
postmodern thinkers, instead of engaging concretely with the problems of the day,
looks beyond the rational potential implicit in the normative structures of modernity.
For Habermas, the concrete effect of the postmodern challenge is that it leaves
everything "as it is", and because of its inability or refusal to look for alternatives
"within", the repressive power of a scientific-instrumental rationality goes
unchallenged.
Unlike Habermas (1984), who makes a clear distinction between the instrumental
and communicative forms of rationality, thus enabling him to find another "more
authentic" voice(s) of reason within the democratic movements of solidarity and
resistance to the unbalanced and harmful expansion of instrumental rationality, the
postmodernist's protest is as a solitary one that finds expression in the esoteric
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language of a different non-rational form of critical thinking. This point confirms
Habermas's thesis regarding the " new obscurity" that has overtaken Western
industrialized societies (Habermas 1989:48-69). It indicates a lack of rational
resources to deal with a modern world that has been overrationalized in terms of
science and technology. Postmodern thinking therefore seeks "metaphysical
comfort" in the non-rational realms of "play" and "mystery". Habermas (1989)
maintains:
It is nowonder, then, that the theories gaining influence today are primarily
those that try to show how the very forces that make for increasing power,
the forces from which modernity once derived its self-consciousness and
its utopian expectations, are inactuality turning autonomy into dependence,
emancipation into oppression, and reason into irrationality. Derrida
concludes from Heidegger's critique of modern subjectivity that we can
escape the treadmill of logocentricism only through aimless provocation.
Instead of trying to master foreground contingencies in the world, he says,
we should surrender to the mysteriously encoded contingencies through
which the world discloses itself. (Habermas 1989:51-52.)
Instead of dealing with the problems in the "real world", by way of an analysis that
identifies and diagnoses the nature and extent of the problems that confronts us
in an overrrationalized society, and thus make us learn from our mistakes and
hopefully advance beyond them, the postmodernist surrenders the critical
(normative) dimension of philosophical thinking, to the authoritarian and mystical
and "playful" power of language.
In the following section, we will examine Habermas's response to Oerrida's critique
of philosophy in general, and the implications of the latter's reduction of the truth
claims of philosophy to the realm of the aesthetic, in particular.
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4.3.2 The epistemic status of philosophy
According to Christopher Norris (1992: 170-171), contemporary reactions to
Oerrida's project of deconstruction can be divided into two main rival
interpretations: on the one hand, there is Rodolphe Gasche, who views Oerrida's
work as a continuation of the Kantian transcendental project, albeit in order to
establish the conditions for "the impossibility of reason"; and there is Rorty, for
whom Oerrida is best understood as a thinker who has turned his back on
"enlightenment" notions and the metaphysical tradition, on the other. Rorty sees
Derrida as having adopted a postmodern-pragmatist stance whence to create new
vocabularies for the "private" purpose of writing.
Adding his voice to this particular debate Rick Roderick, as I show below, sides
with Rorty's appropriation of Oerrida, in which the epistemic status of philosophy
is completely denied. This denial is part of a more general plot to overcome the
conceptual distinction between philosophy and literature. On this approach,
philosophy loses its status as an autonomous discipline, dealing with questions of
knowledge and truth, and is defined instead as a "kind of writing" whose primary
purpose is that of a radical interpretation and reinterpretation of various texts, "free"
of the truth claims that have characterized traditional philosophy. In this regard,
Rorty (1992) challenges Norris when the latter seeks to place Oerrida in the
tradition of rational thinking:
Norris thinks that Oerrida should be read as a transcendental philosopher
in the Kantian tradition - somebody who digs out hitherto unsuspected
presuppositions. 'Oerrida', he says, 'is broaching something like a Kantian
transcendental deduction, an argument to demonstrate ("perversely"
enough) that a priori notions of logical truth are a priori ruled out of court by
rigorous reflection on the powers and limits of textual critique'. By contrast,
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my view of Derrida is that he nudges us into a world in which 'rigorous
reflection on the powers and limits...' has as little place as do a priori
notions of logical truth'. This world has as little room for transcendental
deduction, or for rigour, as for self-authentic moments of immediate
presence to consciousness. (Rorty 1992:236.)
Roderick (1987) credits Rortywith having presented us with a "truer" account of the
intent informing Derrida's project of deconstruction. He reflects on the implications
of the Rortyan-Derridean rejection ofthe conceptual distinction between philosophy
and literature as follows:
In terms of this distinction, Rorty has located one, if not the, central feature
of the realignment of our thought called for by Derrida. The central claims
associated with his work involves a recognition of the "textuality" of all
human enterprises; science, religion, morality, art, philosophy. Thus
Derrida's famous comment: "there is nothing outside the text". Rorty
glosses this remark by saying that texts do not refer to non-texts because
any specification of a referent will be in some "vocabulary," which means
that one is really comparing two descriptions of a thing and not a
description with an independent thing. (Roderick 1987:442.)
Norris, who is sympathetic to the Kantian reading of Derrida, thus feels it
incumbent upon himself to set the record straight by first confronting Habermas
who, in spite of having given us one of the most compelling accounts of the
historical and philosophical antecedents of present-day postmodern thinking, in
Norris' view, has sadly misread Derrida, and thus wrongly placed him in the camp
of Nietzschean irrationalism:
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It seems to me that (Habermas) has misread Derrida's work, and done so
moreover in a way that fits in too readily with commonplace ideas about
deconstruction as a species of latter-day Nietzschean irrationalism, one
that rejects the whole legacy of post-Kantian enlightened thought. In short,
Habermas goes along with the widely held view that deconstruction is a
matter of collapslnq all genre-distinctions, especially those between
philosophy and literature, reason and rhetoric, language in its constative
and performative aspects. (Norris 1992: 167.)
In my view, depending on one's perspective, both of the approaches referred to
above can be reconciled with certain aspects of Derrida's thought, and, what is
more, as Norris points out, Derrida's project in certain respects is indeed
compatible with Habermas's own project of enlightened critique. In this regard, his
essays, The principle of reason: the university in the eyes of its pupils (1983), and
Of an apocalyptic tone recently adopted in philosophy (1984), both bear testimony
to the rational-critical dimension of Derrida's thought, reinforcing my own view that
Derrida is essentially concerned with trying to come to grips with what Habermas
himself has referred to as the "desublimation of reason" and the "disempowering
of philosophy" (Habermas 1987b:131). In this regard, White (1991) tries to show
that ultimately the two forms of critique stem from two different conceptions of
language: the one (Habermas's) is oriented towards action-coordination and
problem-solving. Derrida's, on the other hand, is aimed at disclosing the conditions
that make the truth claims of philosophy and science problematic, by revealing the
"power" lurking behind these claims.
If Norris is correct in his assessment of Derrida as a participant in the "philosophical
discourse of modernity" (and this is certainly evident in Derrida's (1978:54) critique
of Foucault where he asserts that "logos is reason and, indeed, a historical
reason"), then the debate around the epistemic status of philosophy-in-Ianguage
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has to be conducted within the larger context of the "project of modernity", in
relation to which the principle of human freedom and autonomy is to be gauged.
Central to the problem of freedom and autonomy is a clash between two models
of language: an aestheticist model, as envisaged by Derrida (rhetorical, poetic,
"world disclosing") aimed at revealing the oppressive effects of metaphysical-
logocentric reason, on the one hand, and a communicative model (based on
normal or everyday language), aimed at problem-solving, consensus, the
coordination of action, on the other hand.
Habermas is of the view that Derrida's failure to differentiate between the "normal"
and "poetic" aspects of language has dire implications for modernity's project of
moral-political self-determination and autonomy. Moreover, it robs philosophy of its
critical capacity for a practical assessment of modernity's rational potential for
bringing about change. Habermas accordingly accuses Derrida of ignoring the
illocutionary binding force of ordinary speech within communicative action, which
acts as "a mechanism for coordinating action that places normal speech, as part
of everyday practice, under constraints different from those of fictional discourse,
simulation and interior monologue" (Habermas 1987b:196).
It should be noted that Habermas is not totally insensitive to the liberating and
illuminating power of aesthetic expression. He explains the aesthetic expression
in terms of an autonomy that has resulted from the decentering of subjectivity, the
major consequence of which is a release from constraints to act or take
responsibility for one's actions in the world; the aesthetic mode of expression is
there to defamiliarize the face of the familiar:
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At the same time, this decentering indicates an increased sensitivity to what
remains unassimilated in the interpretative achievements of pragmatic,
epistemic, and moral mastery of the demands and challenges of everyday
situations; it effects oneness to the expurgated of the unconscious, the
fantastic, and the mad, the material and the bodily - thus to everything in
our speechless contact with reality which is so fleeting, so contingent, so
immediate, so individualized, simultaneously so far and so near that it
escapes categorical grasp (Habermas 1985:201).
For Habermas, however the aesthetic aspect of language does not lead to the
coordination of actions, nor can it account for the possibility of learning processes
in the world, both of which are dependent on the capacity of language to be critical,
to facilitate learning, and to solve problems, According to Habermas, the source of
these activities is to be found in the social practice of normal everyday
conversation.
Oerrida's aesthetically inspired model of language is unable to account for the
acquisition of knowledge or the mastering of problems in the world, the major
consequence of which is an aesthetic contextual ism which belies the context-
transcendent dimensions of ordinary language:
An aesthetic contextualism blinds him to the fact that everyday
communicative practice makes learning processes possible (thanks to built-
in idealizations) in relation to which the world-disclosive force of interpreting
language has in turn to prove its worth. These learning processes unfold
an independent logic that transcends all local constraints, because
experiences and judgements are formed only in the light of criticizable
validity claims. Derrida neglects the potential for negation inherent in the
validity basis of action oriented toward reaching understanding: he permits
the capacity to solve problems to disappear behind the world-creating
capacity of language... (Habermas 1987b:205.)
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Habermas's account of the problem-solving and learning-enhancing capacity of
linguistic interaction presupposes the possibility of consensus and action
coordination. If the modernity project is to reach its potential, then philosophy has
a definite role to play with regard to the problematic of rationality, reason and truth.
Although it can no longer function on its own as a self-validating discipline, this
does not necessarily have to result in a complete disengagement from the problem
of knowledge. For Habermas, philosophy's concern with the question of reason,
and the related questions of knowledge and truth, do indeed arise in the realm of
ordinary situations of linguistic interaction where metaphor, rhetoric, mysticism,
manipulation, and domination are the order of the day. But the role of philosophy
is to look for the historically rooted possibility for translating the universalizing
ideals of communicative action into concrete social practice. Habermas's clinging
to philosophy as the "guardian of rationality" is in direct contrast to the
postmodernist inability to acknowledge the transformative potential of modernity-
hence the equation of knowledge- and truth-claims with power-claims. This last
point sets the stage for a consideration of Habermas's debate with Foucault.
4.4 THE DEBATE WITH FOUCAULT
Of all the postmodern thinkers, Foucault openly reveals the extent to which he
shares Habermas's concern with the problem of modernity, from the perspective
of "reason in history". Foucault, like Habermas, is particularly concerned with the
Enlightenment legacy of rationalism, with a view to determining it's impact on
modernity. Using Kant's essay, What is Enlightenment?, as his point of departure
for exploring the question of modernity, Foucault clearly situates his own project
within a philosophical tradition of critique, initiated by Kant and later taken up by
Hegel, and reaching its climax in the writings that have come out of the Frankfurt
School of Critical Theory. From this perspective, he is very much aware of the
philosophical tradition that he shares with Habermas:
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In any event...in November 1784 a German periodical, Berlinische
Monatscrift, published a response to the question: Was ist Aufklarung? And
the respondent was Kant.
A minor text perhaps. But it seems to me that it marks the discreet entry
into the history of thought of a question that modern philosophy has not
been capable of answering, but that it has never been able to get rid of
either. And one that has been repeated in various forms for two centuries
now. From Hegel through Nietzsche or Max Weber to Horkheimer or
Habermas, hardly any philosophy has failed to confront this same question,
directly or indirectly. What, then, is this event that is called the Aufklarung
and that has determined, at least in part, what we are, what we think, and
what we do today? ...What is modern philosophy? ...modern philosophy is
the philosophy that is attempting to answer the question raised so
impudently two centuries ago: Was ist Aufklarung? (Foucault 1984:32.)
Foucault furthermore shares Habermas's desire to overcome the modern legacy
of a metaphysically defined subject, but his central focus is to show how 'the
subject" has been constructed in the various disciplines that comprise the human
sciences. It is in this sense that Foucault makes modernity his central focus,
because overcoming the subject means first of all understanding the history in
which it has emerged. For Foucault the subject is a construct of the modern
metaphysical tradition. From this perspective, Kant provides the impetus for
Foucault's own critical reflection and engagement with the nature and significance
of modernity:
[It] seems to me that it is the first time that a philosopher has connected in
this way, closely and from the inside, the significance of his work with
respect to knowledge, a reflection on history, and a particular analysis of
the specific moment at which he is writing and because of which he is
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writing. It is in the reflection on "today" as difference in history and as
motive for a particular philosophical task that the novelty of this text
appears to me to lie.
And by !ooking at it in this way, it seems to me that we may recognize a
point of departure; the outline of what one might call the attitude of
modernity. (Foucault 1984:38.)
What Foucault defines as the "attitude of modernity" underlines his critical
engagement with the problematic of knowledge and truth, from the perspective of
power. Thus Foucault shares with Habermas a rejection of the modern legacy of
metaphysical thinking insofar as they both reject accounts of rationality that are
based on substantive theories about "man" and "reality"; but their respective
emphases are different. Foucault seeks to overcome the legacy of metaphysical
thinking by means of an aesthetic form of self-transformation, aimed at overcoming
the limits imposed on "the subject" within the humanisttradition (Foucault 1984:50).
For Habermas, on the other hand, the privileging of the aesthetic dimension is the
consequence of a one-sided orone-dimensional interpretation of modernity, in view
of the restriction of the question of reason to that of logocentric, or, as in Foucault's
case, "power" thinking.
While Habermas is in sympathy with Foucault on the question of power, he
believes that the normative notions of truth and knowledge can and should be
reformulated from a model of communicative rationality, and articulated from a
post-metaphysical perspective of mutual understanding, if the Enlightenment ideal
of freedom from domination is to make any practical sense at all. But before we
examine Habermas's response, we must first consider Foucault's construal of
modernity in relation to the Enlightenment legacy of reason and freedom.
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4.4.1 Modernity, from the perspective of truth as a product of power
There can be little doubt that the question of reason is of central importance to
Foucault's understanding of modernity. He writes:
I think that the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the
eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the
question: What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical effects?
What are its limits, and what are its dangers? (1984:249.)
In the light of the above, a question that immediately comes to mind is the
following: What exactly does Foucault mean when he speaks of reason within the
context of modernity?
Foucault's account of reason is a reaction against the humanist orientation that has
been the cornerstone of modern philosophy. In this regard, he draws a clear
distinction between the Enlightenment and the various forms of humanism within
modernity. Foucault clearly accepts the Enlightenment as his frame of reference
for the self-understanding of modernity. Moreover, it is in terms of the
Enlightenment that Foucault poses the question of autonomy:
We must try to proceed with the analysis of ourselves as beings who are
historically determined, to a certain extent, by the Enlightenment. Such an
analysis implies a series of historical inquiries that are as precise as
possible; and these inquiries will not be oriented retrospectively towards the
"essential kernel of rationality" that can be found in the Enlightenment and
that would have to be preserved in any event; they will be oriented towards
the "contemporary limits of the necessary", that is, what is not or is no
longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous
subjects. (Foucault 1984:43.)
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In the pursuit of the "constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects", Foucault
rejects all forms of humanism, ranging from the assumption of a transcendental
ego, and various notions of "man" borrowed from science and religion, to the notion
of a universal subject or class in history, such as the proletariat:
And it is a fact that, at least since the seventeenth century, what is called
humanism has always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of man,
borrowed from religion, science, or politics. Humanism serves to colour and
to justify the conceptions of man to which it is, after all, obliged to take
recourse ...1 believe that this thematic, which so often recurs and which
always depends on humanism, can be opposed by the principle of a
critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy: that is, a
principle that is at the heart of the historical consciousness that the
Enlightenment has of itself. From this standpoint, I am inclined to see the
Enlightenment and humanism in a state of tension rather than identity.
(Foucault 1984:44.)
According to Foucault, once the humanistic orientation within modern philosophy
has been overcome, and our understanding of rationality is no longer linked to
universalistic theories of truth and knowledge, then we will hopefully be in a
position to understand the nature of modernity much better. This implies that
reason should not be construed in terms of metaphysical theories of truth, as the
privileged domain of the subject of knowledge, but rather as an investigation of
rationality as a social practice, hence Foucault's commitment to reason in history.
This investigation, whether its takes the form of an archaeological analysis, that is,
one aimed at investigating rational practices within various specific social and
cultural contexts, or whether it takes the form of a genealogical method of enquiry,
that is, one seeking to investigate the possibility of resistance to various forms of
domination (as the "limits of reason"), has one common denominator: the
phenomenon of power.
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The concept of archeology, as explained in his Archeology of Knowledge (1972),
presupposes a method whereby the rules governing the discursive practices within
the human sciences are investigated. Foucault's archeological project is motivated
by the central question: how are the human sciences possible? It should be noted
that Foucault is not so much interested in establishing the validity of the truth
claims of the various disciplines of the human sciences; he seeks to remain
"neutral" on the question of truth. His primary objective is to show how the modern
subject was "invented". Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) explain the significance of
Foucault's archeological method as follows:
[Foucault] argues that what can roughly be referred to as the sciences of
man can be treated as autonomous systems of discourse ...ln the
Archeology he ....[tries] to show that the human sciences could be analyzed
as having an internal self-regulation and autonomy. Moreover, he proposes
to treat the discourses of the human sciences archaeologically, that is, to
avoid becoming involved in arguments about whether what they say is true,
or even whether their statements make sense. Rather he proposes to treat
all that is said in the human sciences as a "discourse object". Foucault
makes it clear that his archeological method, since it must remain neutral
as to the truth and meaning of the discursive systems it studies, is not
another theory about the relation of words and things. He does hold,
however, that it is a theory about discourse - orthogonal to all disciplines
with their accepted concepts, legitimated subjects, taken-for-granted
objects, and preferred strategies, which yield justified claims. (Dreyfus and
Rabinow 1982:xx.)
With the publication of his Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault moves beyond
the archeological method of his earlier work in favour of a genealogical method of
enquiry. In this respect, Nietzsche's "theory" of power becomes the central focus
for Foucault. From the genealogical perspective, the main questions are: How are
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the discourses of the human sciences possible? What are their role in modern
society? (Dreyfus and Rabinow:xxi). For Foucault, the focus on the centrality of
power now becomes the medium in which the question of truth is approached and
interpreted:
The important thing here, I believe, is that truth isn't outside power, or
lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would
repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in
liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by
virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of
power. (Foucault 1980:131.)
According to Foucault, all attempts to universalize or essentialize the "nature of
man", belies the contingent nature of his emergence as a historical creature limited
to the contours of his specific social-cultural horizons. Foucault therefore relativizes
the question of reason and truth:
Each society has its own regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is,
the type of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true: the
mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false
statements, the means by which it is sanctioned; the techniques and
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those
who are charged with the saying of what counts as true (ibid.).
On Foucault's view, when the Enlightenment ideas of freedom and autonomy are
held up against the actual rational practices of modernity, then it would seem that
the path of reason as conceptualized in terms of knowledge and truth, does not
inspire much hope of ever overcoming power, since within the framework of
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.modernity, there is no possibility of separating truth from power. Truth is a political
matter, and each new truth is accompanied by another (incommensurable) regime
of power.
This argument is remarkably similar to that of Lyotard for whom, as we have seen
in the previous chapter, truth is a function of an agonistic conception of language
that belies the possibility of consensus. The similarity is even more striking when
one considers the following argument by Foucault:
The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather
than that of a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning.
History has no "meaning", though this is not to say that it is absurd or
incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of
analysis down to the smallest detail - but this is in accordance with the
intelligibility of struggles, of strategies, and tactics. (Foucault 1980:114.)
Foucault bases this argument on a hermeneutic conception of reason in terms of
which the possibility of a neutral, objective, transcendent perspective is, in
principle, ruled out of court, on the grounds that the knowledge and the subject of
knowledge are part of a complex process of interpretation and reinterpretation,
without the possibility of grounding its knowledge claims in first principles of
absolute truth and certainly. Taking his cue from a scientific-instrumental
conception of rationality, based on a subject-object epistemological model,
Foucault despairs of the possibility of defending the Enlightenment notions of
freedom and autonomy from a perspective either of a subjectivist or objectivist
orientation, on the grounds that the one orientation presupposes the other, and
more importantly, the subject-object cannot be its own ground or foundation of
possibility: modern philosophy is therefore condemned to think the "unthought" as
the condition of it own possibility (Foucault 1970:303-343).
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.From the perspective of modernity, knowledge and rationality are for Foucault
synonymous with science and technology, and given his inability or reluctance to
conceive of an alternative "theory of rationality", Foucault chooses instead to focus
on the implications of power that have accompanied the development of the
normative ideals of truth and knowledge, as conceived from the perspective of a
subject-object model of rationality. From this perspective, a defence of rationality
presupposes a defence of "man" as a power-seeker in the name of knowledge. As
Nancy Fraser (1985) explains:
Humanism, claims Foucault. ..is a political and scientific praxis oriented to
a distinctive object known as "Man". Man only comes into existence in the
late eighteenth or early nineteenth century with the emergence of a new
power/knowledge regime. Within and by means of the social practices that
regime comprises, Man was and is constituted as the epistemic object of
the new "human sciences" and also instituted as the subject who is the
target and instrument of a new kind of normalizing power. Both as
epistemic object and as subject of power, Man is a strange, unstable, two-
sided entity or "doublet". He consists in an impossible symbiosis of two
opposing poles, one objective, the other subjective. Each of these poles
seeks to exclude the other, but in so doing only manages to solicit and
enhance it, since each in fact requires the other. Humanism, then, is the
contradictory, ceaseless, self-defeating project of resolving this Man
problem. (Fraser 1985:169.)
Given Foucault's rejection of the notions of reason, truth and knowledge as
constituting the normative basis of critique, the question that now arises is the
following: What is the nature of Foucault's critique in view of his equation of
knowledge and truth with power? The question is especially crucial when one
considers that Foucault is not prepared to speculate on the possibility of resistance
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or critique from a position of justification (epistemic or normative) of truth (actual or
potential) or knowledge "outside" the structures and relations of power.
Nancy Fraser (1981:275) suggests that Foucault's "neutrality" may be interpreted
as a kind of bracketing or suspension of standard criteria and procedures as is
found in the phenomenological tradition. This would explain why, for example,
"Foucault.. .does not take up the question of whether the various regimes he
studies provide knowledge that is in any sense true or warranted or adequate or
undistorted" (ibid.).
As regards the problem of power and knowledge, it is important to note that
Foucault's approach to the question of power is not a form of "ideology critique",
since the latter presupposes the possibility of opposing truth or knowledge (from
a transcendent position of truth) to power - an argument which he clearly rejects.
Foucault would therefore have us believe that he is not trying to provide us with
another "theory" of power in the tradition of political philosophy, but instead with a
"grid of analysis", the significance of which he explains as follows:
If one tries to erect a theory of power one will always be obliged to view it
as emerging at a given place and time and hence to deduce it, to
reconstruct its genesis. But if power is in reality an open, more-or-Iess
coordinated (in the event, no doubt, ill-coordinated) cluster of relations,
then the only problem is to provide oneself with a grid of analysis which
makes possible an analytic of relations of power. (Foucault 1980:199.)
David R. Hiley's (1984:200) comments on the significance of Foucault's "grid of
analysis" are quite instructive insofar as he unwittingly underlines the
transcendental nature of Foucault's approach to the question of knowledge-power:
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Knowledge cannot exist except through relations of power, and power
makes possible and produces "regimes of truth". Power structures a
domain of knowledge at the same time that enquiry isolates areas as
objects of knowledge, making them targets for the deployment of strategies
of power. (Hiley 1984:200.)
Hiley's "transcendental" argument is certainly borne out by Foucault himself, when
the latter remarks:
We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by
encouraging it because it serves power, or by applying it because it is
useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is
no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at
the same time knowledge. These "power-knowledge relations" are to be
analyzed, therefore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or
is not free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject
who knows, the objects to be known and, the modalities of knowledge must
be regarded as so many effects of these fundamental implications of
power-knowledge and their historical transformations. (Foucault 1977a:27-
28.)
When Foucault looks at modernity through his "grid of analysis", he discerns two
distinct patterns of power: the one juridical power (the legal mechanisms of the
modern state) and the other "bio-power", which has its basis in the biological-
material needs of the individual. Within the modern state, the needs that relate to
bio-power are interpreted and dictated within the framework of capitalism (Foucault
1978: 140-141 ). As regards the significance of bio-power, Foucault remarks:
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Western man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species
in a living world, to have a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life,
an individual and collective welfare ...For the first time in history, no doubt,
biological existence was reflected in political existence ...one would have to
speak of bio-power to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into
the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of
transformation of human life. (Foucault 1978:142-143.)
The significance of Foucault's differentiation of juridical power, as the power
exercised from "the top down" in the forms of rules and prohibitions (the negative
conception of power), and bio-power, in the form of mediation and active
internalization or invasion of the political and economic imperatives of modern life
into the most "private" aspects of the individual's life (the body, the "mind", the
"soul"), is that the question of autonomy and freedom, depending on one's
perspective, becomes all the more urgent, or all the more meaningless. From
Foucault's point of view, it is difficult to see how and why the question of critique
can be explored in a meaningful way, given his transcendental framework of
power-knowledge as the condition forthe possibility of truth. In order to appreciate
this aspect of Foucault's thinking, it is necessary to reflect briefly on the
significance of his genealogical project.
4.4.2 Foucault's genealogical project: writing the history of the present
In his essay, What is Enlightenment, Foucault describes the main thrust of his
genealogical project as:
... [emphasizing] the extent to which a type of philosophical interrogation -
one that simultaneously problematizes man's relation to the present, man's
historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous
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subject - is rooted in the Enlightenment. On the other hand, I have been
seeking to stress that the thread that may connect us with the
Enlightenment is not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather the
permanent reactivation of an attitude - that is, a philosophical ethos that
could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era. (Foucault
1984:42.)
Foucault's genealogical critique is closely tied to his critical appropriation of the
Kantian project, within the broader context of the Enlightenment. In this regard,
Foucault is impressed by Kant's attempt to establish a link between the conditions
of the possibility of knowledge, and the Enlightenment ideal of maturity, that is,
intellectual independence and moral autonomy. This independence and autonomy
are in turn articulated from the perspective of a critical interrogation of the
conditions, the scope and the limits of reason.
Foucault's rejection of the humanistic orientation of the Enlightenment tradition, is
based on the notion that for modernity to come into its own, what is required are
not universalistic theories of knowledge or normative accounts of moral action.
Foucault argues that there is no "turning back", but also no possibility of
speculating about the future either, as for example, in the Marxist vison of a
classless society. This implies that modernity has to be assessed not in terms of
what it can potentially become, but rather in terms of what it has in fact become.
This accounts for Foucault's refusal to look at history as a struggle towards
something "better"; it is more important to recognize the dangers implicit in
modernity, and to resist the "limits" imposed by its power-knowledge regimes.
Rorty's (1985) comments, in this regard, are particularly relevant:
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Foucault once said that he would like to write "so as to have no face". He
forbids himself the tone of the liberal sort of thinker who says to his fellow-
citizens: "We know that there must be a better way to do things than this;
let us look for it together". There is no "we" to be found in Foucault's
writing ...lt is this remoteness which reminds one of the conservative who
pours cold water on hopes for reforms, who affects to look at the problems
of his fellow-citizens with the eye of the future historian. Writing "the history
of the present", rather than suggestions about how our children might
inhabit a better world in the future, gives up not just on the notion of a
common human nature, and on that of "the subject", but on our
untheoretical sense of solidarity. (Rorty 1985:172.)
Foucault, it seems, is in agreement with Rorty, especially in view of the fact that he
(Foucault) is rather skeptical about "theories" seeking to explain or diagnose the
ills of modern society from a universalistic perspective, aimed at reflecting society
as a whole:
To speak of the "whole of society" apart from the only form it has ever
taken is to transform the past into a dream. We readily believe that the
least we can expect of experiences, actions and strategies is that they take
into account the "whole of society" ...But I believe that this is asking a great
deal, that it means imposing impossible conditions on our actions because
this notions functions in a manner that prohibits the actualization, success,
and perpetuation of these projects. "The whole of society", we can only
hope that it never exists again. (Foucault 1977b:233.)
It would, however, be wrong to interpret Foucault's attitude as one of total
indifference, born of a desire for dispassionate neutrality. There is indeed a moral-
political context underlying his critique of modernity's regimes of truth, but this does
not mean that he is prepared to consider any historical alternative. His genealogical
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project of "writing the history of the present" forbids any speculation about the
future, but this does not deter Foucault, however, from engaging with the present.
For Foucault, it is more important, and more relevant, to engage with the present,
not in terms of future possibilities, but rather in terms of its present dangers. As he
himself put it in one of his interviews:
No. I arn not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a
problem in the solution of another problem, raised at another moment by
other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and
that's the reason why I don't accept the word "alternative". I would like to
do the genealogy of problems, of problematiques. My point is not that
everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the
same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we have something to do.
So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.
I think the ethical-political choice we have to make every day is to
determine which is the main danger (Foucault 1984:343.) (Emphasis,
Foucault's.)
According to Foucault, a commitment to the present and its dangers, should not
encourage the tendency to see our present age any "better" or "worse" than any
other age on the grounds that we do not have the normative yardsticks for making
such claims. Nor should we interpret the present on the basis of rupture, an ending,
a new beginning; in fact, there is nothing special or unique about the present; it is
"not of total perdition, in the abyss of darkness, or a triumphant daybreak ...lt is a
time like any other, or rather a time which is never quite like any other" (Foucault,
quoted in David Couzins Hoy 1998:23-24).
A final question to consider with regard to Foucault's genealogical project is the
following: How does Foucault propose to justify his recommendation for a
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philosophical ethos of permanent critique, in view of his own refusal to provide the
normative criteria for such an undertaking? (Fraser 1981; Taylor 1984.)
In response to this question, David R Hiley (1984) makes a rather interesting
comment in which he tries to avoid placing Foucault in one of two equally
untenable categories: rationality or irrationality. Hiley suggests that we consider a
third "nonarbitrary" option:
I want to make the claim that the realization that interpretation is
ungrounded does not mean that the genealogical interpretation of power
is arbitrary ...the alternative of "either grounded or arbitrary" makes sense
only within the framework Foucault's work has set aside. The fear that
unless knowledge is grounded, irrationality will reign supreme is a
particularly modern worry. Within the modern problematic, "grounded" and
"arbitrary" are made for each other. Outside that framework, they are not.
There is clearly another sense of "nonarbitrary" that is not tied to the project
of grounding. That is, to be nonarbitrary is to be open to examination and
dispute. Foucault has always referred to his views with caution, phrasing
them in terms of 'perhaps' or 'maybe' or calling them hypotheses. The
charge that his method aids and abets arbitrariness and irrationality is, as
he has said in a recent paper, "Enlightenment blackmail". (Hiley 1984:198-
199.)
The above quotation clearly points in the direction of a basis of rational consensus
and understanding that goes beyond the limits that Foucault imposes on his
method of genealogical critique. The words "perhaps" and "maybe", as well as
"hypotheses", do not only underline the tentative and fallibilistic nature of our
knowledge and truth claims; they also suggest the possibility of intersubjective
agreement based on arguments whose validity transcend the specific "regimes of
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truth" in which they are raised. This is exactly what Habermas has in mind when
he advances his theory of communicative action and rationality, as a "nonarbitrary"
alternative to the modern philosophical project of grounding. For Foucault,
however, the question of truth has been suspended, and this undermines the
epistemic status of his arguments regarding the nature of modern forms of power.
It should be noted that Foucault's privileging of power resembles, in very significant
respects, the arguments of the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical theory, most
notably Horkheimer and Adorno, whose primary focus in their collaborative critique,
as formulated in their Dialect of Enlightenment (1993), has been the scientific-
technical- capitalist dimension of rationalization, as the distinctive and all-
encompassing horizon of modern reason and "progress". As Peter Dews (1987)
correctly points out
Foucault's thought is rooted in a highly individual historical vision, which
centres on the transition from traditional to modern, industrial societies, and
is specifically concerned with the forms of knowledge and modes of social
organization characteristic of capitalist modernity; his theoretical
formulations can only be fully comprehended when set in the context of this
vision (Dews 1987:145).
Foucault's concern with the phenomenon of power must be understood from the
perspective of the ascendancy of scientific-technical knowledge, which for him is
not so much informed by a concern with truth as a regulative idea, but is rather a
manifestation of a (will-to) power that enslaves and traps the modern subject within
its "regimes of truth".
Foucault does indeed consider the possibility of resistance and insurrection against
the scientific-technical rationalization of modernity, but in view of his reluctance to
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separate the question of knowledge and truth from that of power, he can only
speak of a battle waged by subjugated forms of knowledge (and their regimes of
truth) against the dominant discourses of power-knowledge and their regimes of
truth. This possibility of resistance to the dominant discourses of scientific-technical
knowledge is the grounds for hope in Foucault's genealogical project, and, in my
view, it points to the possibility of consensus and understanding within an
intersubjective context of truth and knowledge, whose validity transcends the local
contexts of power-claims which masquerade as truth.
Foucault accordingly describes his genealogical project as specifically aimed at
destroying the illusion of unity and coherence created by a metaphysically
sanctioned approach to science- technology and history:
What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local,
discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claim of a
unitary body of theory which would filter, hierachise and order them in the
name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes
a science and its objects. Genealogies are therefore not positivistic returns
to a more careful or exact form of science. They are precisely anti-
sciences ...We are concerned...with the insurrection of knowledges that are
opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science,
but to the effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the
institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse within a
society such as ours. (Foucault 1980:83-84.)
Foucault's argument above, which resembles Lyotard's argument with regard to
narrative versus scientific knowledge, as discussed in Chapter Three, implicitly
presupposes the possibility of an expanded conception of rationality, one which
can provide a normative basis for a critique of scientific knowledge from a more
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comprehensive non-foundational model of rationality. Habermas's philosophical
project is an attempt to provide such a model as an alternative approach to the
understanding and analysis of the modern forms of power, as delineated by
Foucault. We will consider Habermas's response to Foucault's (transcendental)
account of power. In our discussion we consider the significance of Habermas's
distinction between instrumental reason, on the one hand, and communicative
reason, on the other.
4.5 HABERMAS'S RESPONSE TO FOUCAULT
Habermas's defense of his vision of modernity, as well as his overall objective of
providing a "theory of the pathology of modernity from the viewpoint of the
realization - the deformed realization - of reason in history", is most clearly reflected
in his debate with Foucault (Habermas1992b:98). In Foucault, Habermas has a
strong opponent whose account of power in the modern world provides an
alternative to his own vison of modernity as an incomplete project whose potential
ultimately depends on a more comprehensive conception of rationality, the success
of which will depend on the cogency of Habermas's distinction between a technical
and a practical norm of rationality.
4.5.1 The distinction between technical and practical reason
If one accepts as a point of departure the process of modernization in terms of the
impact of science and technology, within the broader context of the emergence of
capitalism and its devastating effects on the lives of ordinary people, then
Foucault's account of the modern forms of power is certainly one of the most
challenging and controversial. Stephen K. White's (1988) comments on the
challenging aspects of Foucault's account of power, especially in relation to
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Habermas's appropriation of the emancipatory potential of modernity are quite
significant:
What makes Foucault's work so challenging to critical theory? At bottom,
it is the fact that his genealogies, like Nietzsche's, discover power operating
in structures of thinking and behavior which previously seemed to be
devoid of power relations. In effect, Foucault provides us with an incisive
way of interrogating the structures of culture. His specific target are the
cognitive and institutional structures of modern life. He wants to show us
that structures that we take to be thoroughly enabling are always
simultaneously constraining. This orienting intention of all of Foucault's
work is clearly expressed in the following: "it seems to me that the critical
question today [is:] in what is given to us as universal, necessary,
obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent and
the product of arbitrary constraints?" (White 1988: 144.) (Emphasis,
White's.)
Foucault, as we saw above, seeks to explain the problematic of reason, knowledge
and truth from a transcendental perspective of power. Given his refusal to
distinguish between truth claims and power claims, Foucault's only meaningful
response to the various forms of "subjugated knowledge" is to speculate on the
possibility of resistance from the transcendental perspective of power clashing with
power. Foucault's non-committal attitude towards the question of collective moral-
political action, resistance, solidarity and coordination in the face of "Power",
reflects a misunderstanding of what Habermas refers to as the "project of
modernity". At a deeper level, Foucault fails to realize that modernity's instrumental
rationality is not its defining moment.
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Habermas accounts for Foucault'sgeneralization of scientific-technical knowledge-
power on the basis of a failure on his part to differentiate between a practical, that
is, moral-political conception of reason, and a technical conception of reason, as
we find in writings of Plato and Aristotle, for example. From the perspective of
modernity, Habermas believes that it is more important to focus on the practical
dimension of rationality in order to correct the imbalances of a technocratic age:
Therefore, it is more appropriate to attempt a historical explanation of the
problem: how is knowledge of the social interrelationships of life with a view
to political action possible? How, within a political situation, can we obtain
clarification of what is practically necessary and at the same time
objectively possible? This question can be translated back into our
historical context: how can the promise of practical politics - namely of
providing practical orientation about what is right and just in a given
situation be redeemed without relinquishing, on the one hand, the rigor of
scientific knowledge, which modern social philosophy demands in contrast
to the practical philosophy of classicism? And on the other, how can the
promise of social philosophy, to furnish an analysis of the interrelationships
of social life be redeemed without relinquishing the practical orientation of
classical politics? (Habermas 1974:44.)
If we compare and contrast the modern understanding of social knowledge with
what Habermas has in mind, then the significance of his position becomes
apparent. Habermas is arguing that in view of its overemphasis on science and
technology, reason has not fulfilled its full potential, given the general failure to
acknowledge its importance within the realm of the practical. It is the failure to
distinguish between reason in a practical and in a technical sense, that is mainly
responsible for the dismissal of modernity as a project in history whose completion
depends on criteria emanating from the rational potential within modernity.
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Among the postmodern thinkers, Foucault is especially guilty of collapsing the
technical and the practical categories of reason, and this leads him to "give up" on
the possibility of freedom from the perspective of reason. In Foucault's project
reason has degenerated to its "worst" form of domination and control, and is thus
stripped of the emancipatory potential at the heart of the "project of modernity"
(Habermas 1981). In this regard, Albrecht Wellmer (1991) gives a rather instructive
account of the gradual degeneration of reason into an instrument of domination
and control:
The project of enlightenment as Kant conceived it was concerned with the
emergence of humanity from its 'self-imposed condition of dependency', but
by the time that Max Weber was writing, little remained of that project
except a continual process of rationalization, bureaucratization, technical
progress, and the relentless encroachment of science into social existence.
The capitalist economy, modern bureaucracy, technical progress and finally
those ways of 'disciplining' the body which are analyzed by Foucault have
assumed the proportions of a gargantuan process of destruction -
destruction of traditions, destruction of the ecological environment, finally
the destruction of 'meaning-systems' and of that unitary self which had
been the product as well as the driving force of the enlightenment
process ....ln the context of the modernization processes, the practice of
politics becomes reduced to the technique of retaining power, of
manipulation and organization; democracy becomes merely an efficient
form of organizing government control. (Wellmer 1991:86-87.)
In view of the seeming inability to provide the relevant moral-political resources to
deal with technical-scientific-capitalist processes of modernization, the structures
of modern consciousness seem to have succumbed to a "technocratic
consciousness" in the modern world (Habermas 1971: 111).
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Habermas maintains that technocratic consciousness testifies, not so much to a
disintegration of traditional ethical and moral criteria; it reflects rather a complete
repression of ethics, as a category of life. This repression is the consequence of
the leveling of practical and technical criteria in modern society. The failure to
maintain a distinction between a technical and practical form of knowledge,
accounts forthe inability among postmodern thinkers such as Foucault, to account
for the possibility of freedom not in terms of solidarity, but rather in terms of an
individualistic aesthetic re-creation of the self. Habermas explains the categorial
distinction between the practical and the technical sense of rationality as follows:
But, of course, the real difficulty in the relation of theory to praxis does not
arise from this new function of science as a technological force, but rather
with the fact that we are no longer able to distinguish between practical and
technical power. Yet even a civilization that has been rendered scientific is
not granted dispensation from practical questions; therefore a peculiar
danger arises when the process of scientification transgresses the limit of
technical questions, without however departing from the level of reflection
confined to the technological horizon. For then no attempt at all is made to
attain a rational consensus on the part of citizens concerning the practical
control of their destiny. Its place is taken by the attempt to attain technical
control over history by perfecting the administration of society, an attempt
that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical. (Habermas 1974:255.)
One cannot overemphasize the importance of the categorial distinction between
practical and the technical knowledge in the thinking of Habermas. It is especially
important within the context of his debate with Foucault in particular, and the
postmodern thinkers in general. The elimination of practical knowledge from an
assessment of modernity cannot address the possibility offreedom in a meaningful
way, and as a result, the critique of power (without a practical normative context
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whence to evaluate the effects of domination and control) can only result, whether
we like it or not, in the legitimation of power, on the one hand, and the
depoliticization of the general public, on the other hand. As Richard Bernstein
(1976) puts it:
When practical discourse is eliminated or suppressed, the public realm
loses ...its political function. The problem has become urgent in our time not
only because science and technology are the most important productive
forces in advanced industrial societies, but because a technological
consciousness increasingly affects all domains of human life, and serves
as a background ideology that has legitimating power. (Bernstein
1976:188.)
Given the general inability to distinguish practical and technical knowledge,
Habermas warns against the false reputation for rad icality enjoyed by (postmodern)
thinkers, who seek to approach and dismiss modernity and its progressive status
purely on aesthetic grounds, in the name of a freedom that has no rational concrete
links to practical lives of ordinary people. Habermas (1983: 155) develops a critique
that is "subtle and relentless enough not to let itself be blinded by the mere illusion
of emancipation ....and to contradict the thesis that emancipation itself mystifies".
Foucault's insistence on approaching the question of knowledge from the
perspective of power, in consequence of which the question of truth is restricted
to the realm of its technical application, dictated by a specific regime of truth, leads
in the direction of relativism, the direct consequence of his failure to distinguish
between meaning and validity.
This problem, as we have seen in our discussion of Lyotard in Chapter Three,
leads to a performative contradiction, since Foucault cannot account for the
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epistemic status of the general claim that power produces knowledge and
knowledge produces truth. This is an accusation that is central to Habermas 's
debate with the postmodern thinkers in general. In his encounter with Foucault the
question of validity is especially crucial insofar as it is squarely in contrast to the
primacy of the assumption of truth (or validity claims) as the precondition of
consensus, as developed in Habermas's theory of communicative action and
rationality. Habermas (1987b) accordingly criticizes Foucault's position as follows:
The criteria of validity according to which what is true gets discriminated
from what is false within a discourse abides in a unique transparency and
appearance of having no origin whatsoever - validity has to strip away
every element of the sheer genetic, even its derivation from the basic rules
constitutive of the discourse, which the archeologist lays bare. So little can
the structures that make truth possible themselves be true or false that one
can only inquire about the function of the will that attains expression in
them, and about the genealogy of this will from some network of the
practices of power. (Habermas 1987b:248.)
Whereas Foucault looks for the condition of the possibility of truth within the
structures of power, Habermas looks for the condition of truth within the structures
of communicative action aimed at reaching understanding with others. As we shall
see in the following chapter, the so-called linguistic turn in Habermas's thinking
provides the normative basis for his diagnosis of the pathology of modernity, its
structural imbalances, as well as its asymmetrical relations of power, on the basis
of a theory of communicative action and rationality. In the present context, suffice
it to say, that unlike Foucault who links power with anonymous forces within
modernity, for Habermas. power is manifested in the distortions of communication.
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In his linguistic turn, Habermas makes a clear distinction between the
communicative and the strategic or instrumental mode of communication. It is on
the basis of this distinction, which is a later version of his former distinction
between the practical and technical dimensions of rationality, as discussed above,
that Habermas brings home his interpretation of modernity, as a phenomenon
structured around these two fundamental modes of communication. On this
interpretation, the "pathology of modernity" is the result of a one-sided process of
modernization, in which the various manifestations of power as discussed by
Foucault may be interpreted as an invasion of the instrumental mode of rationality,
emanating from the power-structures of the modern state, into the realm of the
communicative mode of interaction where the logic of mutual understanding and
discourse is supposed to prevail.
In contrast to the one-dimensional account of modernity as given by Foucault,
Habermas adds the second dimension of communicative rationality as the
condition of the possibility of systemic rationalization of modern society. While both
forms of rationality are essential to the survival of modernity, the process of
rationalization and modernization has been dominated by the instrumental form of
rationalization, the domain of science and technology, together with the economic
imperatives of capitalism. The privileging of instrumental rationality has led to
imbalances and pathologies within the modern world, as the sphere of
communicative rationality is increasingly threatened and undermined by
instrumental rationality. This colonization of the life-world has two significant
effects: firstly, a loss offreedom, (which would validate Foucault's theory of power),
and secondly, a general loss of meaning, save in terms of a victory of power over
Power (the second of Foucault's theses). But for the differentiation that he makes
between the instrumental and the communicative modes of rationality, Habermas's
account of the modern forms of power resembles that of Foucault's in many
significant respects:
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In the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration even
in those areas where a consensus-dependent coordination of action cannot
be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at
stake. In these areas, the mediatization of the lifeworld assumes the form
of a colOnization. (Habermas 1987a:196.) (Emphasis, Habermas's.)
4.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we looked at the critiques of metaphysical thinking from the
postmodern perspective. In the case of Derrida the primary emphasis was on his
attempt, if not to overcome, then at least to resist as far as possible the power of
metaphysical closure, by subverting its hypostatization on the strength of his
transcendental account of ditierence, as the possibility of all metaphysical
conceptual distinctions. With tiitterence as the inexhaustible and unfathomable
(creative) non-conceptual basis of our truth and knowledge claims, philosophical
reflection is reduced to uncovering the aesthetic conditions of the possibility of truth
and knowledge claims.
In the case of Foucault, we witnessed the privileging of power as the
transcendental condition of the possibility of truth. On the basis of his genealogical
project, Foucault proceeds to establish an inseparable link between knowledge and
power. On this approach, the question of truth can only be addressed from within
a particular regime of power-knowledge, thus ruling out the possibility of a context-
transcendent perspective of critique and truth. When applied to the social-political
realm, Foucault is guilty of confusing a technical with a practical form of reason,
thus reducing social reality to an endless battle between the dominant discourse
of scientific-technical-capitalist Power and the anti-scientific discourses of
subjugated knowledge-powers.
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In his response to both Derrida and Foucault, Habermas points in the direction of
a more comprehensive understanding of rationality based on communicative
action, that is everyday language that is aimed at the reaching of mutual
understanding and agreement. Habermas finds in the structures of communication
a rational potential, capable of salvaging the project of modernity, as well as its
promise of freedom based on reason. His alternative to the postmodern critique is
a postmetaphysical reconstruction of the rational content of the metaphysical
tradition. We will examine the significance of his postmetaphysical alternative in
Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
POST-METAPHYSICAL THINKING
As we have seen in Chapter Two, the assumption of a transcendental subject
forms the cornerstone of the modern metaphysical tradition. Habermas's debate
with the representatives of postmodern thinking revolves around the question of
whether reason, as a (self-)critical and normative activity, can still be redeemed in
the wake of the rejection of a metaphysical conception of reason that is based on
the assumption of an ahistorical transcendental subject. For Habermas, given the
anti-metaphysical stance of the postmodern thinkers, this question is specifically
concerned with whether we can still legitimately establish a rational (universalistic)
basis for our knowledge and truth claims, or whether (as his postmodern
opponents would have it) we have to abandon the question of reason completely,
and in the process also abandon the central challenge of modernity: the realization
of autonomy and freedom in a rational society. The purpose of this chapter is to
investigate the possibility of this central challenge from the perspective of
postmetaphysical thinking as an alternative to the postmodern challenge.
5.1 OVERCOMING THE METAPHYSICAL TRADITION
From the perspective of the modern philosophical tradition, the possibility of
autonomy and freedom is rooted in the notion of rationality, and any account of
autonomy and freedom, necessarily presupposes (either explicitly or implicitly) a
particular (practical) conception of rationality. In this regard, contemporary social
scientists usually distinguish between two types of practical rationality: strategic
rationality, on the one hand, and contextual rationality, on the other. Strategic
rationality is a means-ends conception, where rationality is determined and
evaluated by the efficiency of an action ("the means") to attain a particular goal
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("the end") - it ultimately boils down to the self-preservation of the individual.
Contextual rationality, in contrast, is a norm-guided approach in which the
rationality of one's actions is determined and evaluated in the light of their
conformity to a particular set or beliefs, social norms and practices as they occur
in a particular context - it ultimately boils down to the possibility of overriding the
interests of self-preservation for the sake of a collective good.
Both of these conceptions presuppose a particular model of subjectivity. The
advocate of strategic rationality views the subject in strictly individualistic terms.
The subject is accordingly projected as a self-interested agent whose relations with
others are based primarily on considerations of "what's in it for me?". The social
world is thus a place of domination and manipulation, and the rationality of the
subject is consequently based on how well or successful he or she can be in
dominating or strategically manipulating others forthe sake of his or her own goals.
This view of the subject is especially reminiscent of Lyotard and Foucault, for
whom, as we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, language is a medium of
strategic manipulation of others (Lyotard), and domination based on power
(Foucault). Although both thinkers deny any explicit interest in a notion of
subjectivity, given their shared commitment to overcoming the subject as rooted in
the metaphysical tradition, this does not mean that they completely abandon "the
subject". A notion of subjectivity based on a strategic conception of rationality is
therefore implicitly presupposed by them.
While one can accept the argument for the complexity of the economic and
administrative (bureaucratic) structures that have characterized the process of
modernization, often interpreted as anonymous intractable structures of control and
domination, it is "people" who manipulate and dominate other "people". It is only
in a social context where rationality is restricted to a strategic model that one
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despairs of the possibility of resistance and transformation, since forthis to become
possible, we need to develop a more comprehensive understanding of rationality,
one based on the possibility of cooperation and the recognition of others as one's
equal.
The respective projects of Lyotard and Foucault clearly do not allow for such a
possibility, since they are focused primarily on the conflictual aspects of social
behavior. In order to demonstrate the inadequacy of a strategically based notion
of rationality, Stephen K. White (1988) quotes the following example by Isaiah
Berlin:
He asks us to imagine an individual who possesses the capacity to reason
only in the strategic manner and who obtains his most intense satisfaction
from sticking pins into surfaces with a particular resiliency. It makes no
difference to him whether these surfaces are tennis balls or human skin.
And he goes about satisfying his desire in a perfectly systematic (means-
ends rational) way. If questioned about his activity, he readily asserts that
he would not like others to stick pins in his own skin, but simply cannot
understand why he should refrain from sticking them in others as often as
circumstances permit. Berlin's concern here is to suggest, on the one hand,
that such an individual falls within the bounds of strategic reason, but to
question, on the other hand, whether we would feel entirely comfortable
calling this man rational. The source of our questioning here is the total
absence of any interest in or even understanding of what it means to
participate in interaction governed by intersubjectively valid norms. (White
1998: 16-17.)
The contextualist approach to rationality, which Rorty clearly identifies with, does
indeed allow for the possibility of cooperation based on the recognition of
intersubjectively valid norms, thus overcoming the shortcomings within the strategic
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conception of rationality, but on Rorty's account of contextualism, conformity to the
prevailing norms and social practices can prove to be a shortsighted and limited
expression of ethnocentric prejudice. This becomes evident when a particular
cultural context encounters other contexts, and the need arises for a universalistic
basis for mediating and adjudicating the perceived incompatibility of different
cultural contexts.
From the contextualist perspective in general, and Rorty's in particular, the
abandonment of "some permanent neutral framework" of all possible enquiry, leads
to an abandonment of all critical discourse and enquiry that is context-transcendent
(Rorty 1980:315). On the contextual model of rationality, therefore, truth claims are
interpreted as a function of social practices of justification; they do not refer to a
normative basis of critique that "point beyond the practices of justification that are
contingently established among us, one that would distance us from these
practices" (Habermas 1992: 136). It is from this perspective that Habermas, in spite
of his sympathy with Rorty in trying to overcome the aporias of a metaphysically
based conception of rationality, is critical of the dogmatic implications of a
contextual model of rationality in which "history" or "historicism" becomes
synonymous with cultural imperialism. The "irrationality" within this position stems
from an identification of reason with totalitarianism; the opposite of reason is
"freedom", which in Rorty's thinking becomes a "private" matter of edification and
the creation of "new vocabularies", and philosophy, traditionally the domain of
rational discourse and argumentation regarding matters of truth, consequently
relinquishes its cognitive status.
In place of the "traditional" philosopher, Rorty recommends the edifying
philosopher:
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Edifying philosophers want to keep space open for the sense of wonder
which poets can sometimes cause - wonder that there is something new
under the sun, something which is not an accurate representation of what
was already there, something which (at least for the moment) cannot be
explained and can barely be described (Rorty 1980:370).
For postmodernists such as Rorty, the question of reason and rationality is
separated from that of freedom and autonomy, and if the processes of
rationalization and modernization are interpreted from a purely instrumental
perspective, then the Enlightenment legacy offreedom and autonomy as the basis
of a rational society, is certainly in danger of losing a" credibility.
Given the fact that the particular history of modernity has coincided with the
emergence of capitalism as the overall horizon for the development of scientific-
technical knowledge, one can understand why a scientific-technical rationality has
been privileged as the fundamental expression of rationality.
Given the centrality of reason and rationality within the context of modernity, the
success of modernity will ultimately depend on the availability of an alternative
model of rationality; one that addresses the aporias of a metaphysically determined
concept of rationality from a perspective that takes into account the objections
raised by the postmodern critique of reason, but which also seeks to expand the
basis of our understanding of rationality.
In my view, Habermas offers us such a rational alternative based on a more
comprehensive notion of rationality that goes beyond the logocentric notion, the
central target of the postmodern critique. From the perspective of Habermas's
debate with the postmodernists, the question that we must ultimately consider is
whether modernity can still be defended on rational grounds, and if so, what would
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be the nature of such a defense, given the argument that philosophy can no longer
function as a special discourse with a privileged access to truth.
In trying to overcome the legacy of metaphysical thinking, we have seen in the
previous chapters a general tendency among the representatives of postmodern
thinking to confront modernity as the exclusive expression of an instrumentalist or
logocentric form of rationality, that is, a form of rationality rooted in power and
domination. Regardless of whether we read Foucault or Derrida, Lyotard or Rorty,
the common thread running through their respective arguments is that reason
cannot be reconciled with the promise of freedom and autonomy, and philosophy
as the medium for the theoretical articulation of reason is adjudged "guilty by
association". This has given rise to the search, among postmodernists, for various
alternative forms of critique, the principal objective of which has been to divest
,
philosophical thinking of its metaphysical trappings, not in order to consider a
rational alternative, but rather to break away completely from the idea of reason,
as it has found expression in the modern metaphysical tradition. I am therefore in
agreement with Habermas when he asserts:
No matter what name it appears under now - whether as fundamental
ontology, as critique, as negative dialectics, deconstruction, or genealogy-
these pseudonyms are by no means disguises under which the traditional
form of philosophy lies hidden; the drapery of philosophical concepts most
likely serves as the cloak for a scantily concealed end of philosophy
(Habermas 1987b:53).
In this chapter I will show that the postmodern challenge does indeed have its
merits, and Habermas is certainly willing to acknowledge them. Implicit in this
acknowledgment, however, is also a warning not to "throw the baby out with
bathwater" (Habermas 1985: 196). According to Habermas, there is a rational
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alternative to the modern legacy of metaphysical thinking; one that does not
necessarily lead to a radical rejection of the rational content of the metaphysical
tradition, nor to a dogmatic dismissal of the rational potential rooted in the
structures of modernity.
Iwill also show that, in his critique of subject-centered reason, Habermas's thinking
overlaps with certain aspects of the postmodern critique; this must not blind us,
however, to the tremendous differences separating them. Within the general
context of the debate, one cannot overstate the importance of this point, which, in
my opinion, finally forces the issue regarding postmetaphysical, as opposed to a
postmodern form of critical thinking. In this regard, I am in agreement with Anton
van Niekerk (1995:173) when he states, "[w]hile all postmodernists are
postmetaphysicians, all postmetaphysicians are certainly not post-modernists".
In the final analysis, what essentially separates the postmetaphysical critique of
reason from its postmodern counterpart, is the notion of communicative rationality,
based on an idea of truth whose normative potential is assumed to originate in the
communicative practices of everyday linguistic interaction. In the place of the
transcendental subject Habermas, unlike his postmodern counterparts who look
"beyond" reason in order to overcome its metaphysical legacy, turns to the life-
world of everyday communicative action for his reorientation of the question of
rationality. Habermas's notion of communicative rationality therefore informs his
commitment to postmetaphysical thinking.
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5.2 RECASTING THE QUESTION OF REASON: THE POSTMETAPHYSICAL
PERSPECTIVE
Postmetaphysical as opposed to postmodern thinking, such as Foucault's
genealogical analysis or Derrida's deconstructive project, takes as its point of
departure the possibility of reformulating the question of reason and rationality,
without, however, falling back on the foundational assumptions of metaphysical
thinking. In this regard, the most important of these assumptions concerns the
possibility of developing a notion of rationality around a central idea or set of
principles, which are then advanced as the incontestable, permanent, universal
foundation of knowledge and truth. Implicit in this assumption is the notion of a
philosophical process of reasoning that can provide the validating context for
differentiating between true knowledge and the mere appearance of it, true
freedom and mere ideological representations of it.
Within the tradition of modern philosophy, as we have seen in our discussion of
Descartes and Kant, the assumption of a transcendental subject takes centre
stage. With the turn to the subject, modern philosophy has inaugurated a mode of
philosophical reflection which is aimed at establishing the foundation of truth and
certainty within the "mind" or "consciousness" of a transcendental subject capable
of reflecting the truth of reality "out there". The subject and its transcendental
accomplishments are assumed to provide us with knowledge of that which is
identical and permanent in a world characterized otherwise by an unstoppable and
dynamic process of change. Modern philosophy is thus paradoxically characterized
by an "inward movement", as the precondition of the possibility of knowledge of
reality "out there". This "inward movement" or subjective turn has accordingly
produced a philosophy of consciousness or subjectivism as the defining moment
of modern metaphysics. The reason of "the subject" becomes the grounds for
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establishing the progress of knowledge, truth and reason in the world, and the
discourse of philosophy must accordingly produce the theories of rationality aimed
at discovering the universal grounds for the possibility of knowledge.
Given this universalistic focus, the subjective turn in modern philosophy has
coincided with a strong conception of "theory", the major implication of which is a
theoretical detachment or disengagement from the everyday world of change and
uncertainty. On this approach, the source of truth is "the subject", and the process
of confirmation of the truths of metaphysical thinking becomes a self-referential
process of philosophical reflection, which demands that "the theoretical thinker
should keep his Iher distance from the everyday network of experience and
interests, or from local prejudices" (Van Niekerk 1995: 175).
As we have seen in previous chapters, the postmodern challenge revolves around
the central argument that the metaphysical tradition of rationalism rooted in the
assumption of a transcendental subject, is no longer valid. Consequently, so it is
claimed, the idea of rationality as a normative, context-transcendent and critical
force cannot be justified, especially in a world where rationalization has become
synonymous with domination. The metaphysical notion of the "One" as the
constitutive ground of "the many" is reformulated in postmodern thinking to capture
the totalitarian character of the modern process of (instrumental) rationalization,
which belies the legitimacy of the notion of the subject as an autonomous agent.
For Habermas, however, the privileging of instrumental rationality is not the whole
story. He simply views the problem of instrumental rationality as symptomatic of the
degree to which the structural changes brought about by the capitalist system of
modernization have overwhelmed and invaded the domain of the life-world where
communicative action (the proper medium of socialization and individualization)
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has been distorted by the language of economic imperatives and the programmes
of public administration:
That is, to the extent that the objectifying descriptions of society migrate
into the lifeworld, we become alienated from ourselves as communicatively
acting subjects. It is this self-objectification that transforms the perception
of heightened societal complexity into the experience of being delivered
over to sheer contingencies. All referents for coping with these
contingencies have been lost - both the societal subject and transcendental
consciousness have long since slipped away from us, the anxious
members of high-risk society. (Habermas 1992a: 141.)
In his bid to offer a model of rationality based on a postmetaphysical alternative,
Habermas sets out to challenge and reverse the reactionary implications of the
postmodern challenge. We will now consider in broad outline the salient themes
of his postmetaphysical alternative. In my presentation of the postmetaphysical
alternative, I will roughly follow the thematic structure as outlined in Van Niekerk's
(1995) article, Postmetaphysical versus Postmodern Thinking.
5.2.1 A procedural model of rationality
Metaphysics has traditionally been concerned with identifying a basic, rationally
structured, reality behind the contingent realm of our everyday experience.
Whether, as in the Platonic tradition, it takes the form of eternal Ideas or Forms; or
whether, as in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition, it takes the form of a transcendental
subject, the underlying fundamental idea is more or less the same: philosophy
must provide the (universal) rational basis for our knowledge and truth claims.
Within the modern tradition of metaphysics, "reality" has invariably been mediated
in terms of a priori structures or principles as the condition for the possibility of
180
knowledge. In the final analysis, knowledge of reality has had to proceed by way
of a prior knowledge of the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, and the
rationality of the world "out there" has thus depended on the rationality of a thinking
process, aimed at giving structure and form to the contingent realm of everyday
experience.
Metaphysical thinking therefore seeks to provide a general framework that will
provide a coherent and exhaustive explanation and interpretation of reality. The
metaphysical conception of rationality is aimed at discovering reality as a "whole",
in the light of which it subsequently proceeds to explain the nature of its constituent
"parts". At the root of metaphysical thinking is the basic assumption of the
possibility of universal criteria of rationality, independent of all historically concrete
practices.
Postmetaphysical thinking, on the other hand, accepts a procedural concept of
rationality as its point of departure, that is, one whose rationality is determined by
the appropriate procedures for solving various problems. For Habermas, a
procedural approach to rationality is linked to a particular understanding of
modernity, one that distinguishes and differentiates three distinct cultural spheres
of science, morality, and art. In this respect, Habermas is clearly following the
examples of Weber and Kant, each of whom identifies and differentiates these
three basic cultural spheres: science, morality and art. Each of these spheres is
accorded its own autonomous internal rationality and validity. For science it is a
question of truth; for morality, it is the question of normative rightness; and for art
it is the question of beauty.
Holub (1991) explains the theory of modernity underlying Habermas's
postmetaphysical stance as follows:
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With the disintegration of a unified religious or metaphysical worldview,
each sphere achieves autonomy and is assigned a particular question and
domain: truth, conceived as an epistemological matter is ascribed to natural
science; normative rightness, formulated in terms of justice, is relegated to
morality; and the determination of authenticity and beauty is determined
through judgements of taste in the realm of art (Holub 1991:135).
The specific rationality attached to each of the three cultural spheres of validity is
as follows: cognitive-instrumental applies to science; moral-practical applies to
ethics; and aesthetic-expressive applies to art. As Holub (ibid) points out:
Only with the advent of modernity do we witness an immanent history for
each of these three realms; only in the modern era do these spheres begin
to operate under internally developed laws and imperatives (Holub
1991:135).
Habermas thus distances himselffrom the metaphysical foundationalist assumption
of an overarching universal context for grounding and validating knowledge claims.
In defense of his interpretation of rationality, Habermas (1990) argues furthermore
that, from a modernist perspective, a procedural approach is a cultural given, and
philosophy would do well to adopt a differentiated approach to the question of
reason:
Reason has split into three moments - modern science, positive law and
post-traditional ethics, and autonomous art and institutionalized art
criticism - but philosophy had precious little to do with this disjunction.
These eminent trends towards compartmentalization constituting as they
do the hallmark of modernity, can do very well without philosophical
justification. (Habermas 1990:17.)
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In the light of his acceptance of a procedural conception of rationality, Habermas
clearly distances himself from the kind of unitary approach that has characterized
metaphysical thinking, and of which he is accused by postmodern thinkers such as
Lyotard (1984:40) for example, when he associates Habermas with the
metaphysical tendency of reducing the significance of the moral"ought" to that of
the epistemological"is". As the following statement clearly shows, Lyotard's claim
is based on a misunderstanding of Habermas's position.
Only at the cost of Occidental rationalism itself could we rescind the
differentiation of reason into those rationality complexes to which Kant's
three critiques of reason refer. Nothing is further from my intention than to
make myself an advocate of such a regression, to conjure up the
substantial unity of reason. (Habermas 1982:235.)
The general significance for Habermas of a procedural conception of rationality lies
in the cognitive status of philosophy, insofar as the latter is characterized by a
hypothetical (fallibilistic) self-understanding, which calls for a rational process of
critical intersubjective argumentation and debate, aimed at reaching consensus.
In this regard, Habermas once again distances himself from a metaphysically
determined conception of rationality, based on a knowledge of first principles of
absolute certainty.
Habermas believes that philosophical theories of rationality are no different from
scientific theories insofar as their point of departure falls within the realm of the
hypothetical. In contrast to the self-referential nature of metaphysical thinking,
postmetaphysical thinking has to justify its hypotheses through arguments. In
redefining the role of philosophy, Habermas sounds remarkably like Rorty
(1980:392) when he denies it the status of a privileged discourse. Unlike Rorty,
however, Habermas does not believe that the overcoming of metaphysical thinking
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leads to a denial of philosophy's concern with truth, knowledge or the question of
rationality. Habermas (1992a) argues instead that:
Philosophy has to implicate itself in the fallibilistic self-understanding and
procedural rationality of the empirical sciences; it may not lay claim to a
privileged access to truth, or to a method, an object realm, or even just a
style of intuition that is specifically its own (Habermas 1992a:38).
It is the reluctance on the part of the postmodern thinkers to offer a theoretical
basis for their critique, for fear of entrenching metaphysical closure, together with
their restriction of reason to the realm of scientific knowledge, that accounts for
their general tendency to refrain from defending the cognitive status of their
"arguments", a major consequence of which has been the negativistic character of
postmodern thinking that ultimately denies that its various positions are based on
argumentatively advanced knowledge claims. As Habermas (1992a) puts it:
Philosophy has appeared ...as the mystical thinking of Being (Heidegger),
as the therapeutic treatment of language (Wittgenstein), as deconstructive
activity (Derrida), or as negative dialectics (Adorno). The antiscientism of
these delimitations permit them only to say what philosophy is not and what
it does not want to be; as a nonscience, however, philosophy must leave
its own status undetermined. Positive determinations have become
impossible because cognitive accomplishments can now prove themselves
only through procedural rationality, ultimately through its procedure of
argumentation. (Habermas 1992a:37-38.)
According to Habermas, philosophy must not abandon its concern with "the whole".
For him, "the whole" is now conceived of as the pre-reflective or pre-theoretical
linguistically mediated context of the "life-world", characterized by communicative
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actions and social practices that reflect the basic conditions for the possibility of
communicative reason. He argues further that the range of linguistic interaction
aimed at reaching agreement and understanding with others, forms a background
of knowledge which serves to validate the intersubjective practices and linguistic
utterances of the socialized individual. Within the modern context, communicative
action ranges across a spectrum of three specifiable types of rationality and validity
claims (of truth, normative rightness, and aesthetic beauty), and the task of
philosophy is to mediate between the communicative reason operative in the life-
world, and those specialized cultures of expertise that have found expression in the
abstract discourses of science, technology, law and morality, the various forms of
art and their specialized discourses of criticism. Habermas (1992a: 38) explains
philosophy's mediating role as follows:
But the lifeworld is always already intrusively present to all of us as a
totality that is unproblematized, nonobjectified, and pretheoretical - as the
sphere of that which is daily taken for granted, the sphere of common
sense. In an awkward way, philosophy has always been closely affiliated
with the latter. Like it, philosophy moves within the vicinity of the lifeworld;
its relation to the totality of this receding horizon of everyday knowledge is
similar to that of common sense. And yet, through the subversive power of
reflection and of illuminating, critical, and dissecting analysis, philosophy is
completely opposed to common sense. By virtue of this intimate yet
fractured relation to the lifeworld, philosophy is also well suited for a role on
this side of the scientific system - for the role of an interpreter mediating
between the expert cultures of science, technology, law, and morality, on
the one hand, and everyday communicative practices, on the other hand...
(Habermas 1992a:38-39.) (Emphasis, Habermas's.)
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For Habermas, the abandonment of the assumption of a transcendental subject
implies the abandonment of a metaphysically oriented conception of reason; it
does not imply a wholesale rejection of the notion of rationality. The vacuum left by
the rejection of a transcendental subject is now "filled" by the inescapable historical
horizon of a linguistically transmitted network of cultural practices. According to
Habermas, overcoming a metaphysically based notion of reason underlines the
need to investigate the possibility of reason, not from a transcendental, but rather
from an historical perspective. The investigation into the possibility of reason as a
critical and normative force in history thus becomes the postmetaphysical answer
to the demise of the Kantian tradition of transcendental philosophy.
5.2.2 Reason in history
There can be no doubt that Habermas is in sympathy with a general tendency in
postmodern thinking towards establishing an historical basis as a point of departure
for an investigation of the possibility and limits of reason. He would, for example,
undoubtedly appreciate Foucault's (1980:131) remark that "[t]ruth is a thing of this
world". Virtually from the beginning of his career, Habermas has been focused on
establishing a connection between reason and history, with a view to overcoming
various ahistorical accounts of reason in order to defend a basic intuition that the
emergence of reason is no accidental contingent fact of history, with no deeper
significance apart from being an instrument of survival and manipulation in the
world. For Habermas, reason testifies to a moral and intellectual process of
progressive development.
To a certain extent, Habermas identifies with the Hegelian-Marxist legacy of an
enlightened and enlightening reason, capable of engaging critically with the
historical distortions and truncation of reason, in the name of a "higher"
186
emancipatory notion of reason that actualizes itself within the actual processes of
history. He therefore rejects the notion of a metaphysically defined reason
operating "behind" or "above" history, calling all the shots, as it were. Reason is
therefore viewed as a normative force of critique capable of engaging critically with
the institutionalization of reason within modern society. In this regard, Habermas
subscribes to the Hegelian idea of reason as Vernunft, whose significance within
the tradition of Critical Theory, Bernstein (1985) explains as follows:
It was characteristic of the older generation of Frankfurt thinkers to oppose
instrumental rationality with the idea of a dynamic emancipatory Reason
that Hegel called Vernunft (even when they ...were deconstructing this
concept of Reason). But the appeal to Vernunft, to Reason actualizing itself
though history, became less and less convincing in light of the catastrophic
events of the twentieth century. (Bernstein 1985:6.)
The general scepticism regarding reason as a force of emancipatory enlightenment
is certainly shared by the postmodernists who, in view of their identification of
reason with the processes of scientific-technical rationalization in a modern world
dictated to by the economic imperatives of capitalism and the regulatory principles
of bureaucratic administration, fail to develop an appreciation for the more positive
achievements of reason, as a radical force of democratic resistance to the
domination of instrumental rationality. It is the failure on the part of the postmodern
thinkers to link history with anything progressive that accounts for their critical
disengagement from the cultural resources of modernity, thus leading to a general
tendency to associate freedom with the "private" world of fantasy, play, sexual
abandon, "madness", the creation of "the new" for the sake of the new.
Habermas (1981) is, however, of the opinion that the postmodern challenge, whilst
its draws upon the aesthetic resources of modernity for the decentering of the
187
subject, cannot do justice to the emancipatory potential of communicative reason
in view of its failure to recognize a rational potential embedded within the
communicative structures of modernity. As Dews (1999) puts it:
[W]e should not allow the concept of reason to be commandeered by those
who equate rationalization with uniformity and regimentation. To do so is
to imply that opposition to the oppressive advance of reason can come only
from the domain of the non-rational. Powerful and moving as it may
sometimes be to unleash the forces of the body, sensuality, mysticism and
derangement against the cold calculation of the modern world, such efforts
are always likely to be dismissed as the expression of a hopeless,
evanescent romanticism, which can provide no basis for alternative social
arrangements. The situation looks different, however, if it can be shown
that the equation of rationalization with increased technical control tells only
half the story. (Dews 1999:2.)
It is certainly to Habermas's credit that he has endeavored to tell the other half of
the story. Habermas sees the postmodernists' insistence on the cultural
situatedness of the agent of knowledge and moral action as part of a larger attempt
by post-Hegelian thinkers, (the "Young Hegelians"), such as Feuerbach, Marx, to
detranscendentalize or "desublimate" the metaphysical conception of reason.
Habermas (1992) asserts:
The Young Hegelians were strong enough to convince (their audience) - in
the name of the objectivity, finitude, and facticity - of the desideratum of a
reason produced in natural history, incarnated bodily, situated socially, and
contextualized historically. But they could not redeem this desideratum at
the level marked out by Kant and Hegel. They thus opened the gates to
Nietzsche's more radical critique of reason which, through inversion, ends
up totalizing itself. (Habermas 1992:39-40.)
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It is in this context, that Habermas places himself and the postmodern thinkers
within the tradition of post-Hegelian critique:
Today the situation of consciousness still remains the one brought about
by the Young Hegelians when they distanced themselves from Hegel and
philosophy in general. And the triumphant gestures of mutually surpassing
one another, in which we gladly overlook the fact that we remain
contemporaries of the Young Hegelians, have also been in currency since
then. Hegel inaugurated the discourse of modernity; the Young Hegelians
permanently established it, that is, they freed the idea of a critique
nourished on the spirit of modernity, from the burden of the Hegelian
concept of reason.
We have seen how Hegel, with his emphatic concept of reality as the unity
of essence and existence, shoved aside just that element which had to
matter most to the modern consciousness - the transitory aspect of the
moment, pregnant with meaning, in which the problems of an onrushing
future are tangled in knots. (Habermas 1987b:53.)
The significance of placing the postmodernists within the context of post-Hegelian
thinking clearly lies in the attempt that they share with Habermas to establish a link
between reason and history. The postmodernists' attempt to establish this link,
however, is simultaneously a rejection of modernity, since the latter is evaluated
by them exclusively in terms of instrumental rationality. Habermas, in contrast,
reads the history of modern culture differently. Given his distinction between
instrumental and communicative rationality, he argues that the pragmatic
presuppositions accompanying the validity claims of the speech acts within
communicative action, suggest the possibility of responding critically to the pre-
established context of values and norms which originate within our inherited
traditions.
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For Habermas, the postmodern attempts to de-transcendentalize philosophy
merely end up engaging in metaphysics of a negative sort, as their historicist
accounts of reason only succeed in denying the possibility of overcoming the very
problem that they correctly identify, namely an ahistorical account of reason. On
the postmodern account, history is a negative expression of reason: it is deplete
of all meaning in a coherent unifying sense, and it denies the possibility of freedom
in a rational sense. As McCarthy (1991) puts it:
A common feature of these negative metaphysics is an abstract negation
of the conceptual apparatus of rationalist individualism; the individual is
represented as thoroughly submerged in some whole and the historical
movement of the whole is viewed as governed by sub- or suprapersonal
forces beyond the reach of reason. The idea of rationality influencing the
shape of social life comes to appear as naive, depasse, and in short,
hopelessly modern. Trading ingrand narratives of progress for equally one-
sided Verfal/sgeschichten of Nietzschean or Heideggerean provenance
only adds to the problem. The fixation on technocratization, informatization,
bureaucratization, normalization, and so forth tends to make invisible the
hard-won gains in civil, political, social, and human rights - not to mention
the positive fruits of science and technology, democratic politics and social-
welfare arrangements. (McCarthy 1991:3.)
For Habermas, in contrast, the lesson of reason in history yields negative as well
as positive results. According to him, the possibility of a more accurate account of
the progressive advancement of reason in history, calls for a model of
communicative rationality, which for him represents a "new paradigm ...of mutual
understanding" (Habermas, 1992:43).
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It is in terms of his model of communicative rationality (his so-called linguistic turn)
that Habermas seeks to reformulate the question of reason and rationality in
postmetaphysical terms. The idea of reason is therefore not abandoned; it is simply
transformed to capture its rootedness in history from a perspective that retains its
normative (critical) dimension. The significance of this point is duly illustrated by
Van Niekerk (1995) when he argues:
Although the idea of rationality cannot be abandoned, postmetaphysical
thinking does abandon an unsituated reason, as well as the idea of
transcendentalism, in the sense that reason remains of necessity what it is,
irrespective of historical influences and developments. Postmetaphysical
thinking understands that reason is a product of history ...that it regularly
becomes threatened by irrational ruptures in the tradition, and that that
which is worthwhile in the tradition of Western rationality ought therefore to
be cherished and protected, rather than abandoned. (Van Niekerk
1995:177.)
Habermas argues therefore that reason, because it arises within the social
practices of our specific cultural contexts, imparts an "epistemological significance"
to the life-world of everyday social practices (Habermas, 1992a:46). The potential
for reason located within the structures of communication creates the possibility of
transcending the horizons of our specific cultural contexts, through a self-critical
process of learning. As he (1992a) puts it:
Natural languages do more than open the horizons in which socialized
subjects find themselves. They also force these subjects to their own
independent accomplishments - namely, to an innerwordly practice inwhich
projected world-disclosing meanings are subjected to an ongoing test in
which they can prove their worth. (Habermas 1992:43.) (Emphasis,
Habermas's.)
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In the following section we will examine Habermas's model of communicative
rationality as an alternative to the postmodern critique of reason. In order to
appreciate the dimension of self-transcendence through the medium of language,
we will have to consider Habermas's communicative model of rationality, based on
his appropriation of the linguistic turn in philosophy.
5.2.3 The linguistic turn
The linguistic turn is arguably the most revolutionary event in late twentieth century
thinking. In England the linguistic turn was pioneered by thinkers such as
Wittgenstein at Cambridge, and J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle at Oxford University."
The common thread running through the work of these thinkers is a rejection of a
representational theory of language in favour of a more pragmatic approach, in
which the primacy of speech as it occurs in ordinary language becomes the focal
point of investigation. From this perspective, the performative as well as descriptive
uses of language, within specific social contexts, provide the common starting point
of linguistic analysis. This approach was a direct challenge to the more traditional
approach in which the philosopher of language was primarily interested in an ideal
metalanguage aimed at explicating the universal essence of language. For these
thinkers, language is therefore conceived of primarily as a form of social practice.
As Martin Jay (1982) points out:
Language was first of all speech, which was a central component of what
Wittgenstein called a form of life. Accordingly, the philosopher's task was
not to construct an ideal metalanguage neutralizing the concrete mediation
of the speaker, but rather to examine and clarify ordinary language within
specific social contexts. (Jay 1982:87.)
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In France, linguistic philosophy was revolutionized by Ferdinand de Saussure, who
focused on the structural regularities of language in order to demonstrate the
arbitrary nature of the system of signs, as the condition of the possibility of ordinary
linguistic interaction. Given the emphasis on the synchronic relations of a linguistic
system, rather than on its diachronic (that is, its historical) development, the
language movements which drew their inspiration from de Saussure (semiotics,
structuralism and post-structuralism), all proceeded from a common perspective:
a rejection of a transcendental ego or a common (transcendent) historical
consciousness. These "meta narratives", to echo Lyotard's argument (1984), were
now interpreted as the fictional constructs of a particular discourse, namely,
modern philosophy.
Taking the linguistic revolution one step further, Derrida as we have seen in
Chapter Four, emphasized the primacy of writing as the medium forthe expression
of aitterence, the destabilizing and subversive force operating "behind" all fixed
identities and metaphysical closures. For Derrida, the autonomous nature of
language supercedes all other claims to autonomy, especially truth claims based
on independent theories of rationality. Derrida has accordingly privileged
intertextuality rather than intersubjectivity, with a view to deconstructing our
received notions of an autonomous rational subject, on the basis of his view of
language as the destroyer of potentially anything it creates, since language cannot
reach beyond or represent anything "outside" the boundaries of its own aesthetic
possibilities, a position shared by Rorty.
Foucault embraces a similar anti-subjectivist view of language On his approach,
language is an all-powerful medium of impersonal, self-referential regimes of truth
whose power extends beyond the reach of subjective mastery. Concentrating on
discontinuities and ruptures, and rejecting teleological or causal accounts of
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history, Foucault has displayed a hostility to the Enlightenment notion of
humanism.
According to Habermas (1987b:296), the major significance of the linguistic turn
lies in the possibility of a paradigm shift from the philosophy of the subject to a
paradigm in which the question of rationality can be approached from the
perspective of communicative action, that is, linguistic interaction based on the
possibility of mutual understanding. The most significant implication of this
paradigm shift is that the philosophical problem of foundationalism can be
overcome, to be replaced by a postmetaphysical communicative account of
rationality (Habermas, 1992a: 44-45). Within the context of his postmetaphysical
account of rationality, Habermas (1987b:314) claims, '''Rationality' refers in the first
instance to the disposition of the speaking and acting subjects to acquire and use
fallible knowledge".
It is the disposition to acquire and use fallible knowledge, based on universal
validity claims, in and through the medium of language, that constitutes the basis
of Habermas's linguistic turn. Bernstein's comments (1985: 18) on the significance
of Habermas's linguistic turn are particularly useful:
One primary reason - perhaps the primary reason - for the "linguistic turn"
is that it no longer entraps us in the mono/ogical perspective of the
philosophy of the subject. Communicative action is intrinsically dialogical.
The starting point for an analysis of the pragmatics of speech is the
situation of a speaker and a hearer who are oriented to mutual reciprocal
understanding; a speaker and a hearer who have the capacity to take an
affirmative or negative stance when a validity claim is challenged.
(Emphases, Bernstein's)
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Habermas's attempt to overcome the metaphysical legacy of Cartesian-Kantian
notions of subjectivity is not the only thing he has in common with postmodernists;
he also goes along with their rejection of a representational view of language
(1992:45). Where he parts company with them, however, is in his pragmatic view
of language which clearly represents a major challenge to their anti-subjectivist
views. For Habermas, the significance of the linguistic turn is that it rules out the
possibility of a God's-eye perspective, that is, one that claims to speak "from
above" or "beyond" the horizons of our specific cultural context. This does not
mean that Habermas embraces a position of relativism. While he (1985: 192) does
acknowledge the phenomenon of pluralism as the salient characteristic of modern
culture, Habermas clearly defends an element of universality within the process of
communicative action. This element of universality is evident when a speaker, from
a first-person perspective engages in communication with another person/so The
element of universality is present when the person asserts his or her views as
being true, not within a particular context only, but true in a universal sense:
From the perspective of the participant, a moment of unconditionedness is
built into the conditions of action oriented towards reaching understanding.
From the perspective of the first person, the question of which beliefs are
justified is a question of which beliefs are based on good reasons; it is not
a function of life-habits that enjoy social currency in some places and not
in others. (Habermas 1985:195.) (Emphases, Habermas's.)
In his attempt to reformulate the question of rationality, Habermas's model of
communicative rationality is based on a central idea of Kant; rationality is based on
the justification of the principles in the light of which we justify our knowledge
claims. But even though he shares Kant's commitment to a normative conception
of rationality, he does not share his predecessor's transcendental-foundationalist
assumptions. With his linguistic turn, Habermas clearly steps outside the Kantian
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tradition when he expresses his support forthe Wittgensteinian view that language
and understanding are "equally original, mutually elucidating concepts" (Habermas,
1982: 233). When he raises the question regarding the conditions of the possibility
of mutual understanding as the starting point of a new approach to the question of
rationality, Habermas acknowledges his debt to Kant:
If, in a certain analogy to Kant's critique of reason, we seek to answer the
question concerning how a use of language oriented to reaching
understanding is possible, we come across an intuitive knowledge
possessed by subjects capable of speech and action, a knowledge which
the growing child has to learn in order to be able to use it in communicative
action as an adult. The rational reconstruction of this pre-theoretical
knowledge can be carried on from a universalistic perspective, whether the
investigations are directed to hypothetically assumed competencies of a
grammatical or of a pragmatic sort. (Habermas 1982:233-234.)
According to Habermas, the "intuitive knowledge possessed by subjects capable
of speech and action" is informed by certain principles whose necessity can only
be called into question by the very same principles that make such a doubting
process possible, in the first place. In this regard, as we have seen in our
discussion of Lyotard, Habermas warns against the danger of falling into the trap
of a "performative contradiction", that is, the propositional content of a statement
cannot contradict its formal presuppositions. This is why he does not take the
postmodernists at their word when they deny the validity of the process of
argumentation when putting forward their own "arguments" for the demise of the
modern metaphysical tradition, and in consequence seek to redefine the question
of reason from a non-rational (transcendental) context. Habermas therefore cannot
accept a non-rational basis as the condition for the possibility of reason in any
form; for him it makes more sense to account for the pathological process of
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rationalization in terms of a conception of reason that encompasses more than
instrumental rationality.
According to Habermas, the possibility of a more comprehensive and critical notion
of rationality is embedded within the structures of (ordinary) linguistic interaction
aimed at mutual understanding, given the universal presuppositions that
necessarily accompany such interaction:
A peculiarity exhibited by these pragmatic presuppositions of consensus
formation is that they contain strong idealizations. For example, the
supposition that all participants in dialogue use the same linguistic
expressions with identical meanings is unavoidable but often
counterfactual. The validity claims that a speaker raises for the content of
his assertoric, normative, or expressive sentences are also bound to similar
idealizations: what the speaker here and now in a given context, asserts as
valid transcends, according to the sense of his claim, all context-
dependent, merely local standards of validity. These and similar idealizing
yet unavoidable presuppositions for actual communicative processes
possess a normative content that carries the tension between the
intelligible and the empirical into the sphere of appearance itself.
Counterfactual presuppositions become social facts. This critical thorn
sticks in the flesh of any social reality that has to reproduce itself via action
oriented towards reaching understanding. (Habermas 1992a:47.)
(Emphasis, Habermas's.)
For Habermas the linguistic process of mutual understanding is the primary aspect
of communication; it is also the condition for the possibility of the learning process.
Given the universalistic nature of the pragmatic presuppositions that accompany
communicative action, the learning process is something that occurs in a context
simultaneously within and (formally) beyond the specific context within in which it
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occurs. In this regard, Habermas rejects the relativistic implications of postmodern
thinking, and adopts the Gadamerian notion of a merger or fusion of interpretative
horizons when different cultural communities encounter one another. In such an
encounter, what we learn from "the Other", and what "the Other" learns from us,
is primarily the result of a mutual exchange of a rational (reason-based) process
of communication, in which the difference of "the Other" is the condition of the
possibility of the leaning process:
For learning itself belongs to neither us nor them; both sides are caught in
it in the same way. Even in the most difficult processes of reaching
understanding, all parties appeal to the common reference point of a
possible consensus, even if this reference is projected in each case from
within their own context. For, although they may be interpreted in various
ways and applied to different criteria, concepts like truth, rationality, or
justification play the same grammatical role in every linguistic community.
(Habermas 1992a:138.) (Emphasis, Haberrnas's.)
Thus for Habermas, a communicative model of rationality, based on the pragmatic
idealizations implicitly involved in the process of mutual understanding, is the
answer to the abandonment of reason by his postmodern opponents. Whilst he
may accept the disclosive function of language, as the revealer of radically different
(incommensurable) life-worlds, he does not believe that the postmodern model of
language can account for the self-critical process of learning which, by its very
nature, suggests the possibility of revising or rejecting our former positions. He
therefore maintains:
From the possibility of reaching understanding linguistically, we can read
off a concept of situated reason that is given voice in validity claims that are
both context-dependent and transcendent. ..the validity claimed for
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propositions and norms transcends spaces and times, but in each actual
case the claim is raised here and now, in a specific context, and accepted
or rejected with real implications for social interaction (Habermas
1992a: 139).
By linking his theory of language with the possibility of a critique of social reality,
Habermas provides us with a normative basis for a critical engagement with
modernity. Unlike his postmodern opponents, Habermas's appropriation of the
linguistic turn does not result in a mystical submission of the principles of autonomy
and freedom to non-rational sources, in a bid to overcome a discredited subject-
centred tradition of metaphysics; on the contrary, his linguistic turn leads to the
possibility of reclaiming these principles within a postmetaphysical sense. In the
final analysis, Habermas's linguistic turn is a critical appropriation of the Hegelian
notion of Vemunft:
The human interest in autonomy and responsibility is not mere fancy, for
it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only
thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure,
autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence
expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained
consensus. Taken together, autonomy and responsibility constitute the only
Idea that we possess a priori in the philosophical tradition. (Habermas
1971 :314.)
For Habermas, the linguistic turn is based on a process of communicative action
that has its origins in the practical concerns of everyday life. This brings us to the
last theme in our discussion of postmetaphysical thinking: the relation of theory to
practice.
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5.2.4 Practice as the precondition of theory
Given his position of the situatedness of reason within our social-linguistic
practices, Habermas tries to show that our theoretical discourses have their
normative foundations within the linguistic practices of communication. From his
earliest writings, Habermas has been preoccupied with establishing the pre-
theoretical context as the normative foundation of theoretical enquiry. With the
publication of Knowledge and Human Interests (1972), we find his first full-fledged
effort to formulate a theory of rationality along the lines of a "quasi-transcendental"
analysis aimed at demonstrating the general role and status of three distinct
"cognitive" interests or orientations: the technical, the practical, and the
emancipatory. In this early work, Habermas develops a theory of rationality that
sets out to account for the scientific and social disciplines by tracing them back to
certain anthropologically-based activities, considered to be essential to the material
and cultural reproduction of the human species. In this regard, Habermas points
to the activities of labour and the interactive aspects of language as constituting the
fundamental activities to which the rational pursuit of knowledge within the
scientific-technical and the moral-practical fields of enquiry, are ultimately
traceable. Although certain arguments presented in this work have justifiably been
subjected to severe criticism, given that its immediate objective was to attack the
positivistic/scientistic conception of rationality, the philosophical significance of its
central investigation of the pre-theoretical origins of reason has often been
overlooked." Habermas (1972) explains his programmatic intent as follows
Iam undertaking a historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the prehistory
of modern positivism with the systematic intention of analyzing connections
of knowledge and human interests. In following the process of the
dissolution of epistemology which has left the philosophy of science in its
place, one makes one's way over abandoned stages of reflection.
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Retreading this path from a perspective that looks back towards the point
of departure may help to recover the forgotten experience of reflection. To
disavow reflection is positivism. (Habermas 1972:vii.) (Emphasis,
Habermas's.)
The philosophical significance of this work lies in the rejection of the assumption
of a transcendentally defined concept of reason which privileges philosophical (a
priori) insights into universal ahistorical conceptual structures and categories. In his
rejection of a positivistic or scientistic understanding of rationality, Habermas
reveals his underlying objective of establishing a pre-theoretical normative basis
for the critique of science, one that avoids a new form of transcendentalism, on the
one hand, and epistemological relativism, on the other hand.
In Habermas's view, it is the failure to account for scientific theory in terms other
than that of a scientific language of self-validation, that is mainly responsible for the
loss of a (self- )critical process of reflection. In this respect, Habermas seems to be
echoing the view of Lyotard who, as we have seen in Chapter Three, maintains a
conceptual distinction between narrative knowledge, on the one hand, and
scientific knowledge, on the other. Unlike Lyotard, however, Habermas does not
see these two forms of knowledge as mutually exclusive "Iangauge-games". He
argues instead for the primacy of narratological knowledge as the condition of the
possibility of scientific knowledge. On his approach, the two forms of knowledge
are therefore not necessarily mutually incompatible, as Lyotard would have us
believe.
According to Habermas, what needs to be done is to establish a new approach to
the question of rationality, one that preserves the normative intent of the modern
philosophical tradition, but as stated above, without having recourse to either a new
form of transcendentalism, on the one hand, or relativism, on the other. Habermas
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therefore accounts for the prevalence of positivism, that is, the loss of critical
reflection, in the light of a failure by philosophers to come to terms with the collapse
of the epistemological tradition of foundationalism:
Philosophy's position with regard to science, which at one time could be
designated with the name "theory of knowledge", has been undermined by
the movement of philosophical though itself. Philosophy was dislodged
from this position by philosophy. From then on, the theory of knowledge
had to be replaced by a methodology emptied of philosophical thought. For
the philosophy of science that has emerged since the mid-nineteenth
century as the heir to the theory of knowledge, is methodology pursued
with a scientistic understanding of the sciences. "Scientism" means
science's belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer
understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must
identify knowledge with science. (Habermas 1972:4.)
Habermas's pursuit of a normative basis for critique was initially conducted within
an epistemological framework, a position he eventually abandoned in view of the
foundational-transcendental nature of the cognitive interest. (Habermas 1971 :301-
380). The abandonment of the epistemological framework did not, however, lead
to an abandonment of his overall objective: a normative foundation of theoretical
enquiry. It was the linguistic turn, however, as noted above, that provided him with
the means of overcoming the problem of philosophical foundationalism. As
Bernstein (1985) explains:
Habermas no longer speaks of "quasi-transcendental" cognitive interests.
This has led some to think that he has simply abandoned the major
systematic theses of Knowledge and Human Interests. It is true that he
sought to purge his thinking of the vestiges of the philosophy of
consciousness and the philosophy of the subject. But the insights contained
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in his original trichotomy of human interests are conceptually transformed
in a new register within the context of his theory of communicative action.
The distinction between the technical interest, on the one hand, and the
practical and emancipatory interests, on the other hand, is itself based on
a categorial distinction of purposive-rational action and communicative
(symbolic) action. This distinction is not abandoned in Habermas's
universal pragmatics. On the contrary, it is refined and developed in far
more detail than in his earlier work. Furthermore, from the perspective of
the theory of communicative action, we gain a clearer understanding of the
conceptual space and foundations for what Habermas called the practical
and emancipatory cognitive interests. (Bernstein 1985:17.)
The linguistic turn, as we have seen above, does not lead Habermas in the
direction of the pre-rational, but rather in the direction of a more comprehensive
conception of rationality, in which the scientific-cognitive aspect of rationality, is
placed in the larger context of the moral-practical and the aesthetic aspects of
rationality.
It is the phenomenological concept of the life-world, as developed in the work of
Husserl, for example, together with the concept of philosophical hermeneutics, as
developed by thinkers such as Dilthey and Gadamer, that provides Habermas with
the conceptual resources for developing the pre-theoretical normative foundation
of theoretical knowledge. According to Habermas,
[P]hilosphy still maintains a certain relation to pretheoretical knowledge and
to the nonobjective totality of the lifeworld. From there, philosophical
thinking can turn back towards science as a whole and undertake a self-
reflection of the sciences that goes beyond the limits of methodology and
the theory of science and that - in a reversal of the ultimate grounding of all
knowledge in metaphysics - exposes the meaning-foundation of scientific
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theory-formation in prescientific practice (Habermas 1992:48-49.)
(Emphases, Habermas's.)
Given philosophy's concern with the impact of science on the communicative realm
of our life-world experiences, it is only at our peril that we choose to ignore the
practical pre-theoretical normative foundations of scientific theory that arise within
the larger context of the life-world, where we experience a richly textured network
of linguistic practices based on a combination of validity claims to propositional
truth, normative rightness, and subjective truthfulness (sincerity - the feeding
elements of scientific discourse).
It is the general tendency among the postmodern thinkers to dismiss the linguistic
practices within the life-world as devoid of rational content, that is largely
responsible for their inability to provide a normative (rational) basis for the critique
of logocentrcism, thus giving rise to the different types of contextualism that we
have encountered in the previous two chapters. As Habermas (1992a) argues:
The insight into the fundamental primacy of practice over theory ...leads to
a radical skepticism about reason only if the gaze of philosophy is restricted
to questions of truth that can be dealt with by science. Ironically, philosophy
has itself fostered this kind of cognitivistic reduction and has pinned reason
down to only one of its dimensions, at first ontologically, later
epistemologically, and then even in linguistic analysis ... The occidental
deference towards logos reduces reason towards something that language
performs in only one of its functions, in representing states of affairs.
Ultimately, pursuing questions of truth ... then appears to be irrational as
such. Contextualism is only the flipside of logocentricism. (Habermas
1992a:49-50.) (Emphasis, Habermas's.)
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It is precisely in terms of the primacy of reason as it occurs in the practical world
of communicative action, that Habermas feels justified in defending his vision of
modernity against his postmodern critics. For Habermas, the Enlightenment legacy
of freedom and autonomy is based on an emancipatory potential of reason, made
available by the cultural resources of modernity.
5.3 THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: THE QUESTION OF
FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY
The crux of the debate between Habermas and the postmodern thinkers ultimately
comes down to the question of the possibility of (political) freedom and (moral)
autonomy, the cornerstones of the Enlightenment legacy. As indicated above,
these moral-political principles were originally defended on the basis of a rationally
ordered society. The common objective which Habermas shares with his
postmodern opponents is that of overcoming the metaphysical conception of
rationality, based on the assumption of a transcendental subject. But whereas for
Habermas, the current debate regarding the end of philosophy is merely an
indication of the exhaustion of the paradigm of the subject, and not necessarily the
normative concepts of truth and reason that have accompanied it, for the
postmodernists, however, it means a total rejection of the critical idea of reason,
thus restricting the role of critique to that of exposing the authoritarian nature of
reason. As Habermas (1987b) puts it:
In the discourse of modernity, the accusers raise an objection that has not
substantially changed from Hegel and Marx down to Nietzsche and
Heidegger, from Bataille and Lacan to Foucault and Oerrida. The
accusation is aimed against a reason grounded in the principle of
subjectivity. And it states that this reason denounces and undermines all
unconcealed forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and
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alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of
rationality. Because this regime of a subjectivity puffed up into a false
absolute transforms the means of conscious-raising and emancipation into
just so many instances of objectification and control, it fashions for itself an
uncanny immunity in the form of a thoroughly concealed domination. The
opacity of an iron cage of a reason that has become positive disappears as
if in the glittering brightness of a completely transparent crystal palace. All
parties are united on this point: These glassy facades have to shatter. They
are, to be sure, distinguished by the strategies they elect for overcoming
the positivism of reason (Habermas 1987b:55-56.) (Emphasis,
Habermas's. )
By identifying reason with its instrumental form of expression, the postmodernists'
position is very similar to that of Weber who, "in his analysis of societal
rationalization as it makes its way in the modern period ...allows himself to be
guided by the restricted idea of purposive rationality [Zweckrationalitafj" (Habermas
1984: 143). For Weber the transition to the modern condition can only be explained
in terms of the processes of rationalization." In this regard, Habermas supports
him. It is only when the former equates reason with the rationalization of modernity
in an instrumental sense that Habermas objects. Albrecht Wellmer (1985) explains
the significance of the Weberian concept of Zweckretionelitet within the context of
modernity in the following manner:
[T]hrough his analysis of the institutional correlates of progressive
rationalization - capitalist economy, bureacracy, and professionalized
empirical science - he shows at the same time that the "rationalization" of
society does not carry any utopian perspective, but is rather likely to lead
to an increasing imprisonment of modern man in dehumanized systems of
a new kind - to an increasing "reification" as Weber's disciple Lukacs later
on would call it (Wellmer 1985:41).
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In contrast to the one-dimensional account of modernity as given byWeber and his
followers, Habermas adds the second dimension of communicative rationality as
the condition of the possibility of systemic rationalization of modern society. While
both forms of rationality are essential to the survival of modernity, the process of
modernization has been dominated by the cognitive-instrumental dimension of
purposive rationality, the domain of science and technology.
According to Habermas, the privileging of cognitive-instrumental rationality has led
to imbalances within the modern world, as the sphere of communicative rationality
has increasingly been threatened and undermined by the cognitive-instrumental
dimension of rationality, thus leading to a colonization of the life-world, which
manifests itself as a loss of freedom, on the one hand, and a general cultural
impoverishment leading to sense of apathy and a general loss of meaning, on the
other hand. (Habermas 1984:346:355). Fromthis perspective, Habermas's analysis
comes remarkably close to the "iron cage" analysis of Weber.
When one compares Weber's one-dimensional analysis of modernity with that of
Habermas, the picture changes dramatically. On Habermas's interpretation, the
rationalization of modern society should not only be understood in terms of the
cognitive-instrumental form of rationality; it should reflect the communicative form
of rationality as it has emerged within the life-world. This two-dimensional account
of the rationalization of modernity allows forthe possibility of addressing modernity
from the perspective of the rational potential implicit in the communicative
structures of modern consciousness. Habermas therefore disagrees with Weber
when the latter interprets the progressive rationalization of modernity in terms of
an unresolvable paradox, since the project of modernity which, for Habermas,
implies a differentiation of the scientific-cognitive, the moral-practical, and the
aesthetic-expressive modes of rationality, must not be reduced to the level of
Zweckreiionelitei. Habermas (1984) therefore maintains:
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Only with the conceptual framework of communicative action do we gain
a perspective from which the process of societal rationalization appears as
contradictory from the start. The contradiction arises between, on the one
hand, a rationalization of everyday communication that is tied to the
structures of intersubjectivity of the lifeworld, in which language counts as
the genuine and irreplaceable medium of reaching understanding, and on
the other hand, the growing complexity of sub-systems of purposive-
rational action, in which actions are coordinated through steering media
such as money and power. Thus there is competition not between the
types of action oriented to understanding and to success, but between
principles of societal integration - between the mechanisms of linguistic
communication that is oriented towards validity claims - a mechanism that
emerges in increasing purity from the rationalization of the lifeworld - and
those de-linguistified steering media through which systems of success-
oriented action are differentiated out. The paradox of rationalization of
which Weber spoke can then be abstractly conceived as follows: The
rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible a kind of systemic integration
that enters into competition with the integrating principle of reaching
understanding and, under certain conditions, has a disintegrative effect on
the lifeworld. (Habermas, 1984:342-343.) (Emphasis, Habermas's.)
It is to the extent that the various fields of professional expertise have become
independent of the lives of ordinary people, that the project of modernity has been
viewed with scepticism. Yet if the project of modernity is to succeed, the answer to
this complex problem lies in the possibility of a balanced interaction between
instrumental rationality, on the one hand, and communicative rationality, on the
other. Within the context of modernity, each of these spheres of rationality are
responsible for the performance of two equally important functions: the material
preservation of human life, and, the normative guidance of social interaction and
cooperation. The problem with modernity, however, has been the failure to nurture
these two (different) forms of rationality with equal respect:
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The occasions for protests and discontent originate exactly when spheres
of communicative action, centered on the reproduction and transmission of
values and norms, are penetrated by a form of modernization guided by
standards of economic and administrative rationality; however, those very
spheres are dependent on quite different standards of rationalization - on
the standards of what I call communicative rationality (Habermas 1981:7-
8).
It is on the basis of his distinction between systemic rationality as a type of
purposive rationality, on the one hand, and communicative action and rationality,
geared towards mutual understanding, on the other hand, that Habermas is in a
good position to address the imbalances and pathologies of the modern condition.
In this regard, the "iron cage" account of modernity, as represented by the
postmodern position is less persuasive when the "the project of modernity" is
addressed from the perspective of communicative rationality, since the possibility
of resistance and transformation is based on the moral-practical rational potential
for solidarity and cooperation, based on the possibility of communication.
Habermas therefore questions the effectiveness of the postmodern challenge in
view of its "blind" opposition to modernity as a cultural and rational force, making
it difficult to conceive of an historical alternative to the modern condition; hence the
overindulgence in negative metaphysics, the salient characteristic of postmodern
thinking.
The project of modernity is therefore incomplete, not only because of the selective
processes of rationalization (in and through the capitalist form of modernization),
but also as a democratic ideal of communication free of domination. It serves as
a regulative idea in the Kantian sense, to ensure that the different life-worlds within
modernity can reach consensus (from time to time) through the concrete
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recognition of the "permanence" of difference, mediated through the linguistic
practices of communicative rationality. For Habermas (1992) the project of
modernity holds out the promise of "peace" in a world of difference:
For the transitory unity that is generated in the porous and refracted
intersubjectivity of a linguistically mediated consensus not only supports but
furthers and accelerates the pluralization of forms of life and the
individualization of lifestyles. More discourse means more contradiction and
difference. The more abstract the agreements become, the more diverse
the disagreements with which we nonviolently live. (Habermas 1992: 140.)
(Emphasis, Habermas's.)
5.4 CONCLUSION
The significance of postmetaphysical thinking (as opposed to the postmodern
alternative) lies in the possibility of overcoming the aporias that have
accompanied the development of the modern metaphysical tradition, whilst
retaining the normative notions of reason and truth within a (self-) critical ethos
of cognitive fallibilism. The possibility of critique presupposes the possibility of
an ongoing learning process within the general context of a more balanced
approach to the rationalization of modern society. Postmetaphysical thinking
accepts that all our knowledge and truth claims are, in principle, criticizable and
testable within a rational forum of ongoing debate motived by the idea of truth,
as the projected outcome of all our critical and self-critical encounters. It is this
commitment to truth as context-transcendent ideal that is implicitly
presupposed by the validity claims that necessarily accompany the
communicative process of intersubjective understanding and agreement, that
clearly demonstrates the significance of postmetaphysical thinking.
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As I have shown in this chapter, Habermas is certainly sensitive to the dangers
of an oppressive and totalitarian conception of reason. But this does not mean
that the practice of reason as such is problematic; it is rather indicative of the
dogmatic application of criteria of rationality which shut out the possibility of
truth through consensus. Within the context of postmetaphysical thinking,
power is opposed by the force of the better argument.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
The confrontation between Habermas and the representatives of postmodernity
is an important one. It raises many disturbing questions about the nature, the
status, and the value of modernity in general, and is especially concerned
about the role of reason in advancing the cause of human freedom and
enlightenment in a world which, in the wake of the collapse of traditional
worldviews, needs self-reassurance and guidance in the light of criteria, norms
and values that are not metaphysically postulated, but that are justified in terms
of procedures and arguments that enjoy intersubjective validity. The seeming
circularity that emerges when reason is called upon to justify itself exclusively
in the light of principles deriving their legitimacy solely from reason, and thus
to provide the normative basis for our knowledge and actions within modernity,
provides the strongest challenge. Given the exacting nature of this challenge,
one can understand why philosophy has always been haunted by the problem
of self-referentiality, as so brilliantly illustrated by Rorty in his Philosophy and
the Mirror of Nature.
In response to modernity's need for self-reassurance, modern philosophy
initially proposed a model of rationality based on the assumption of a
transcendental subject as the Archimedean point in a world characterized by
a historical self-consciousness of change and progress, in view of its perceived
critical independence of the authority of the past, and its confidence in shaping
its own futu re.
In the debate between Habermas and the postmodernists, the legacy of the
modern metaphysical tradition is subjected to serious criticism as each thinker
tries to come to terms with the question of reason and rationality. For the
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postmodernist, reason represents a betrayal of the ideals of political freedom
and moral autonomy. This conviction is based on an interpretation of
modernity, in which the human subject is portrayed as a helpless plaything of
various autonomous indeterminate sources of power. Hence the metaphor of
the modern subject as a prisoner in the "iron cage" of reason.
For a postmetaphysical thinker such as Habermas, however, the "iron cage"
account of modernity represents a betrayal of reason, since it fails to take into
account the democratic and moral advances of modernity when compared with
the more traditional forms of social life. Habermas is of the opinion that, once
the lessons of democratic freedom and moral autonomy are learned, they can
only be unlearned byway of moral-political regression. This is his greatest fear;
it is also the fundamental source of his motivation for "taking on" the
postmodernists who, in his view, propose a false programme offreedom, which
they seek to defend in defiance of the lessons of history. The lessons of
solidarity in the face of human suffering and domination are discarded in favour
the "freedom" of a (politically and morally) decentered and disengaged (non-)
subject, who revels in his or her aesthetic capacity to say "No" to modernity, in
view of the ignominious complicity of reason, they claim, in the suffering of "the
Other".
On the postmodern approach, the status and condition of philosophy are
reflective of the current status and condition of modernity. Following the
example of thinkers such as Heidegger and Adorno, the postmodern thinker
interprets modernity as a social phenomenon devoid of all prospects of ever
redeeming the Enlightenment promise of a rational society. Adorno and
Horkheimer declare:
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We are wholly convinced - and therein lies our petitio principii - that
social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought. Nevertheless,
we believe that we have just as clearly recognized that the notion of
this very way of thinking, no less than the actual historic forms - the
social institutions - with which it is interwoven, already contains the
seed of the reversal universally apparent today (1993:xiii).
Heidegger, who also equates modern reason with an inescapable form of technical
rationality, despairs of the possibility of a rational means of overcoming the modern
legacy of metaphysics, writes:
Philosophy will be unable to effect any immediate change in the current
state of the world. This is true not only of philosophy but of all purely human
reflection and endeavor. Only a god can save us. The only possibility
available to us is that by thinking and poeticizing we prepare a readiness
for the appearance of a god or for the absence of a god in (our) decline,
insofar as in view of the absent god we are in a state of decline. (Quoted
in Bernstein 1991:45.)
The general tendency among postmodern thinkers is to look at modernity through
"the lens" of a metaphysical understanding of reason, and consequently to reject
it, without ever considering that maybe Oust maybe) "the lens" is defective. It is at
this point that postmodern thinking invokes the authority of Nietzsche to conduct
an aesthetically inspired revolt against the mostfundamental principle of modernity:
the justification of reason, truth, justice and freedom, in the light of universalistic
criteria of rationality. As Axel Honneth (1985) puts it:
Poststructuralism does not shy away from extending Nietzsche's diagnosis
of culture and Heidegger's critique of metaphysics directly to social reality,
thereby turning all social achievements of the modern period into
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documents of a single principle of thought, be it the will to power or rational
self-assertion. Thus like Adorno and Horkheimer's earlier theory of
civilization, so today must the historical constructions of poststructuralism
produce the appearance that the various separate ways of life, systems of
institutions and cultural forms of developed society as a whole only
represent the objectification of an all-excluding principle of rationality ... (the
postmodernist thinker) limits the institutional and cultural givens of the
modern period to those phenomena which are the result of a thought
anchored in the principle of subjectivity. (Honneth 1985:149.)
Postmodern thinkers thus deploy an aestheticist form of critique in which they
challenge the instrumental form of rationality, which has become so predominant
in the process of modernization. The privileging of the aesthetic dimension of
language thus becomes the (non-rational) condition for the possibility of the
postmodern critique of reason. In this regard, one can develop an argument in
support of two rather different, diametrically opposed forms of critique, based on
two radically different conceptions of language, as White (1991) proposes.
In terms of this proposal, we are required to accept an aestheticist conception of
language as envisaged by the postmodernists, aimed at disclosing various
problematic aspects of modernity, on the one hand, or a communicative conception
of language, as developed by Habermas, envisaged as a problem-oriented
approach based on a dialogical procedure of consensus formation, on the other
hand.
While I accept the argument for a differentiation between these two conceptions
of language, as two radically different forms of communication, with radically
different objectives, one should guard against the danger of seeing them as
mutually exclusive. I would rather view them as two complementary aspects of
modernity, emanating from a common social and cultural process.
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It is because the postmodernists show no inclination to move beyond the
theoretical constructs of post-structuralism, that they fail to recognize the culture
of modernity "in the background", as it were, as the enabling condition of the
possibility of their own critique. Thus even though they take their cue from the
poststructuralist orientation towards the "decentering of the subject", with a view
to undermining the modernist assumption of a transcendent (self-present, self-
transparent) autonomous subject, they fail to acknowledge that the very possibility
of their own critique (its independence and validity) presupposes an autonomy and
critical independence, which they deny in their critique of reason.
But if the question of reason cannot be formulated from a more comprehensive
normative perspective of rationality, as the postmodernist position implies, then
howwill the postmodern critique of reason proceed? If reason, truth and power are
interpreted as inseparable elements of the same process of rationalization, with the
prospect of a (formal) second-order level of reflection ruled out, as a matter of
principle, what would be the nature of this critique, and how would one reconcile
it with, for example, Foucault's (1984) argument, as advanced in his essay, What
is Enlightenment?, that his critique of the Enlightenment legacy of humanist
rationalism should not be seen as a defense of "the irrational", when for him power
belongs to the same regime as truth?
It is this predicament that forces the postmodernist to look in the direction of "the
aesthetic" (as opposed to "the political") for a solution in defense of "the Other" of
reason. This aesthetically oriented critique, undertaken without due consideration
for "the political", rules out the possibility of encountering "the Other" as an equal
participant in the culture of modernity, because the postmodern orientation towards
"the Other", in spite of the concerted attempt to overcome the subject, is still
trapped within the monological framework of an isolated consciousness similar to
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that of the Cartesian subject. But whereas Descartes was concerned with
establishing the condition of the possibility of reason and truth from the perspective
of a transcendental subject, the postmodern thinker sets out to establish the
impossibility of reason (and the associated normative ideas of truth and
knowledge), based on the "non-subjective" and the "non-rational" authority of the
aesthetic.
It is the failure to reconcile a positive interaction between the aesthetic and the
moral-political from a more comprehensive notion of rationality that in the end
undermines the postmodern project. It is from this perspective that the radical
critique of reason as articulated on the authority of Nietzsche becomes problematic
for a thinker such as Habermas. As David Rasmussen (1990) puts it:
Nietzsche's endorsement of the aesthetic puts him with the avant-garde
program of aesthetic modernity. But Nietzsche gives up on the idea of
emancipation. Identity, individuation, uniqueness, ideas at the very heart
of the program of emancipation, are abandoned in his return to the
Dionysian. Nietzsche is no longer interested in the idea of truth. Beyond
truth and falsity, beyond good and evil, lies taste, "the yes and the no of the
palate". This is the Habermasian characterization. Itappears that Nietzsche
has exempted himselffrom the curse of enlightenment by over-coming the
Western theory of rationalization, by returning to the archaic. (Rasmussen
1990:13.)
But if the aesthetic is viewed as part of the larger "project of modernity" it can
(potentially) be seen as part of the solution to the problems posed by a one-sided
interpretation of modernity's rational potential (Habermas 1981). If a critical
perspective on reason in history can be developed, based on a more
comprehensive notion of rationality, then we will be in a position where we can
217
distinguish between a mere narrative of modernity and one which is able to
distinguish between its achievements, its future possibilities, as well as its failures
and dangers. We would then avoid the trap of confusing a mere litany of disasters
with an adequate replacement for a rational process of philosophical thinking,
guided by an informed historical analysis. The following argument by Lyotard, for
example, illustrates my point regarding the postmodern approach to the political
dimension and its implications for philosophy:
Following Theodor Adorno, I have used the name "Auschwitz" to signify just
how impoverished recent Western history seems from the point of view of
the "modern" project of the enlightenment of humanity. What kind of
thought is capable of "relieving" Auschwitz - relieving (re/ever) in the sense
of aufheben - capable of situating it in a general, empirical or even
speculative process directed towards universal emancipation? There is a
sort of grief in the Zeitgeist. It can find expression in reactive, even in
reactionary, attitudes or in utopias - but not in a positive orientation that
would open up a new perspective. (Lyotard 1992:78.)
As can be seen in these words, the postmodern critique of reason is infused with
an overwhelming sense of moral-political impotence and rage. Given the
postmodernists' reluctance to consider a "political solution", they undermine the
effectiveness of their critique. The most disturbing consequence of this failure on
the part of postmodern thinking is that "the Other", as the subject of its underlying
moral concern, also becomes a fictional construct instead of a "real" person. It is
this implication of postmodern thinking that I find most disturbing.
At the moment, philosophy stands before a dilemma. The question that it is faced
with is whether it can still defend itself as the "guardian of reason", in the wake of
the contemporary onslaught against its most cherished ideas of reason and truth.
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If we follow the path set out by postmodern thinking, then the answer is clearly
"no".
It is to the credit of the postmetaphysical thinking, as practiced by Habermas,
however, that one begins to realize the possibility of an alternative to the
conclusions reached by the postmodern thinkers in their respective critiques of
reason. In place of the postmodern dogmatic dismissal of the question of reason
and rationality, postmetaphysical thinking brings us to recognize our limitations as
well as our strengths. In this regard, the demise of the metaphysical tradition of
philosophical thinking does not lead to a total abandonment of reason; it merely
emphasizes that when the idea of rationality is brought in line with our fallibility as
users of reason, the lesson to be learned is to recast our received notions of
reason in the light of our self-understanding as finite and fallible agents of
knowledge.
This implies that philosophy's transition to the realm of hypothetical knowledge,
based on claims that are at best tentative, is not to be viewed as a sign of
"weakness", but as a sign of its strength, because it keeps us from falling into the
trap of intellectual dogmatism and cultural imperialism. As far as I am concerned,
this is the most important lesson to be learned from Habermas's debate with the
representatives of postmodern thinking. In the final analysis, we do want to know
whether what we say and believe is "true", and we want to distinguish between
what is right and wrong. If philosophy continues to pursue these question within an
intersubjective communicative process aimed at mutual understanding and
agreement, and if it continues, furthermore, to be guided by the search for the
better argument as the only legitimate expression of "force", then philosophy, and
its central concern with the question of reason, is far from over.
219
It this respect, we are contemporaries not only of Hegel, as Habermas would have
us believe, but also of Socrates for whom the medium of dialogue is the moral and
political precondition of human freedom and truth.
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ENDNOTES
1. See Robert C. Holub (1991) for an excellent account of the various debates
that Habermas has been involved in over the years.
2. David R. Rasmussen (1990) belabours the pointthatthe postmodernists are
not overly concerned with the problem of modernity. I feel his argument
misses the central point of the debate, namely the problem of reason.
3. See Peter Dews (1999:1-25).
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